In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right in the First Amendment, Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 8 -9 (1968), Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967), Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886), see Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S., at 484 -485; in the Ninth Amendment, id., at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring); or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). These decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed “fundamental” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.
They also make it clear that the right has some extension to activities relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12(1967); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541-542 (1942); contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S., at 453-454; id., at 460, 463-465 [410 U.S. 113, 153] (WHITE, J., concurring in result); family relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); and child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925), Meyer v. Nebraska, supra.