Stalin receives FDRs blessing as the first American president to officially recognize the Soviet Union. Putin receives the scorn of the current regime in Washington. Stalin? Well, lets allow Robert Nisbet tell the story, from his book Roosevelt and Stalin: The Failed Courtship.
Roosevelt, of course, made many concessions to Stalin during the war; I will not focus on the early years, but begin with Yalta in February, 1945. By this point, the war in Europe was nearing an end and Americans were moving successfully across the Pacific toward Japan. Certainly, the worst attributes of Stalin and the Soviets were clear to Roosevelt and the administration.
In other words, by this point there was no need (as if there ever was one) for further favors to be passed the Soviets way; there was no excuse (as if there ever was one) for claiming ignorance of the unfathomable murder that coursed through Stalins veins.
Yalta did not hand Eastern Europe to Stalin he already occupied or would soon occupy much of this, as privately agreed with Roosevelt in Tehran in November 1943. This private agreement was given concrete form by Roosevelts continuing insistence that the Allies not proceed into Central Europe via the Mediterranean to head off the Soviets (as Churchill would have preferred). Stalin wanted only an assault from the west against the Germans; Roosevelt ensured this would be the focus.
Yalta offered something to Stalin that he could never achieve on his own:
I have just stressed that Yalta is not the source of the Soviet possessions in eastern Europe; that Teheran is. But Yalta performed a service to the Soviets that was almost as important to Stalin as the occupied areas themselves. This was the invaluable service of giving moral legitimation to what Stalin had acquired by sheer force. (P. 70)
As Chester Wilmot wrote in his The Struggle for Europe, the real issue was not what Stalin would or could have taken but what he was given the right to do. (P. 71)
That Roosevelt did not agree to send the Allied military into central Europe through the Mediterranean and stop Stalin from taking even more territory is one thing; to legitimize the dark night over Eastern Europe is quite another.
not only did power over the Baltic and Balkan peoples pass to Stalin; these people had to watch what democracy and freedom they had known before the war disappear, and then suffer the added humiliation of seeing such words as free elections, sovereignty, democracy, independence, and liberation deliberately corrupted, debased, made duplicitous
. (P. 71)
Kind of like the elections in Crimea.
After one of the plenary sessions at Yalta, Roosevelt wrote privately to Stalin regarding the Polish government-in-exile in London:
The United States will never lend its support in any way to any provisional government in Poland that would be inimical to your interests. (P. 72)
Yalta removed the post-war possibility of the Americans stating to Stalin Get out. Imagine: the United States government legitimized a massive land-grab by one of the two worst murderers of the 20th century.
Roosevelt further agreed to every request Stalin had in the Far East as a condition to join the battle against the Japanese much of the territory belonging (or rightly reverting) to the Chinese, but handed to Stalin without consulting Chiang Kai-shek.
Back to Yalta: what happened immediately after the summit?
On March 6 messages reached Churchill
about mass arrests taking place in Cracow
As many as 6,000 former Home Army officers were put in a camp
. (P. 78)
Churchill notified Roosevelt; Roosevelt did not protest to Stalin.
On March 21, Averill Harriman carried a note personally to Roosevelt:
We must come to clearly realize that the Soviet program is the establishment of totalitarianism, ending personal liberty and democracy as we know it. (P. 81)
As if this was not known in 1933.
A most interesting development regarded the direct communication between Eisenhower and the Soviets. This was discussed between Roosevelt and Stalin at Yalta:
The President said he felt that the armies were getting close enough to have contact between them and he hoped General Eisenhower would communicate directly with the Soviet Staff rather than through the Chiefs of Staff in London and in Washington. (P. 84)
Stalin readily agreed. Stalin was even more pleased when he received a telegram from Eisenhower on March 28. In it, Eisenhower outlined his military strategy in the coming weeks, making no mention of Berlin despite Berlin being included in the Combined Chiefs strategy that was unanimously approved at the beginning of February. (P. 84)
Stalins joy must have been intense
. The Soviet capture of Berlin, courtesy of General Eisenhower, would be a crowning completion to a larger Soviet plan to assume hegemony in all of central Europe
. (P. 84)
Nisbet suggests that Eisenhower would never send such a telegram on his own authority Ike had the endorsement of Marshall, and it is highly doubtful that Marshalls endorsement came without Roosevelts approval, if not at Roosevelts direction.
What difference did this make? you ask. The Soviets would have captured Berlin with or without Eisenhowers permission.
Not so fast.
The 9th U.S. Army under the command of Lt. General William Simpson, which was then part of Montgomerys larger army group, reached the Elbe River on April 11. (P. 84)
With Berlin practically in sight, Simpsons army was transferred from the British Montgomery to the American Bradley who immediately ordered Simpson to stop at the Elbe. Bradley said the order came from Eisenhower (who did nothing without clearance from Marshall). (P. 84)
Churchill protested to Roosevelt why not continue the strategy agreed by the Combined Chiefs? Roosevelts reply was a model of the blandly evasive
.
In 1972, General Simpson gave a detailed interview on this matter; after detailing both the strength of his army and supply, as well as the logistics support, Simpson concluded:
So I think we could have ploughed across there [the Elbe] within twenty-four hours and been in Berlin in twenty-four to forty-eight hours easily. (P. 87)
Simpson stressed that the area between the Elbe and Berlin was lightly defended with the heavy German concentrations instead facing the Soviets. (P. 87)
US Supports Giving Half of Europe to Russia ? LewRockwell.com