Nonsense. That case took place under one legal framework. No we have a different legal framework. It no longer is relevant other than a historical lesson. It does not serve as precedent.
again, go back to law school. You were obviously and properly taught.
There was no legal framework before 230. Statutes do not render court decisions invalid and do not overturn them Except to the extent that the language in the statute conflicts with the language in the holding. Everything else in the whole thing is still controlling law unless overturned by a court.
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No, it's not editing any more than me replying to your post is editing. They are separate statements from separate speakers. Trump's statement is there, unedited, in it's original form.
why am I not surprised that you cannot see how making such comments amounts to taking an active role and actually publishing content. It doesn't matter if the statement is separate. They are not acting as a mere conduit for information content providers, they are becoming information content providers and if you can't see the difference then you have no business discussing this topic.
Please explain to me how Twitter is not becoming an information content provider by commenting on trumps tweets.
This ought to be good.
Not quite. Prodigy is saying that any attempt at moderation strips the status as a "bookstore, library or network affiliate" which is what 230 prevents.
Yes, any attempt at moderation strips Twitter of its "interactive computer service" status and makes Twitter an "information content provider."
However, 230 carves out an exception to becoming an "information content provider" if Twitter is only removing material that is obscene/etc.
You should definitely look very closely at this part of the quote you generously provided:
In addition, the Court also notes that the issues addressed herein may ultimately be preempted by federal law if the Communications Decency Act of 1995, several versions of which are pending in Congress, is enacted.
You'll note that even the court case you're referring to acknowledges the case is irrelevant if the CDA of 1995 (which contains in the infamous section 230) passes.
So?
I've already acknowledged that portions of the Prodigy holding would be overturned by the statute. Other portions have not been overturned as I have clearly demonstrated.
And nothing in that changes what I have said. And it certainly does not give Twitter a permanent, unchangeable "interactive computer service" status if they take on the role of editing and providing content, a.k.a. being any and "information content provider."
230(c)(1) renders 230(c)(2) redundant. The mere fact that section 230(c)(1) prevents Twitter from being considered a publisher immunizes it from basically all civil liability. It does not need section 230(c)(2).
This is, unequivocally, wrong in every sense of the word.
You have completely ignored or you are filthy ignorant of the rules of statute interpretation.
One section of a statute cannot render another section redundant.
This is such a basic legal concept in principle that there is no way anyone who does not understand this should be talking about legal issues.
because you were obviously poorly informed and have no business talking about statutory construction, I'm not going to waste anymore time on this. I'm just gonna cut and paste what is contained in Wikipedia, and if you have something to the contrary you feel free to look it up and provide it.
- We begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.:" Consumer Product Safety Commission et al. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. et al.,447 U.S. 102 (1980). "n interpreting a statute a court should always turn to one cardinal canon before all others. . . .[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there." Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992). Indeed, "when the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: 'judicial inquiry is complete.'" 503 U.S. 249, 254.
[*]9th Circuit Court of Appeals: In the dissent from en banc rehearing of Silveira v. Lockyer312 F.3rd 1052 (2002), dissent at 328 F.3d 567 (2003) at 575, Judge Kleinfeld stated "it is 'a cardinal principle of statutory construction that we must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.' Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)."
False. From the plain language of the law, Section 230(c)(1) is sufficient for (as far as I can tell) every purpose we are discussing. There is no stipulation in any part of the law that stops 230(c)(1) from being relevant. This has been interpreted broadly and existing case law backs me up.
First, Section 230(c)(1) specifies that service providers and users may not “be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” Courts have interpreted this provision broadly, holding that Section 230(c)(1) immunity may apply in any suit in which the plaintiff seeks to hold the provider liable “as the publisher” of another’s information, apart from the express exceptions discussed below.
As long as they are not editing the content.
The section below gives them permission to edit certain content and maintain their liability protections.
As for the remainder of your cited document:
"
Consequently, one court described Section 230(c)(2) as applying when a service provider “does filter out offensive material,” while Section 230(c)(1) applies when providers “refrain from filtering or censoring the information on their sites. But as one Section 230 scholar has pointed out, courts sometimes collapse the distinctions between these two provisions and cite Section 230(c)(1) in dismissing suits premised on service providers’ decisions to take down certain content. This development could be significant. As noted, Section 230(c)(2) grants immunity only for actions “taken in good faith,” while Section 230(c)(1) contains no similar requirement. In this sense, Section 230(c)(2) immunity is narrower than Section 230(c)(1)’s liability shield. At least one trial court has rejected a plaintiff’s attempt to claim Section 230(c)(1) immunity over Section 230(c)(2) immunity, saying that where Section 230(c)(2)’s “more specific immunity” covered the disputed actions, the court would not apply Section 230(c)(1) because that would improperly “render[] the good-faith requirement superfluous.”
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pjmedia.com
