Sorry I didn't notice your link, my apologies.
So Brennan colluded with the White House. They went with shakey intel. They violated established trade craft practices. It was produced in a rush, obviously to please Obama and Brennan. And Putin wasn't concerned who won the election.
Supports DNI Gabbards release of declassified documents.
However, before work on the assessment
even began, media leaks suggesting that the IC
had already reached definitive conclusions
risked creating an anchoring bias.
On 9 December, both the Washington
Post and New York Times reported the IC had
concluded with high confidence that Russia had
intervened specifically to help Trump win the
election. The Post cited an unnamed US official
describing this as the IC’s “consensus view.”
__________________
The NIO for Russia, who only received the
final draft for review hours before it was
published, noted that with more time, “they
could have done more” to bolster the judgments
and “make the presentation more elegant.”
__________________
From the outset, agency heads chose to
marginalize the National Intelligence Council
(NIC), departing significantly from standard
procedures for formal IC assessments.
Typically, the NIC maintains control over
drafting assignments, coordination, and review
processes. In his book Undaunted, Brennan
reveals that he established crucial elements of
the process with the White House before NIC
involvement, stating he informed them that
CIA would “take the lead drafting the report”
and that coordination would be limited to
“ODNI, CIA, FBI, and NSA.
_________________
It also was markedly unconventional to have
Agency heads review and sign off on a draft before
it was submitted to the NIC for review. The NIC did
not receive or even see the final draft until just
hours before the ICA was due to be published.
_________________
The decision by agency heads to include
the Steele Dossier in the ICA ran counter to
fundamental tradecraft principles and ultimately
undermined the credibility of a key judgment. The
ICA authors first learned of the Dossier, and FBI
leadership’s insistence on its inclusion, on 20
December—the same day the largely coordinated
draft was entering the review process at CIA. FBI
leadership made it clear that their participation in
the ICA hinged on the Dossier’s inclusion and, over
the next few days, repeatedly pushed to weave
references to it throughout the main body of the
ICA
________________
The ICA authors and multiple senior CIA
managers—including the two senior leaders of
the CIA mission center responsible for Russia—
strongly opposed including the Dossier,
asserting that it did not meet even the most
basic tradecraft standards. CIA’s Deputy
Director for Analysis (DDA) warned in an email
to Brennan on 29 December that including it in
any form risked “the credibility of the entire
paper.
________________
Ultimately, agency heads decided to
include a two-page summary of the Dossier as
an annex to the ICA, with a disclaimer that the
material was not used “to reach the analytic
conclusions.” However, by placing a reference
to the annex material in the main body of the
ICA as the fourth supporting bullet for the
judgment that Putin “aspired” to help Trump
win, the ICA implicitly elevated
unsubstantiated claims to the status of credible
supporting evidence, compromising the
analytical integrity of the judgment.
________________
The DA Review identified multiple specific
concerns, including: a higher confidence level
than was justified; insufficient exploration of
alternative scenarios; lack of transparency on
source uncertainty; uneven argumentation;
and the inclusion of unsubstantiated Steele
Dossier material
________________
As a result, the authors agreed to
separate out the “aspired” judgment, and NSA
eventually settled on ascribing it a “moderate
confidence” level—which the DA Review found
more consistent with ICD 203 standards. As
explained in Annex H, “moderate confidence
generally means that the information is
credibly sourced and plausible but not . . .
corroborated sufficiently.”
________________
In one instance, the authors cited part
of a credibly sourced report that supported the
“high confidence” assessment on the first two
goals of the Putin-directed campaign—
undermining the US democratic process and
denigrating Clinton—but omitted information
that conflicted with the “aspired” judgment.
The omitted information, as well as a small
body of other credibly sourced reporting that
also was not cited in the ICA, suggested Putin
was more ambivalent about which candidate
won the election.
_________________
Once the “aspire” judgment was
separated from the other two findings on
Putin's intentions, it struggled to stand on its
own. As noted earlier, the subsequent decision
to bolster this judgment by referencing the
unsubstantiated Steele Dossier material only
further weakened its analytic foundation. This
raised the question of whether the “aspire”
judgment was even needed, as its inclusion
risked distracting readers from the more well-
documented findings on Putin’s strategic
objectives.
________________
Nice link by the way.