...most Russian people. They are profoundly different from us.
"...but if Russia really is what it is sometimes portrayed in Western bourgeois historiography, that is, backward, stagnant, allegedly incapable of creative initiative and independent development, tyrannical and anarchic at the same time, etc., etc., then it is permissible to ask our critics how to explain that this country emerged victorious from the struggle for existence, survived, grew up and even turned into a great power? Had the trials that had befallen her been too easy?
The question of the comparative burden of historical trials should become the starting point for any more or less objective researcher who wants to establish what, in fact, the uniqueness (relative, of course) of Russian history in comparison with the history of the West consists in. Let's start with one specific example.
Richard Nixon, in one of the speeches he delivered when he was President of the United States, repeated with full approval the idea of Andre Malraux that the United States of America is the only country that has become a great power without making any effort to do so. And in this the French writer and the American president are certainly right. Complete security throughout history from outside invasions, a vast territory acquired through the extermination of Indians that did not require much effort, fertile lands, a fertile climate, rich and diverse minerals, and, finally, the fact that in both world wars America captured the lion's share of the fruits of victory at the cost of little blood — all this serves as the basis for the official thesis about the God-chosen of the American people, it is a matter of national pride.
And here is another country, the antipode of America. The Polish historian of the XIX century, the least inclined to Russophilia, Valishevsky, speaking about Peter's transformations, makes an apt remark relating to Russian history in general: "... There will be a huge waste of wealth, labor, even human lives. However, the strength of Russia and the mystery of its fate for the most part lies in the fact that it has always had the will and had the power not to pay attention to spending when it came to achieving a once-set goal".
Behind this characteristic feature of Russia lies the action of a powerful factor completely unknown to the United States: in the XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII centuries, as well as later in the era of Peter I — in the XIX and XX centuries, the Russian land was subjected to a devastating invasion at least once a century and quite often simultaneously from several sides. The state that emerged on this land, in order to fend off the pressing enemies, had to imperiously demand from its people as much wealth, labor and lives as it needed to win, and the latter, since he wanted to defend his political independence, had to give it all without counting. This is how some national habits were formed and strengthened by the intensified repetition, which gave a national character in the aggregate.
Is it right for a serious researcher who has set himself the goal of comparing American and Russian history to ignore the fact, colossal in its consequences, that Russia has lived in a regime of ultra-high pressure from the outside throughout its centuries-old history, and America did not know such pressure at all? No, you don't have the right. By doing so, he will be forced to explain the observed differences not by their actual causes, but by absolutely fantastic ones. But that's exactly what American Slavists do all the time.
According to the calculations of the Russian historian V. O. Klyuchevsky, the Great Russian nation during its formation in 234 years (1228-1462) endured 160 external wars.
In the XVI century, Muscovy has been fighting in the northwest and west against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Livonian Order and Sweden for 43 years, without interrupting the struggle against the Tatar hordes on the southern, southeastern, and eastern borders for a years. In the XVII century, Russia fought for 48 years, in the XVIII century — 56 years.
In general, for Russia of the XIII–XVIII centuries, the state of the world was rather an exception, and war was a cruel rule.
So what kind of wars were they?
In the XIII–XV centuries, it was the struggle of the Russian people for existence in the most direct and precise sense of the word. Placed by fate on the border of two continents, Russia covered Europe with itself as a shield from the invasion of wild Tatar-Mongol hordes and in gratitude received blows from her in the back.
Russians have barely spread the news of the terrible Batu pogrom in the West, when his spiritual head, the Pope, announces a crusade against the "Russian schismatics" in order to push them into the arms of the Catholic Church with the edge of the sword. When the hopes pinned on the Swedish Crusaders and the Teutonic Order collapsed, Pope Alexander IV (1255) sent a letter to the "Lithuanian king" with permission to "fight Russia" and annex its regions to his possessions. The main threat to Russia during this period came from the East — here the struggle was waged for life and death. But the West (Sweden and the Order) threatened enslavement or at least (in the person of Lithuania) deprivation of political independence. Having not yet had time to form a dense ethnic core, Great Russia had to take up a circular defense.
In the XV century, Russia, having thrown off the Tatar-Mongol yoke, goes on the offensive on all fronts. Up to the end of the XVIII century, with a sword in her hands, she eliminated the direct and indirect foreign policy consequences of the Mongol invasion and domination: gathers the ancient Russian lands captured by Lithuania and Poland within the borders of a single power; overcomes economic isolation, breaks through trade routes to the Baltic and Black Seas; repopulates the devastated South Russian lands and brings to an end the struggle with the Tatar khanates, fragments of the Golden Horde — Kazan, Astrakhan, Siberian, Crimean.
Defending or attacking, Russia as a whole was waging fair and inevitable wars at that time: it had no other choice. If the country wanted to live and develop, it had to throw away the scabbard as unnecessary, and prove its right to life and development to its neighbors with a blade for five centuries. In a certain sense, these wars were people's wars with the constant and active participation of the people's armed forces directly, the Cossacks.
Bourgeois historiographers who like to contrast Russia and the West on the basis of insignificant or even existing only in their author's imagination signs, do not want to notice this very important characteristic feature of Russian history, really distancing Russia from all, with only one exception, the countries of Western Europe.
This exception is Spain. Like Russia, which stood guard on the eastern borders of Europe, it restrained the pressure of nomadic Africa in the extreme west. The Spanish Reconquista, like the Russian offensive on the steppe, was a national cause — its driving forces, along with the feudal class, were the cities and the peasantry. And the same factor, the role of a border outpost on a troubled border, has distinguished Spain, as well as Russia, from the general flow of European history. According to Marx, "... the slow liberation from Arab rule in the process of almost eight hundred years of persistent struggle gave the peninsula, by the time its territory was completely cleared, features completely different from Europe at that time..." (c) "The Connection of Times" by Fyodor Nesterov