Thinking Horizontally

[preemptingyou03]

Delves into Thomas P.M. Barnett's thesis on "unending war." One of the reasons, I think, so many oppose Iraq is because they define it using archaic terminology and old-school logic. Counterinsurgencies don't just "end," nor will terrorism be "defeated" in a WWII-type sense. Bush understands this and that's the premise of the op-ed.

Thinking Horizontally
Getting Away From Obsolete Logic
By Nicholas M. Guariglia
May 3, 2006

One of the most telling moments of the Bush presidency came in a late August interview, during the 2004 presidential campaign. President Bush was having a candid one-on-one with NBC’s Matt Lauer, on his campaign bus. The subject, unsurprisingly, turned to the war against terrorism, in which Lauer asked, “Do you really think we can win this war on terror in the next four years?” “I have never said we can win it in four years,” replied the president, which prompted Lauer with a follow-up: “So I’m just saying can we win it? Do you see that?” Bush’s response? “I don’t think you can win it.”

Of course, that became a political goldmine for the Kerry campaign, as well as the New York Times, which printed “Bush Cites Doubt America Can Win War on Terror” as its headline the next morning. But this apparently uncharacteristic moment of defeatism for Bush was not as revealing as his clarification, which his critics obviously omitted: “… I think you can create conditions so that those who use terror as a tool are less acceptable in parts of the world –– let’s put it that way… I don’t have any… definite end.”

That exchange with Lauer and his subsequent clarification perhaps expressed one of the greatest indicators into Bush’s mind, showcasing both his true understanding of this weird, wacky paradigm called the “war on terror,” as well as a lack of understanding –– or a lack of clarification –– on behalf of the American public. This confusion regarding the confines of the war on terrorism is natural and understandable, and the administration is partly to blame for not thoroughly explaining the inherent traits of this war. They have the bully pulpit, after all, and they ought to utilize their gargantuan national microphone far more.

What Bush was attempting to explain –– and clearly failed at doing –– was what Naval War College professor Thomas P.M. Barnett would call “horizontal thinking.” Dr. Barnett, author of two new books that have sent reverberations throughout the defense community and the Washington establishment –– The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century and its sequel Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating –– is credited, amongst other things, for his now-famous Core-Gap thesis. The theory suggests the world is divided into a “Functioning Core,” or countries integrated into the global economy, and a “Non-Integrated Gap,” or societies that have not yet joined globalization.

But amongst the epiphanies you’ll have reading his work, the largest of all will be his take on horizontal thinking, which will have you feeling like you already knew what he was talking about… but just needed someone to explain it better. Barnett explains that horizontal thinkers are different from “vertical thinkers” in that they often are synergists, which enjoy combing disparate concepts in abnormal combinations. “The most important advantage of horizontal thinking,” he goes on, “is the ability to see a future unfolding in realistic stages, never becoming too invested in any one particular pathway.”

So what does this all mean and how does it apply to counterterrorism? Mainly, when skeptics say, “You can’t go to war against terrorism because terrorism is a tactic,” they are right in a terminology sense. Terrorism is indeed a tactic and it cannot be vanquished, in a classical way, anymore than the tactic of punching someone in the face can be vanquished. Where these skeptics are wrong is in their belief that the administration doesn’t hold this view as well. Both prior and after his Lauer interview, Bush himself has gone on record as saying, “We actually misnamed the war on terror; it ought to be the struggle against ideological extremists who do not believe in free societies, who happen to use terror as a weapon to try to shake the conscience of the free world.” He went on to say a month later, “Frankly, the war on terror is somewhat misnamed, though. It ought to be called the struggle of a totalitarian point of view that uses terror as a tool to intimidate the free.”

In non-jargon English, this means that the war against terrorism –– the “War on Terror,” the “Long War,” “World War IV,” or whatever you opt to call it –– cannot end in the sense that, there is no barometer for knowing when it could end. There is no single state to destroy, no single country to conquer, no single man to terminate; terrorism is an individual’s enterprise, and the moment a future hypothetical president declares the war against terrorism to be “won,” a single man, with a single bomb, could take out a New York City subway train.

Does this mean this war is unwinnable and therefore should not be waged? Not in the least. It simply means we will need to redefine winning, and understand that both the broader war against terrorism and the smaller conventional wars within it will never have a “definite end,” in Bush’s terms. When will the Iraqi war end? When we’ve met all of our goals? When we’ve withdrawn? When the violence stops? What if the violent stops, but not completely –– or it stops in 2008 and then begins back up again in 2011? What if we meet all of our objectives, draw force-levels down, and U.S. fatalities all but cease… and then, on an autumn day in 2015, a jihadist inside Iraq infiltrates a U.S. base in Kurdistan and is successful in poising the food supply for an entire contingent of Marines, killing thousands? Does that constitute as “Operation Iraqi Freedom”? Are those deaths part of the Iraqi war? Or was the war simply twenty-one days in March and April of ’03, and all of this has just been a really bad peace?

In horizontal scenarios, there is no clear-cut beginning as well. When did this war begin? Some would say on Sept. 11, some would say prior to that during the attacks on our embassies and barracks in the ‘90s and ‘80s, or during the first Persian Gulf War in ’91, or during the Iranian hostage crisis in ’79, or after the creation of Israel in ’48, or during the Crusades centuries ago. When you’re facing an ideological opponent that is comprised of loosely affiliated networks and individuals, the gauges for wins and losses become blurrier than simple X’s and O’s on a map where conquering territory is the sole prize.

So how do you win? Barnett, whose modus operandi is “disconnectedness defines danger,” proposes killing terrorists and toppling tyrants may be where all the fun is at, but in the end, “winning” means reaching our strategic objectives faster than our enemies can reach their strategic objectives. Their objective is disconnectedness –– a return to a past glory and a pristine Islam –– disconnectedness from international norms, the global community, an end to cultural intercourse, Westernization, alien concepts like women’s rights, and political dialogue. This means no globalization, which means no connectivity to the outside world, which means we have our answer for success: connectedness. If we can connect –– economically, politically, culturally –– what they seek to disconnect faster than they can disconnect what we seek to connect, we win. And that doesn’t guarantee or even promise an end to warfare or bombings, but a gradual decline in the acceptance of fascistic ideologies within societies that will at last shun these terrorists as the racist and sexist demagogues they truly are.

Using archaic nomenclature like “bringing the boys home” and “ending” this “war” only confuses an already apathetic public with obsolete twentieth-century definitions and vocabulary. We must turn our backs away from embracing conventional and vertical concepts of war, and start thinking horizontally. Vertical scenarios may be easier to understand, and vertical wars may seem more familiar, but Mr. Bush, Dr. Barnett, and the jihadists themselves can assure us all that this war will not end with a Victory Day parade down Broadway with thrilled sailors kissing random girls in Times Square, or a peace treaty and a formal declaration of surrender. Things will either get gradually worse… or gradually better. And by any account, we’re talking a decades-long effort –– not years or months.

http://www.worldthreats.com/general_information/Guariglia_20060525_04.htm

 

[Gunny]

Delves into Thomas P.M. Barnett's thesis on "unending war." One of the reasons, I think, so many oppose Iraq is because they define it using archaic terminology and old-school logic. Counterinsurgencies don't just "end," nor will terrorism be "defeated" in a WWII-type sense. Bush understands this and that's the premise of the op-ed.

Everyone who doesn't have a leftist agenda understands this; thus, the urgency to get a fully-functional Iraq government capable of sustaining and defending itself and the people of Iraq running on all cylinders.

 

[rtwngAvngr]

The Lefty Decoder Genie Says: "old school logic = actual logic"

 

[Abbey Normal]

The Lefty Decoder Genie Says: "old school logic = actual logic"

Or perhaps: Anti-Bush/Republican agenda = actual logic

 

[Mr.Conley]

Barnett's books make an interesting read. I like a lot of what he says. He's very original and indepth, if a bit too much of a theorist. If we are really going to go through with Dr. Barnett's ideas, we'll need a radical change in our foreign policy. Bush's dealing with India and his new relationship with Germany seem to be a step in the right track though.