Stolen Valor, too many get by with it.

[westwall]

Actually Dugout Doug ordered General Wainwright to fight to the last man before he got on the PT boat and escaped. It doesn't matter anyway. There is nothing in the citation that justifies the MOH.

Correct. The establishment had two choices with old Mac, fire him for incompetence, or make him a hero for propaganda purposes.

They chose the latter.

 

[Mushroom]

Actually Dugout Doug ordered General Wainwright to fight to the last man before he got on the PT boat and escaped. It doesn't matter anyway. There is nothing in the citation that justifies the MOH.

And that is once again your opinion. Me, I simply stick to facts as there is a saying about opinions and rectal orifices.

 

[Mushroom]

Correct. The establishment had two choices with old Mac, fire him for incompetence, or make him a hero for propaganda purposes.

Oh, I would love to see somebody trying that.

Remember, he actually retired back in October 1935. He was only recalled from retirement in late July 1941.

I would defy anybody to say he was "incompetent" in only 4 months of returned service.

But no matter what, the decision made was to retreat to Bataan and then hold out there and wait for the relief forces from the US to arrive. That was the battle plan from even before he was recalled. The only change he made to it was to fight for Luzon as long as possible, and not just retreat as soon as the Japanese attacked. And that was exactly what was done.

So unless somebody can make a valid claim that the defense of Luzon prior to the retreat to Bataan was not well executed, then there was no incompetence there on his part. Or that his decision to hold Luzon as long as possible before retreating to Bataan was a bad decision, there was not incompetence there either. The decision to both do that then send everybody to Bataan was made at the highest levels of the War Department, and they are the ones that also had the plan to send a large relief force to kick the Japanese off of the island.

In fact, on 8 December General Marshall ordered him to start the retreat to Bataan.

So exactly where is this "incompetence"?

And FYI, I actually have a pretty low opinion of General MacArthur. But he was given a shitty command, with shitty troops and shitty equipment. His main coastal defenses were manned by National Guard troops with outdated equipment that was broken most of the time even before he was put in charge. The supplies and reinforcements he was promised never arrived, and he was ordered against his wishes to retreat the day of the initial attack.

Heck, they did even better than the Asiatic Fleet did. And that was another example of the problems in the Philippines. In December 1941, that was composed of 15 ships of the line. 1 Heavy Cruiser, 1 Light Cruiser, and and 13 Destroyers in addition to subs and support craft. Upon news that Japan attacked, almost the entire fleet packed up and sailed for Australia. The only ones that remained behind were the handful of river gunboats, that could not have made the trip to Australia. Those were all captured, scuttled, or destroyed.

 

[westwall]

Oh, I would love to see somebody trying that.

Remember, he actually retired back in October 1935. He was only recalled from retirement in late July 1941.

I would defy anybody to say he was "incompetent" in only 4 months of returned service.

But no matter what, the decision made was to retreat to Bataan and then hold out there and wait for the relief forces from the US to arrive. That was the battle plan from even before he was recalled. The only change he made to it was to fight for Luzon as long as possible, and not just retreat as soon as the Japanese attacked. And that was exactly what was done.

So unless somebody can make a valid claim that the defense of Luzon prior to the retreat to Bataan was not well executed, then there was no incompetence there on his part. Or that his decision to hold Luzon as long as possible before retreating to Bataan was a bad decision, there was not incompetence there either. The decision to both do that then send everybody to Bataan was made at the highest levels of the War Department, and they are the ones that also had the plan to send a large relief force to kick the Japanese off of the island.

In fact, on 8 December General Marshall ordered him to start the retreat to Bataan.

So exactly where is this "incompetence"?

And FYI, I actually have a pretty low opinion of General MacArthur. But he was given a shitty command, with shitty troops and shitty equipment. His main coastal defenses were manned by National Guard troops with outdated equipment that was broken most of the time even before he was put in charge. The supplies and reinforcements he was promised never arrived, and he was ordered against his wishes to retreat the day of the initial attack.

Heck, they did even better than the Asiatic Fleet did. And that was another example of the problems in the Philippines. In December 1941, that was composed of 15 ships of the line. 1 Heavy Cruiser, 1 Light Cruiser, and and 13 Destroyers in addition to subs and support craft. Upon news that Japan attacked, almost the entire fleet packed up and sailed for Australia. The only ones that remained behind were the handful of river gunboats, that could not have made the trip to Australia. Those were all captured, scuttled, or destroyed.

He had almost 24 hours advance notice that the Japanese were coming, knew about Pearl, and STILL had the planes lined up on the ground.

Later, when they were retaking the PI he refused the requests for artillery and naval bombardment for certain targets because they risked destroying property he owned.

The only worse general we had was Mark Clark.

 

[Mushroom]

He had almost 24 hours advance notice that the Japanese were coming, knew about Pearl, and STILL had the planes lined up on the ground.

No, he did not have "almost 24 hours advance notice".

On 8 December at 12:30PM the aircraft at Clark Field were being prepared for loading ordinance so they could conduct a bombing raid on Formosa. The ordinance were still being trucked from the bunkers to the loading areas at the air field when the Japanese attacked.

I can't believe I have to even say this. 24 hours indeed, that is so stupid I can hardly believe I have to answer that.

Oh, and General MacArthur owned no property in the Philippines. If you believe that, somebody lied to you.

 

[Soupnazi630]

The real McCoy won't tell to many stories. But I admit I've stretched a few now and then.

And made one up for a bunch of privates one day, They wanted to know about war so I made up a story about Nam, I got really detailed and got into it like I was reading it from a book, ended up where my squad was down to about 6 people and we were surrounded by a battalion of VC regulars and out of ammo, I sudden got up shook my head and started to walk away, and sure enough one of them had to ask...
"What Happened"? I looked him in the eye and answered "What would you think, we were surrounded outnumbered 100 to one and out of ammo, we all died......" And walked away........I was so perfect that day.....

ALl veterans find stolen valore repugnant as they should. One should also remember however that there are degrees of it. You admit to stretching a few stories and making one up. All veterans have done that. Veterans trade and borrow war stories from each other.

For example in Desert Storm someone someone got a video tape in the mail. When he had a chance to watch it he saw it was innocent enough at least how it started. Many versions exist, some say it was a tape of family events from home like thanksgiving dinner etc. Other say it was a commercial film. Suddenly the video changed to a pornagraphic scene and it turned out to be the guys wife having sex with another man. She deliberately sent him this to screw with his mind or to demand a divorce while he was deployed. Naturally the guy who got this tape flipped out, Some say he was on suicide watch others say he killed himself.

The point is not the story. I am sure it happened to someone somewhere during that deployment. However in the years after desert storm I heard it repeated probobly a hundred times with all the little details changed and embellished. They even included it in a movie called " JARHEAD ". All the people I heard this story from while on active duty started it out the same way as in " This guy In my unit got a video tape from home".

While the general story is probably true the number of different people telling it from a first person view would make it seem like hundreds of guys had the same thing happen to them.

We should all police ourselves some so we do not let our war stories get out of hand ( that includes me) Some of the worst examples of stolen valor I have scence or heard about have come from veterans who actually served. Even legit decorated heroes have lied about this stuff. I read an account of a Helicopter pilot from the Vietnam war who had recieved the purple heart, silver star and DFC. He had no need to lie about anything but found himself lying about having been shot down captured and held prisoner for years. That is until some real former POWs called him out on it.

 

[westwall]

No, he did not have "almost 24 hours advance notice".

On 8 December at 12:30PM the aircraft at Clark Field were being prepared for loading ordinance so they could conduct a bombing raid on Formosa. The ordinance were still being trucked from the bunkers to the loading areas at the air field when the Japanese attacked.

I can't believe I have to even say this. 24 hours indeed, that is so stupid I can hardly believe I have to answer that.

Oh, and General MacArthur owned no property in the Philippines. If you believe that, somebody lied to you.

My mistake, he only had 9 hours to prepare. Gosh. The fact remains that he did NOTHING to prepare. And yes, his family did have interests in the PI. He raced full speed to Manila instead of defeating the Japanese in detail on the way.


The Japanese Attack on the Philippines

MacArthur's inaction and failure to follow war orders causes the loss of American air power in the Philippines

Within minutes of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which occurred at about 2.30 a.m. on 8 December 1941 (Manila time), the news was received at the headquarters of the United States Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines. Admiral Hart was informed at about 3.00 a.m. The news was not passed on to the army. Shortly after 3.00 a.m. on that morning, General MacArthur was informed of the Japanese attack by his Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Richard K. Sutherland. An army signalman had picked up the news while listening to a Californian radio station. At 3.40 a.m., Brigadier Leonard T. Gerow, Chief of the Army's War Plans Division, telephoned MacArthur from Washington to confirm that Pearl Harbor had been attacked by the Japanese. He told MacArthur that he "wouldn't be surprised if you get an attack there in the near future". [1]

The commander of MacArthur's Far East Air Force, Major General Lewis Brereton, heard the news about Pearl Harbor from Brigadier General Sutherland shortly before 4.00 a.m. Brereton immediately placed MacArthur's only powerful offensive weapon on war alert. Many of his fliers had only just returned to their airbases from the lavish party at MacArthur's hotel.

It is at this point, that MacArthur's headquarters at Manila takes on the characteristics of a chapter from Alice in Wonderland. History records that the Japanese launched devastating attacks on MacArthur's airbases at about 12.20 p.m. on 8 December 1941. Instead of acting decisively to prepare for a likely Japanese attack on the Philippines, MacArthur took no significant action between 3.00 a.m. and 12.20 p.m. to bring his command to a proper state of readiness to resist an attack and to preserve his air force. Whether MacArthur's paralysis during these critical nine hours was due to indecision or the restraining influence of President Quezon, or perhaps a combination of both, has never been satisfactorily explained by historians. From 5.00 a.m. on the morning of 8 December 1941, Major General Brereton tried to speak to MacArthur about a Far East Air Force response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, but he was repeatedly denied access to MacArthur by Brigadier General Sutherland.



"As a direct result of MacArthur's inexcusable failure to bring his command to a proper state of readiness to resist a likely Japanese attack, most of Brereton's aircraft were sitting on their airstrips when Japanese bombers and fighters arrived overhead at about 12.20 p.m. on 8 December and took them by surprise."

The Battle for Australia 1942-43

www.pacificwar.org.au

 

[Mushroom]

The fact remains that he did NOTHING to prepare. And yes, his family did have interests in the PI.

Then give us a reference that he had a lot of interests in the Philippines.

He ordered the planes to prepare for an attack mission on Formosa, but the commander of Clarke Air Base is the one that dwaddled.

And that is your reference? A web page that is over 13 years out of date, and looks like something I have seen back on Geocities 2 decades ago? With no citations or references?

Sorry, no interest in a "reference" that is a vanity page that has no actual references, is all opinion, and has been abandoned since November 2009.

 

[whitehall]

Oh, I would love to see somebody trying that.

Remember, he actually retired back in October 1935. He was only recalled from retirement in late July 1941.

I would defy anybody to say he was "incompetent" in only 4 months of returned service.

But no matter what, the decision made was to retreat to Bataan and then hold out there and wait for the relief forces from the US to arrive. That was the battle plan from even before he was recalled. The only change he made to it was to fight for Luzon as long as possible, and not just retreat as soon as the Japanese attacked. And that was exactly what was done.

So unless somebody can make a valid claim that the defense of Luzon prior to the retreat to Bataan was not well executed, then there was no incompetence there on his part. Or that his decision to hold Luzon as long as possible before retreating to Bataan was a bad decision, there was not incompetence there either. The decision to both do that then send everybody to Bataan was made at the highest levels of the War Department, and they are the ones that also had the plan to send a large relief force to kick the Japanese off of the island.

In fact, on 8 December General Marshall ordered him to start the retreat to Bataan.

So exactly where is this "incompetence"?

And FYI, I actually have a pretty low opinion of General MacArthur. But he was given a shitty command, with shitty troops and shitty equipment. His main coastal defenses were manned by National Guard troops with outdated equipment that was broken most of the time even before he was put in charge. The supplies and reinforcements he was promised never arrived, and he was ordered against his wishes to retreat the day of the initial attack.

Heck, they did even better than the Asiatic Fleet did. And that was another example of the problems in the Philippines. In December 1941, that was composed of 15 ships of the line. 1 Heavy Cruiser, 1 Light Cruiser, and and 13 Destroyers in addition to subs and support craft. Upon news that Japan attacked, almost the entire fleet packed up and sailed for Australia. The only ones that remained behind were the handful of river gunboats, that could not have made the trip to Australia. Those were all captured, scuttled, or destroyed.

Mac had done his duty and retired as Army COS. Why an Old Soldier who had done his duty in WW1 and retired was chosen to command the area most likely to be attacked by the Japanese is anybody's guess. It's possible that the sweet talker in the W.H. convinced Mac that he would be more of a political envoy than a real commander because that's exactly how he behaved, hobnobbing with the Manila elite while his Troops were ill equipped and trained. Legend has it that MacArthur became unnerved by the impending attack after Pearl Harbor and was unable to function. As a result the "War Plan" was not initiated and his entire air force was destroyed parked wing to wing on the ground. With the cooperation of his little army of correspondents, he was able to blame subordinates for his negligence.

 

[westwall]

Then give us a reference that he had a lot of interests in the Philippines.

He ordered the planes to prepare for an attack mission on Formosa, but the commander of Clarke Air Base is the one that dwaddled.

And that is your reference? A web page that is over 13 years out of date, and looks like something I have seen back on Geocities 2 decades ago? With no citations or references?

Sorry, no interest in a "reference" that is a vanity page that has no actual references, is all opinion, and has been abandoned since November 2009.

It is one of many. There are many books that go into detail of MacAurthurs failures.

 

[Mushroom]

Why an Old Soldier who had done his duty in WW1 and retired was chosen to command the area most likely to be attacked by the Japanese is anybody's guess. It's possible that the sweet talker in the W.H. convinced Mac that he would be more of a political envoy than a real commander because that's exactly how he behaved, hobnobbing with the Manila elite while his Troops were ill equipped and trained.

He was literally creating the Philippine Army from nothing. And it was a 10 year mission that was still in the early stages. The first class of their Military Academy had not even graduated yet, and the equipment that the US promised had yet to arrive. No tanks, no artillery, no aircraft, they were going to the US bases to borrow their equipment to get what training they could.

Yes, his troops were poorly equipped, nobody questions that. However, said equipment had been promised by the US for over 5 years and had yet to be delivered at all.

Of course, the official "War Plan Orange" only stated that MacArthur only had to hold out for 45 days. At that point, US forces and supplies would flood the islands and throw the Japanese back into the sea. The US planners never expected the Japanese to make such a serious push into the islands. As well as attack Hawaii, as well as New Guinea, Dutch East Indies, Guam, Wake, Burma, and Singapore all at the same time. Let alone conduct most of those attacks successfully.

You keep blaming one General, meanwhile ignoring the fact that the war plans of the US, UK, and every other country attacked was completely ill prepared for what the Japanese did. War Plan Orange was a complete joke, which was obvious by when Admiral Fletcher's Task Force 14 was turned around on 22 December and ordered to return to Pearl Harbor and not reinforces the besieged Marines on Wake. That made it obvious that nothing of War Plan Orange would happen, and that not only Wake, but Guam, the Philippines, and every other US territory outside of Hawaii would fall.

So tell me, was General MacArthur responsible for the complete and utter failure of War Plan Orange? Because his area of responsibility was just one of many, and every single one of them failed. And how was their being ill-equipped his failure, when the US had been promising them equipment for years and had yet to provide any?

At least the US did learn a lesson, as after the war was over the Philippine military did get a hell of a lot of top of the line equipment. Such as the horses of their Cavalry Regiment being replaced with enough M4 tanks to create a division. And the Navy had over a dozen surface ships, and was literally nothing but on paper before the war. And they actually got an Air Force, starting with over 100 P-51 Mustangs after the war, where before the war all they had was a handful of T-6 training aircraft.

 

[westwall]

He was literally creating the Philippine Army from nothing. And it was a 10 year mission that was still in the early stages. The first class of their Military Academy had not even graduated yet, and the equipment that the US promised had yet to arrive. No tanks, no artillery, no aircraft, they were going to the US bases to borrow their equipment to get what training they could.

Yes, his troops were poorly equipped, nobody questions that. However, said equipment had been promised by the US for over 5 years and had yet to be delivered at all.

Of course, the official "War Plan Orange" only stated that MacArthur only had to hold out for 45 days. At that point, US forces and supplies would flood the islands and throw the Japanese back into the sea. The US planners never expected the Japanese to make such a serious push into the islands. As well as attack Hawaii, as well as New Guinea, Dutch East Indies, Guam, Wake, Burma, and Singapore all at the same time. Let alone conduct most of those attacks successfully.

You keep blaming one General, meanwhile ignoring the fact that the war plans of the US, UK, and every other country attacked was completely ill prepared for what the Japanese did. War Plan Orange was a complete joke, which was obvious by when Admiral Fletcher's Task Force 14 was turned around on 22 December and ordered to return to Pearl Harbor and not reinforces the besieged Marines on Wake. That made it obvious that nothing of War Plan Orange would happen, and that not only Wake, but Guam, the Philippines, and every other US territory outside of Hawaii would fall.

So tell me, was General MacArthur responsible for the complete and utter failure of War Plan Orange? Because his area of responsibility was just one of many, and every single one of them failed. And how was their being ill-equipped his failure, when the US had been promising them equipment for years and had yet to provide any?

At least the US did learn a lesson, as after the war was over the Philippine military did get a hell of a lot of top of the line equipment. Such as the horses of their Cavalry Regiment being replaced with enough M4 tanks to create a division. And the Navy had over a dozen surface ships, and was literally nothing but on paper before the war. And they actually got an Air Force, starting with over 100 P-51 Mustangs after the war, where before the war all they had was a handful of T-6 training aircraft.

The PAAC by August of 1941 had 64 aircraft. Two squadrons of which were the obsolete P-26 pursuit planes. They also had a squadron of bombers and two training flights. We blame Mac because HE was the big cheese.

History of the Philippine Air Force | GOVPH

Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines - The Official Gazette is the official journal of the Republic of the Philippines. Edited at the Office of the President of the Philippines Under Commonwealth Act No. 638

www.officialgazette.gov.ph

 

[Mushroom]

The PAAC by August of 1941 had 64 aircraft. Two squadrons of which were the obsolete P-26 pursuit planes. They also had a squadron of bombers and two training flights. We blame Mac because HE was the big cheese.

And who did they get the equipment from?

Not General MacArthur, that is for sure.

 

[westwall]

And who did they get the equipment from?

Not General MacArthur, that is for sure.

They got it from the USA. The Far East Air Forces had over 400 aircraft when the attack began. Most were destroyed in minutes thanks to inaction.

 

[Mushroom]

They got it from the USA. The Far East Air Forces had over 400 aircraft when the attack began. Most were destroyed in minutes thanks to inaction.

Oh wow, not even close to being accurate.

Here is a full accounting of the aircraft of the FEAF.

Fighters:

P-40 Warhawk: 89
P-35: 26
P-26 "Peashooter": 12

That's it, just 127 fighters.

Of course, there is the single operational A-27 that was there, which was the export version of the aforementioned T-6 Texan.

Bombers:

B-17: 32
B-10: 4

Transports: and others

B-18 "Bolo": 15 (even by 1940 it was realized the bomber variant of the DC-2 was inferior so they were all converted to transports)
O-52 "Owl": 11
Stearman 76: 42 (this was a basic flight training biplane)

So that is the total number of aircraft in the FEAF on 8 December 1941. Only 128 of them "fighters" even if the T-6/A-27 is counted.

And against that, Japan threw 288 front line fighters, in addition to 162 bombers.

I am not sure what you expect 128 mostly obsolete fighters could have done against a fighter force that was over twice as strong, with highly experienced pilots. And a bomber fleet over 5 times the size of that of the Americans.

Yes there were indeed around 400 aircraft, but that is not the same as saying "400 fighters". Next to the Warhawks, the largest number were trainers as they were still trying to get the Philippine Air Force up to the capability where they could even send them actual fighters. Hence, around 100 of the aircraft there were unarmed trainers.

Of course, I am ignoring the single bomber of the Philippine Air Force at the time. Literally a B-3, a bi-wing bomber that once again was used for flight training for the bomber pilots for when they actually got real bombers (eventually).

Yes, it may sound impressive when you say "over 400 aircraft", but in reality is was around 365. And as you can see from the breakdown of exactly what the operational aircraft were, only a small handful of those were even fighters.

Oh, and not all of them were "destroyed on the ground", not even close. The P-40s were used by the 17th Pursuit Squadron, and they literally had been flying a CAP and were in the process of refueling when the islands were first attacked. The attack destroyed over half of their fighters as the pilots were eating lunch and they were being serviced before being taken out again. The survivors were mostly the 22 that were still in their revenants on standby. On 12 December the decision was made by the War Department to pull all remaining operational aircraft to Australia.

So no, they were not all "destroyed on the ground, and in fact the Warhawks that were destroyed on the ground had literally just returned from a 6 hour patrol. And were in the process of being refueled and the pilots taking a break when the attack happened.

That is about as far from "inaction" as you can get.

 

[westwall]

Oh wow, not even close to being accurate.

Here is a full accounting of the aircraft of the FEAF.

Fighters:

P-40 Warhawk: 89
P-35: 26
P-26 "Peashooter": 12

That's it, just 127 fighters.

Of course, there is the single operational A-27 that was there, which was the export version of the aforementioned T-6 Texan.

Bombers:

B-17: 32
B-10: 4

Transports: and others

B-18 "Bolo": 15 (even by 1940 it was realized the bomber variant of the DC-2 was inferior so they were all converted to transports)
O-52 "Owl": 11
Stearman 76: 42 (this was a basic flight training biplane)

So that is the total number of aircraft in the FEAF on 8 December 1941. Only 128 of them "fighters" even if the T-6/A-27 is counted.

And against that, Japan threw 288 front line fighters, in addition to 162 bombers.

I am not sure what you expect 128 mostly obsolete fighters could have done against a fighter force that was over twice as strong, with highly experienced pilots. And a bomber fleet over 5 times the size of that of the Americans.

Yes there were indeed around 400 aircraft, but that is not the same as saying "400 fighters". Next to the Warhawks, the largest number were trainers as they were still trying to get the Philippine Air Force up to the capability where they could even send them actual fighters. Hence, around 100 of the aircraft there were unarmed trainers.

Of course, I am ignoring the single bomber of the Philippine Air Force at the time. Literally a B-3, a bi-wing bomber that once again was used for flight training for the bomber pilots for when they actually got real bombers (eventually).

Yes, it may sound impressive when you say "over 400 aircraft", but in reality is was around 365. And as you can see from the breakdown of exactly what the operational aircraft were, only a small handful of those were even fighters.

Oh, and not all of them were "destroyed on the ground", not even close. The P-40s were used by the 17th Pursuit Squadron, and they literally had been flying a CAP and were in the process of refueling when the islands were first attacked. The attack destroyed over half of their fighters as the pilots were eating lunch and they were being serviced before being taken out again. The survivors were mostly the 22 that were still in their revenants on standby. On 12 December the decision was made by the War Department to pull all remaining operational aircraft to Australia.

So no, they were not all "destroyed on the ground, and in fact the Warhawks that were destroyed on the ground had literally just returned from a 6 hour patrol. And were in the process of being refueled and the pilots taking a break when the attack happened.

That is about as far from "inaction" as you can get.

B-18s were used by the USAAF in the anti submarine role till 1943. But yes, the majority of aircraft were obsolete.

They never got a chance to do anything because THEY NEVER LEFT THE GROUND.

Thanks to old Mac sitting on his hands.

 

[Mushroom]

B-18s were used by the USAAF in the anti submarine role till 1943. But yes, the majority of aircraft were obsolete.

They never got a chance to do anything because THEY NEVER LEFT THE GROUND.

The B-18s in the FEAF were converted to cargo configurations before they were sent there. And yes, they were obsolete as bombers, but the DC-2 was still a common cargo and passenger aircraft. In essence, their use as a bomber was a failure, so they repurposed them for other uses.

And no, they indeed did not "never leave the ground". As I clearly said, most of the P-40 had just returned form a recon flight. They had been in the air already for over 6 hours, and they needed to be refueled and the pilots needed a break when the Japanese attacked. Those were the aircraft that were attacked on the runways and destroyed, in the process of being readied to be sent out again.

The roughly 25 that were not being used that day in fact were not damaged at all as they were still in their revenants. Those were the "stand-by" fighters, and were eventually sent on to Australia.

Now why you keep saying they never left the ground when they had actually just returned from a mission, I have absolutely no idea. Other than you simply refuse to accept the facts and only want to believe your fantasy.

The 3rd Pursuit Squadron dispatched its fighters to make the intercept, and they were tracked by radar as they flew toward the unknown formation. The radar operators saw the blips merge on their scope, but the fighter pilots never saw the unknown aircraft in the predawn darkness. Apparently, they had flown beneath the Japanese. After failing to locate the unidentified aircraft, they returned to Iba and breakfast. What the Japanese did is unclear, since the first attacks were still several hours away. Apparently, they were on a reconnaissance flight.

U.S. Heavy Bombers in WWII: Caught on the Ground

Questions linger concerning the deployment of U.S. heavy bombers on the first day of World War II.

warfarehistorynetwork.com

And once again, what I stated about the bombers being prepared for an attack on Formosa when the Japanese arrived.

Regardless of what really happened, at 10:14 Brereton reported that he received a phone call from MacArthur authorizing him to carry out an attack on Formosa in late afternoon at his discretion. A few minutes before the phone call, Lt. Col. Eugene Eubank, the commander of V Bomber Command, left for Clark with orders to dispatch a reconnaissance flight over the Japanese airfields on Formosa in preparation for a strike. There is reason to believe that Brereton received authority, possibly from Sutherland, to mount an air strike against Japanese installations on Formosa as early as 8 am.

The only thing I can imagine you are thinking is that you are confusing the attacks on Hawaii and Philippines, and combining the two.

Oh, and FYI, I realized your mistake in a moment earlier when you tried to say that General MacArthur had done nothing for a day prior to the attack. Because I knew that although we think of "Pearl Harbor" being on 7 December, in Japan and the Philippines it was already 8 December because it was on the other side of the International Date Line. I knew that immediately, but apparently as the actions in the Philippines happened on 8 December, you just assumed they had done nothing for a full day. In reality, only about 8 hours passed between the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the attack on the Philippines. That is not a hell of a lot of time.

But please, I would absolutely love to see your reference that the FEAF did absolutely nothing, and that no aircraft were in the air prior to the attack. Care to give us a credible and verifiable reference?

 

[westwall]

The B-18s in the FEAF were converted to cargo configurations before they were sent there. And yes, they were obsolete as bombers, but the DC-2 was still a common cargo and passenger aircraft. In essence, their use as a bomber was a failure, so they repurposed them for other uses.

And no, they indeed did not "never leave the ground". As I clearly said, most of the P-40 had just returned form a recon flight. They had been in the air already for over 6 hours, and they needed to be refueled and the pilots needed a break when the Japanese attacked. Those were the aircraft that were attacked on the runways and destroyed, in the process of being readied to be sent out again.

The roughly 25 that were not being used that day in fact were not damaged at all as they were still in their revenants. Those were the "stand-by" fighters, and were eventually sent on to Australia.

Now why you keep saying they never left the ground when they had actually just returned from a mission, I have absolutely no idea. Other than you simply refuse to accept the facts and only want to believe your fantasy.

U.S. Heavy Bombers in WWII: Caught on the Ground

Questions linger concerning the deployment of U.S. heavy bombers on the first day of World War II.

warfarehistorynetwork.com

And once again, what I stated about the bombers being prepared for an attack on Formosa when the Japanese arrived.



The only thing I can imagine you are thinking is that you are confusing the attacks on Hawaii and Philippines, and combining the two.

Oh, and FYI, I realized your mistake in a moment earlier when you tried to say that General MacArthur had done nothing for a day prior to the attack. Because I knew that although we think of "Pearl Harbor" being on 7 December, in Japan and the Philippines it was already 8 December because it was on the other side of the International Date Line. I knew that immediately, but apparently as the actions in the Philippines happened on 8 December, you just assumed they had done nothing for a full day. In reality, only about 8 hours passed between the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the attack on the Philippines. That is not a hell of a lot of time.

But please, I would absolutely love to see your reference that the FEAF did absolutely nothing, and that no aircraft were in the air prior to the attack. Care to give us a credible and verifiable reference?

No, I just last read about the attacks around 35 years ago, so memories fade.

The point stands, Mac allowed the bulk of his aircraft to be destroyed in minutes because he didn't follow orders.

 

[Mushroom]

No, I just last read about the attacks around 35 years ago, so memories fade.

The point stands, Mac allowed the bulk of his aircraft to be destroyed in minutes because he didn't follow orders.

In other words, you have no references or actual evidence. Noted.

 

[westwall]

In other words, you have no references or actual evidence. Noted.

Try again. I may be off by a few hours, but my points are valid. You sucking macs cock doesn't make them not true.

You claimed the PAAC only had 6 T6 Texans. You were flat asked wrong. They had 64 aircraft including fighters and bombers. Yes, they were obsolete, but they had them.

The FEAF had nearly 400 aircraft. Most of them modern. Your hero was diddling the maid and failed to follow orders, and failed to enact a proper defense.

Other than the maid diddling, everything I just posted is factual.

Put that in your pipe and smoke it.