And a contemporary dogma that harms the public (though admittedly in a far less atrocious way) is the prohibition via the law of same sex marriage. Their sense of peace is enhanced by this because they bevel that they are preserving the moral fabric of society by doing so and yet it denies a particular set of people the legal benefits of getting married.
But that's not a religious argument. I'm not religious and I utterly reject the notion of homosexual marriage and I don't invoke any religious mumbo-jumbo to support my position, besides, homosexuals have always had the right to get married. Rock Hudson was married, so too was Dr. Sally Ride.
I now make a counter request of you to give an example of a Liberal groups actions that clearly demonstrates the negative effects of their dogma. And I don't think that we should stamp out Liberalism any more than we should stamp out religion. Rather we should encourage the formation of a "kinder gentler" form of both religion and Liberalism.
Sure. Liberals are very keen on promoting equality. There have been a few cases in the news lately of business owners being forced into associations with people that they simply didn't want to associate with. These association were forced onto people because liberals are seeking to make homosexuals feel normal. These actions make liberals feel good about themselves, they believe that they have good motives, that they are pure of heart, that they are on their side of righteousness. Meanwhile, this quest for forced niceness comes at the cost of the actual, very real, human right of free association.
Another toxic liberal action is the promotion of multiculturalism onto society because they value diversity. The world is a big and wonderful place, I've traveled to many countries and experienced much cultural diversity. Any liberal who has a deep longing for experiencing diversity has the world before them ready to serve it up but instead liberals desire to force that diversity onto unwilling people. The phenomenon of white flight is a reaction to unwanted diversity. The cost of family formation is getting higher and higher as people seek ever better housing near good schools, where the quality of schools is largely a function of low minority population. Fleeing bad schools means that housing costs for families are higher than they should be. Look back at American history and you see that housing costs were cheaper, people were able to afford to start families earlier in life and have more children because this was affordable.
Liberals are actually changing family dynamics through the negative externalities arising from imposing their religious dogma onto society. These are very personal costs being inflicted upon people so that liberals can feel good about themselves as they champion their religious value of diversity. All the empirical evidence accumulated across history shows the destructive effects of diversity and yet liberal religious faith in this dogma is so strong that it blinds them to the evidence. A religious liberal will no sooner reject the dogma of diversity than a Christian will reject the divinity of Christ. It's unthinkable for a liberal to reject it, even when they read something like
this:
A bleak picture of the corrosive effects of ethnic diversity has been revealed in research by Harvard University’s Robert Putnam, one of the world’s most influential political scientists.
His research shows that the more diverse a community is, the less likely its inhabitants are to trust anyone – from their next-door neighbour to the mayor. . . .
The core message of the research was that, “in the presence of diversity, we hunker down”, he said. “We act like turtles. The effect of diversity is worse than had been imagined. And it’s not just that we don’t trust people who are not like us. In diverse communities, we don’t trust people who do look like us.”
A rationalist, which Atheists purport to be, would accept this information and change his thinking, he'd throw off the religious dogma of liberalism, reject its precepts because they were based on faith and invalidated by empiricism. If a rationalist thought about the points in this article, his rejection of liberal dogma would be further
confirmed:
But as Britain becomes more diverse that common culture is being eroded.
And therein lies one of the central dilemmas of political life in developed societies: sharing and solidarity can conflict with diversity. This is an especially acute dilemma for progressives who want plenty of both solidarity (high social cohesion and generous welfare paid out of a progressive tax system) and diversity (equal respect for a wide range of peoples, values and ways of life). The tension between the two values is a reminder that serious politics is about trade-offs. It also suggests that the left's recent love affair with diversity may come at the expense of the values and even the people that it once championed.
It was the Conservative politician David Willetts who drew my attention to the "progressive dilemma". Speaking at a roundtable on welfare reform, he said: "The basis on which you can extract large sums of money in tax and pay it out in benefits is that most people think the recipients are people like themselves, facing difficulties that they themselves could face. If values become more diverse, if lifestyles become more differentiated, then it becomes more difficult to sustain the legitimacy of a universal risk-pooling welfare state. People ask: 'Why should I pay for them when they are doing things that I wouldn't do?' This is America versus Sweden. You can have a Swedish welfare state provided that you are a homogeneous society with intensely shared values. In the United States you have a very diverse, individualistic society where people feel fewer obligations to fellow citizens. Progressives want diversity, but they thereby undermine part of the moral consensus on which a large welfare state rests." . . .
Moreover, modern liberal societies cannot be based on a simple assertion of group identity - the very idea of the rule of law, of equal legal treatment for everyone regardless of religion, wealth, gender or ethnicity, conflicts with it. On the other hand, if you deny the assumption that humans are social, group-based primates with constraints, however imprecise, on their willingness to share, you find yourself having to defend some implausible positions: for example, that we should spend as much on development aid as on the NHS, or that Britain should have no immigration controls at all. The implicit "calculus of affinity" in media reporting of disasters is easily mocked - two dead Britons will get the same space as 200 Spaniards or 2,000 Somalis. Yet every day we make similar calculations in the distribution of our own resources. Even a well-off, liberal-minded Briton who already donates to charities will spend, say, £200 on a child's birthday party, knowing that such money could, in the right hands, save the life of a child in the third world. The extent of our obligation to those to whom we are not connected through either kinship or citizenship is in part a purely private, charitable decision. . . .
Yet it is also true that Scandinavian countries with the biggest welfare states have been the most socially and ethnically homogeneous states in the west. By the same token, the welfare state has always been weaker in the individualistic, ethnically divided US compared with more homogeneous Europe. And the three bursts of welfarist legislation that the US did see - Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, Harry Truman's Fair Deal and Lyndon Johnson's Great Society - came during the long pause in mass immigration between the first world war and 1968. . . .
In their 2001 Harvard Institute of Economic Research paper "Why Doesn't the US Have a European-style Welfare State?", Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser and Bruce Sacerdote argue that the answer is that too many people at the bottom of the pile in the US are black or Hispanic. Across the US as a whole, 70% of the population are non-Hispanic whites - but of those in poverty only 46% are non-Hispanic whites. So a disproportionate amount of tax income spent on welfare is going to minorities. The paper also finds that US states that are more ethnically fragmented than average spend less on social services. The authors conclude that Americans think of the poor as members of a different group, whereas Europeans still think of the poor as members of the same group. Robert Putnam, the analyst of social capital, has also found a link between high ethnic mix and low trust in the US. There is some British evidence supporting this link, too. Researchers at Mori found that the average level of satisfaction with local authorities declines steeply as the extent of ethnic fragmentation increases. Even allowing for the fact that areas of high ethnic mix tend to be poorer, Mori found that ethnic fractionalisation still had a substantial negative impact on attitudes to local government.
Finally, Sweden and Denmark may provide a social laboratory for the solidarity/diversity trade-off in the coming years. Starting from similar positions as homogeneous countries with high levels of redistribution, they have taken rather different approaches to immigration over the past few years. Although both countries place great stress on integrating outsiders, Sweden has adopted a moderately multicultural outlook. It has also adapted its economy somewhat, reducing job protection for older native males in order to create more low-wage jobs for immigrants in the public sector. About 12% of Swedes are now foreign-born, and it is expected that by 2015 about 25% of under-18s will be either foreign-born or the children of the foreign-born. This is a radical change and Sweden is adapting to it rather well. (The first clips of mourning Swedes after the murder of the foreign minister Anna Lindh were of crying immigrants expressing their sorrow in perfect Swedish.) But not all Swedes are happy about it.
Denmark has a more restrictive and "nativist" approach to immigration. Only 6% of the population is foreign-born, and native Danes enjoy superior welfare benefits to incomers. If the solidarity/diversity trade-off is a real one and current trends continue, then one would expect in, say, 20 years that Sweden will have a less redistributive welfare state than Denmark; or rather that Denmark will have a more developed two-tier welfare state with higher benefits for insiders, while Sweden will have a universal but less generous system.
When a rationalist is confronted with this proposition:
"The basis on which you can extract large sums of money in tax and pay it out in benefits is that most people think the recipients are people like themselves, facing difficulties that they themselves could face. If values become more diverse, if lifestyles become more differentiated, then it becomes more difficult to sustain the legitimacy of a universal risk-pooling welfare state" he would consider both values and pick one because he realizes that it's impossible to have both, but those who cling to the Religion of Liberalism believe with the most heartfelt conviction that you can have a high sharing state and a very racially and culturally diverse state and everything will turn out fine. This is the equivalent of believing in angels.