Instead of the simple sure I really know what truth is statement, I offer two pieces to mull over. Humor as truth and how we know truth. Find the truth - Good luck.
"Many of my Republican friends have said to me, “George, why are you voting for Barack Obama?” They assume it is because I believe in his radical socialist agenda of being fair to everyone, even the poor. But that’s not it at all. I could actually care less about the poor. We have some living near us, and pee-yew. They are always coming and going to their three or four jobs at all hours of the day and night. Annoying! No, the reason I am voting for Obama is more complicated. And it’s painful. But there’s a lot at stake in this election and so I’m going to confess some embarrassing personal stuff here."
"And now, at long last, my moment is here. I am going to vote for Obama in memory of the broken, sniveling boy I was in 1977, even if it means every poor person in America has a fair shot. I am going to vote against Romney - Ryan even if it means those poor freaks living near me end up at home more often, and with health care. I will vote against Paul Ryan even if it means that the rich—the true princes, who give us everything that we have, and ask only to be allowed to produce—must continue to suffer under the many restrictions, such as the law, such as taxes, imposed by the small parasitic men who malinger beneath them, hoping for their crumbs."
George Saunders 'I Was Ayn Rand’s Lover'
I Was Ayn Rand s Lover - The New Yorker
"Moral anti-realists like me of course recognize that moral attitudes tend to be responsive to non-moral facts-even the most subjective evaluative attitudes are so responsive, after all. The judgment, "We shouldn't eat at La Bistro Francais Pretense," will typically give way before a satisfying gustatory experience there. More importantly, the evaluative judgment, "Don't eat the pork dishes at Szechuan West, they're made from cat," is quite plainly defeated by the revelation that this is a slander on the restaurant's proprietor. Changes in our understanding of the facts have surely played some role in changes in our moral attitudes, yet this just pushes the explanatory question back one step: namely, why were people so slow to correctly cognize the non-moral facts, why were they so ready to accept factual claims that could not, in fact, withstand scrutiny in light of the canons of epistemic warrant otherwise operative in contemporaneous scientific investigations? Canons of epistemic warrant and justification are, after all, themselves norms or values, and yet they were rendered inert in certain domains by countervailing inegalitarian moral attitudes. Some other evaluative attitude-disgust with, contempt for, antipathy towards, e.g., Africans or Jews-was itself an obstacle to responsible investigation of the non-moral facts. That phenomenon should hardly be surprising in light of recent work in social psychology. In an influential paper ten years ago that synthesized a wide body of empirical research,' Jonathan Haidt argued
that moral judgments in most ordinary contexts arise from powerful emotional responses, not rational reflection, and that while reasons and evidence are often supplied post-hoc, commitment to the evaluative judgment typically survived the failure of the reasons and evidence to support them! Haidt suggested that "the mere fact that friends, allies, and acquaintances have made a moral judgment" was more important to understanding someone's commitment to it than the actual rational support for the judgment.' That suggests the best explanation for the prevalence of a moral judgment will be psycho-social in character-whatever it is that explains the community convergence-rather than something epistemic or cognitive." Brian Leiter