Why the principles in Citizens United should be expanded

[Bfgrn]

Tell you what, why don't you tell me what facts the court decided on that you think they got wrong. My guess is you have no idea what you are talking about, but I am willing to give you a chance to prove me wrong. Give it a shot.

I just did. Maybe you need an interpreter?

Read Justice Stevens's scathing dissent.

CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N

Although this 2005 speech was before the Right wing robes manifesto, Bobby Kennedy Jr. hits the nail on the head.

There is nothing wrong with corporations. Corporations are a good thing. They encourage us to take risks. They maximize wealth. They create jobs. I own a corporation. They're a great thing, but they should not be running our government. The reason for that is they don't have the same aspirations for America that you and I do. A corporation does not want democracy. It does not want free markets, it wants profits, and the best way for it to get profits is to use our campaign-finance system -- which is just a system of legalized bribery -- to get their stakes, their hooks into a public official and then use that public official to dismantle the marketplace to give them a competitive advantage and then to privatize the commons, to steal the commonwealth, to liquidate public assets for cash, to plunder, to steal from the rest of us.

And that doesn't mean corporations are a bad thing. It just means they're amoral, and we have to recognize that and not let them into the political process. Let them do their thing, but they should not be participating in our political process, because a corporation cannot do something genuinely philanthropic. It's against the law in this country, because their shareholders can sue them for wasting corporate resources. They cannot legally do anything that will not increase their profit margins. That's the way the law works, and we have to recognize that and understand that they are toxic for the political process, and they have to be fenced off and kept out of the political process. This is why throughout our history our most visionary political leaders -- Republican and Democrat -- have been warning the American public against domination by corporate power.

This (Bush) White House has done a great job of persuading a gullible press and the American public that the big threat to American democracy is big government. Well, yeah, big government is a threat ultimately, but it is dwarfed by the threat of excessive corporate power and the corrosive impact that has on our democracy. And you know, as I said, you look at all the great political leaders in this country and the central theme is that we have to be cautious about, we have to avoid, the domination of our government by corporate power.

Teddy Roosevelt, a Republican, said that America would never be destroyed by a foreign power but he warned that our political institutions, our democratic institutions, would be subverted by malefactors of great wealth, who would erode them from within. Dwight Eisenhower, another Republican, in his most famous speech, warned America against domination by the military industrial complex.

Abraham Lincoln, the greatest Republican in our history, said during the height of the Civil War "I have the South in front of me and I have the bankers behind me. And for my country, I fear the bankers more." Franklin Roosevelt said during World War II that the domination of government by corporate power is "the essence of fascism" and Benito Mussolini -- who had an insider's view of that process -- said the same thing. Essentially, he complained that fascism should not be called fascism. It should be called corporatism because it was the merger of state and corporate power. And what we have to understand as Americans is that the domination of business by government is called communism. The domination of government by business is called fascism. And our job is to walk that narrow trail in between, which is free-market capitalism and democracy. And keep big government at bay with our right hand and corporate power at bay with our left.

That was the issue before the court. McCain Feingold specifically made it illegal for most corporations, and unions, to talk about political issues, but only during periods surrounding elections.

Want to try again?

I don't need to 'try again'. You need to learn how to comprehend.

Justice Stevens:

In the context of election to public office, the distinction between corporate and human speakers is significant. Although they make enormous contributions to our society, corporations are not actually members of it. They cannot vote or run for office. Because they may be managed and controlled by nonresidents, their interests may conflict in fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters. The financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental orientation of corporations raise legitimate concerns about their role in the electoral process. Our lawmakers have a compelling constitutional basis, if not also a democratic duty, to take measures designed to guard against the potentially deleterious effects of corporate spending in local and national races.

The majority’s approach to corporate electioneering marks a dramatic break from our past. Congress has placed special limitations on campaign spending by corporations ever since the passage of the Tillman Act in 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864. We have unanimously concluded that this “reflects a permissible assessment of the dangers posed by those entities to the electoral process,” FEC v. National Right to Work Comm. , 459 U. S. 197, 209 (1982) (NRWC) , and have accepted the “legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation,” id. , at 209–210. The Court today rejects a century of history when it treats the distinction between corporate and individual campaign spending as an invidious novelty born of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce , 494 U. S. 652 (1990) . Relying largely on individual dissenting opinions, the majority blazes through our precedents, overruling or disavowing a body of case law including FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life , Inc., 551 U. S. 449 (2007) (WRTL) , McConnell v. FEC , 540 U. S. 93 (2003) , FEC v. Beaumont , 539 U. S. 146 (2003) , FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life , Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (1986) (MCFL) , NRWC , 459 U. S. 197 , and California Medical Assn. v. FEC , 453 U. S. 182 (1981) .

In his landmark concurrence in Ashwander v. TVA , 297 U. S. 288, 346 (1936) , Justice Brandeis stressed the importance of adhering to rules the Court has “developed … for its own governance” when deciding constitutional questions. Because departures from those rules always enhance the risk of error, I shall review the background of this case in some detail before explaining why the Court’s analysis rests on a faulty understanding of Austin and McConnell and of our campaign finance jurisprudence more generally . 1 I regret the length of what follows, but the importance and novelty of the Court’s opinion require a full response. Although I concur in the Court’s decision to sustain BCRA’s disclosure provisions and join Part IV of its opinion, I emphatically dissent from its principal holding.

I

The Court’s ruling threatens to undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the Nation. The path it has taken to reach its outcome will, I fear, do damage to this institution. Before turning to the question whether to overrule Austin and part of McConnell , it is important to explain why the Court should not be deciding that question.

Scope of the Case

The first reason is that the question was not properly brought before us. In declaring §203 of BCRA facially unconstitutional on the ground that corporations’ electoral expenditures may not be regulated any more stringently than those of individuals, the majority decides this case on a basis relinquished below, not included in the questions presented to us by the litigants, and argued here only in response to the Court’s invitation. This procedure is unusual and inadvisable for a court. 2 Our colleagues’ suggestion that “we are asked to reconsider Austin and, in effect, McConnell ,” ante , at 1, would be more accurate if rephrased to state that “we have asked ourselves” to reconsider those cases.

...

Essentially, five Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the case before us, so they changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to change the law.

 

[C_Clayton_Jones]

Let me ask you this; do any of the citizens who are part of a corporation have any less first amendment rights than you or I do as individuals? BUT, do you and I have the same collective power to get our beliefs out to the general public?

Whatever inequities may exist between corporate and individual, they do not justify government preemption. The ‘remedy’ to prohibiting someone yelling "fire" in a crowded theater is not to lock the doors to the theater allowing no one to enter.

One might be in agreement there is a problem, at issue is the remedy.

The Roberts court ruled that money can buy MORE free speech, influence the outcome of elections and control government to the benefit of stockholders.

It did no such thing.

The Court correctly determined that the policy as implemented exceeded the government’s authority to regulate speech:

This regulatory scheme may not be a prior restraint on speech in the strict sense of that term, for prospective speakers are not compelled by law to seek an advisory opinion from the FEC before the speech takes place. Cf. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson , 283 U. S. 697, 712–713 (1931) . As a practical matter, however, given the complexity of the regulations and the deference courts show to administrative determinations, a speaker who wants to avoid threats of criminal liability and the heavy costs of defending against FEC enforcement must ask a governmental agency for prior permission to speak. See 2 U. S. C. §437f; 11 CFR §112.1. These onerous restrictions thus function as the equivalent of prior restraint by giving the FEC power analogous to licensing laws implemented in 16th- and 17th-century England, laws and governmental practices of the sort that the First Amendment was drawn to prohibit. See Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist. , 534 U. S. 316, 320 (2002) ; Lovell v. City of Griffin , 303 U. S. 444, 451–452 (1938) ; Near , supra , at 713–714. Because the FEC’s “business is to censor, there inheres the danger that [it] may well be less responsive than a court—part of an independent branch of government—to the constitutionally protected interests in free expression.” Freedman v. Maryland , 380 U. S. 51, 57–58 (1965) . When the FEC issues advisory opinions that prohibit speech, “[m]any persons, rather than undertake the considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through case-by-case litigation, will choose simply to abstain from protected speech—harming not only themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.” Virginia v. Hicks , 539 U. S. 113, 119 (2003) (citation omitted). Consequently, “the censor’s determination may in practice be final.” Freedman , supra , at 58.

It’s true a quasi-conservative Court dismantled a regulatory entity, but it did so in the context of well-established and well-reasoned case law; it’s difficult to take issue with the Court when it restricts government per the First Amendment, as intended by the Framers.

It is incumbent upon the Court, however, to rule in a consistent manner when a less attractive minority seeks relief when its right to free expression is curtailed by the state.

 

[Bfgrn]

Let me ask you this; do any of the citizens who are part of a corporation have any less first amendment rights than you or I do as individuals? BUT, do you and I have the same collective power to get our beliefs out to the general public?

Whatever inequities may exist between corporate and individual, they do not justify government preemption. The ‘remedy’ to prohibiting someone yelling "fire" in a crowded theater is not to lock the doors to the theater allowing no one to enter.

One might be in agreement there is a problem, at issue is the remedy.

The Roberts court ruled that money can buy MORE free speech, influence the outcome of elections and control government to the benefit of stockholders.

It did no such thing.

The Court correctly determined that the policy as implemented exceeded the government’s authority to regulate speech:

This regulatory scheme may not be a prior restraint on speech in the strict sense of that term, for prospective speakers are not compelled by law to seek an advisory opinion from the FEC before the speech takes place. Cf. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson , 283 U. S. 697, 712–713 (1931) . As a practical matter, however, given the complexity of the regulations and the deference courts show to administrative determinations, a speaker who wants to avoid threats of criminal liability and the heavy costs of defending against FEC enforcement must ask a governmental agency for prior permission to speak. See 2 U. S. C. §437f; 11 CFR §112.1. These onerous restrictions thus function as the equivalent of prior restraint by giving the FEC power analogous to licensing laws implemented in 16th- and 17th-century England, laws and governmental practices of the sort that the First Amendment was drawn to prohibit. See Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist. , 534 U. S. 316, 320 (2002) ; Lovell v. City of Griffin , 303 U. S. 444, 451–452 (1938) ; Near , supra , at 713–714. Because the FEC’s “business is to censor, there inheres the danger that [it] may well be less responsive than a court—part of an independent branch of government—to the constitutionally protected interests in free expression.” Freedman v. Maryland , 380 U. S. 51, 57–58 (1965) . When the FEC issues advisory opinions that prohibit speech, “[m]any persons, rather than undertake the considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through case-by-case litigation, will choose simply to abstain from protected speech—harming not only themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.” Virginia v. Hicks , 539 U. S. 113, 119 (2003) (citation omitted). Consequently, “the censor’s determination may in practice be final.” Freedman , supra , at 58.

It’s true a quasi-conservative Court dismantled a regulatory entity, but it did so in the context of well-established and well-reasoned case law; it’s difficult to take issue with the Court when it restricts government per the First Amendment, as intended by the Framers.

It is incumbent upon the Court, however, to rule in a consistent manner when a less attractive minority seeks relief when its right to free expression is curtailed by the state.

So, you don't see any danger? Is that what you are saying? Is Supreme Court justices ruling doctrinaire and a manifesto based on a dogmatic economic zealotry and conditions that do not exist in the real world what our founding father's envisioned for their nation and government?

Do you know how our founding fathers governed? Do you know how they treated corporations??

 

[Quantum Windbag]

I just did. Maybe you need an interpreter?

Read Justice Stevens's scathing dissent.

CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N

Although this 2005 speech was before the Right wing robes manifesto, Bobby Kennedy Jr. hits the nail on the head.

There is nothing wrong with corporations. Corporations are a good thing. They encourage us to take risks. They maximize wealth. They create jobs. I own a corporation. They're a great thing, but they should not be running our government. The reason for that is they don't have the same aspirations for America that you and I do. A corporation does not want democracy. It does not want free markets, it wants profits, and the best way for it to get profits is to use our campaign-finance system -- which is just a system of legalized bribery -- to get their stakes, their hooks into a public official and then use that public official to dismantle the marketplace to give them a competitive advantage and then to privatize the commons, to steal the commonwealth, to liquidate public assets for cash, to plunder, to steal from the rest of us.

And that doesn't mean corporations are a bad thing. It just means they're amoral, and we have to recognize that and not let them into the political process. Let them do their thing, but they should not be participating in our political process, because a corporation cannot do something genuinely philanthropic. It's against the law in this country, because their shareholders can sue them for wasting corporate resources. They cannot legally do anything that will not increase their profit margins. That's the way the law works, and we have to recognize that and understand that they are toxic for the political process, and they have to be fenced off and kept out of the political process. This is why throughout our history our most visionary political leaders -- Republican and Democrat -- have been warning the American public against domination by corporate power.

This (Bush) White House has done a great job of persuading a gullible press and the American public that the big threat to American democracy is big government. Well, yeah, big government is a threat ultimately, but it is dwarfed by the threat of excessive corporate power and the corrosive impact that has on our democracy. And you know, as I said, you look at all the great political leaders in this country and the central theme is that we have to be cautious about, we have to avoid, the domination of our government by corporate power.

Teddy Roosevelt, a Republican, said that America would never be destroyed by a foreign power but he warned that our political institutions, our democratic institutions, would be subverted by malefactors of great wealth, who would erode them from within. Dwight Eisenhower, another Republican, in his most famous speech, warned America against domination by the military industrial complex.

Abraham Lincoln, the greatest Republican in our history, said during the height of the Civil War "I have the South in front of me and I have the bankers behind me. And for my country, I fear the bankers more." Franklin Roosevelt said during World War II that the domination of government by corporate power is "the essence of fascism" and Benito Mussolini -- who had an insider's view of that process -- said the same thing. Essentially, he complained that fascism should not be called fascism. It should be called corporatism because it was the merger of state and corporate power. And what we have to understand as Americans is that the domination of business by government is called communism. The domination of government by business is called fascism. And our job is to walk that narrow trail in between, which is free-market capitalism and democracy. And keep big government at bay with our right hand and corporate power at bay with our left.

That was the issue before the court. McCain Feingold specifically made it illegal for most corporations, and unions, to talk about political issues, but only during periods surrounding elections.

Want to try again?

I don't need to 'try again'. You need to learn how to comprehend.

Justice Stevens:

In the context of election to public office, the distinction between corporate and human speakers is significant. Although they make enormous contributions to our society, corporations are not actually members of it. They cannot vote or run for office. Because they may be managed and controlled by nonresidents, their interests may conflict in fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters. The financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental orientation of corporations raise legitimate concerns about their role in the electoral process. Our lawmakers have a compelling constitutional basis, if not also a democratic duty, to take measures designed to guard against the potentially deleterious effects of corporate spending in local and national races.

The majority’s approach to corporate electioneering marks a dramatic break from our past. Congress has placed special limitations on campaign spending by corporations ever since the passage of the Tillman Act in 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864. We have unanimously concluded that this “reflects a permissible assessment of the dangers posed by those entities to the electoral process,” FEC v. National Right to Work Comm. , 459 U. S. 197, 209 (1982) (NRWC) , and have accepted the “legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation,” id. , at 209–210. The Court today rejects a century of history when it treats the distinction between corporate and individual campaign spending as an invidious novelty born of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce , 494 U. S. 652 (1990) . Relying largely on individual dissenting opinions, the majority blazes through our precedents, overruling or disavowing a body of case law including FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life , Inc., 551 U. S. 449 (2007) (WRTL) , McConnell v. FEC , 540 U. S. 93 (2003) , FEC v. Beaumont , 539 U. S. 146 (2003) , FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life , Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (1986) (MCFL) , NRWC , 459 U. S. 197 , and California Medical Assn. v. FEC , 453 U. S. 182 (1981) .

In his landmark concurrence in Ashwander v. TVA , 297 U. S. 288, 346 (1936) , Justice Brandeis stressed the importance of adhering to rules the Court has “developed … for its own governance” when deciding constitutional questions. Because departures from those rules always enhance the risk of error, I shall review the background of this case in some detail before explaining why the Court’s analysis rests on a faulty understanding of Austin and McConnell and of our campaign finance jurisprudence more generally . 1 I regret the length of what follows, but the importance and novelty of the Court’s opinion require a full response. Although I concur in the Court’s decision to sustain BCRA’s disclosure provisions and join Part IV of its opinion, I emphatically dissent from its principal holding.

I

The Court’s ruling threatens to undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the Nation. The path it has taken to reach its outcome will, I fear, do damage to this institution. Before turning to the question whether to overrule Austin and part of McConnell , it is important to explain why the Court should not be deciding that question.

Scope of the Case

The first reason is that the question was not properly brought before us. In declaring §203 of BCRA facially unconstitutional on the ground that corporations’ electoral expenditures may not be regulated any more stringently than those of individuals, the majority decides this case on a basis relinquished below, not included in the questions presented to us by the litigants, and argued here only in response to the Court’s invitation. This procedure is unusual and inadvisable for a court. 2 Our colleagues’ suggestion that “we are asked to reconsider Austin and, in effect, McConnell ,” ante , at 1, would be more accurate if rephrased to state that “we have asked ourselves” to reconsider those cases.

...

Essentially, five Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the case before us, so they changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to change the law.

The appellant brief specifically asked the court to overrule McConnell, yet Stevens is saying it didn't. Who am I to believe, my own eyes, or a man who would prefer that we still live with Jim Crow laws and segregation just because the court once ruled that they were constitutional?

 

[Bfgrn]

That was the issue before the court. McCain Feingold specifically made it illegal for most corporations, and unions, to talk about political issues, but only during periods surrounding elections.

Want to try again?

I don't need to 'try again'. You need to learn how to comprehend.

Justice Stevens:

In the context of election to public office, the distinction between corporate and human speakers is significant. Although they make enormous contributions to our society, corporations are not actually members of it. They cannot vote or run for office. Because they may be managed and controlled by nonresidents, their interests may conflict in fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters. The financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental orientation of corporations raise legitimate concerns about their role in the electoral process. Our lawmakers have a compelling constitutional basis, if not also a democratic duty, to take measures designed to guard against the potentially deleterious effects of corporate spending in local and national races.

The majority’s approach to corporate electioneering marks a dramatic break from our past. Congress has placed special limitations on campaign spending by corporations ever since the passage of the Tillman Act in 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864. We have unanimously concluded that this “reflects a permissible assessment of the dangers posed by those entities to the electoral process,” FEC v. National Right to Work Comm. , 459 U. S. 197, 209 (1982) (NRWC) , and have accepted the “legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation,” id. , at 209–210. The Court today rejects a century of history when it treats the distinction between corporate and individual campaign spending as an invidious novelty born of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce , 494 U. S. 652 (1990) . Relying largely on individual dissenting opinions, the majority blazes through our precedents, overruling or disavowing a body of case law including FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life , Inc., 551 U. S. 449 (2007) (WRTL) , McConnell v. FEC , 540 U. S. 93 (2003) , FEC v. Beaumont , 539 U. S. 146 (2003) , FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life , Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (1986) (MCFL) , NRWC , 459 U. S. 197 , and California Medical Assn. v. FEC , 453 U. S. 182 (1981) .

In his landmark concurrence in Ashwander v. TVA , 297 U. S. 288, 346 (1936) , Justice Brandeis stressed the importance of adhering to rules the Court has “developed … for its own governance” when deciding constitutional questions. Because departures from those rules always enhance the risk of error, I shall review the background of this case in some detail before explaining why the Court’s analysis rests on a faulty understanding of Austin and McConnell and of our campaign finance jurisprudence more generally . 1 I regret the length of what follows, but the importance and novelty of the Court’s opinion require a full response. Although I concur in the Court’s decision to sustain BCRA’s disclosure provisions and join Part IV of its opinion, I emphatically dissent from its principal holding.

I

The Court’s ruling threatens to undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the Nation. The path it has taken to reach its outcome will, I fear, do damage to this institution. Before turning to the question whether to overrule Austin and part of McConnell , it is important to explain why the Court should not be deciding that question.

Scope of the Case

The first reason is that the question was not properly brought before us. In declaring §203 of BCRA facially unconstitutional on the ground that corporations’ electoral expenditures may not be regulated any more stringently than those of individuals, the majority decides this case on a basis relinquished below, not included in the questions presented to us by the litigants, and argued here only in response to the Court’s invitation. This procedure is unusual and inadvisable for a court. 2 Our colleagues’ suggestion that “we are asked to reconsider Austin and, in effect, McConnell ,” ante , at 1, would be more accurate if rephrased to state that “we have asked ourselves” to reconsider those cases.

...

Essentially, five Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the case before us, so they changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to change the law.

The appellant brief specifically asked the court to overrule McConnell, yet Stevens is saying it didn't. Who am I to believe, my own eyes, or a man who would prefer that we still live with Jim Crow laws and segregation just because the court once ruled that they were constitutional?

Commenting on the procedural issues, Justice Stevens said that although there was initially a “facial challenge to the constitutionality of Section 203 [of the Act]” . . . . n its motion for summary judgment . . . Citizens United expressly abandoned its facial challenge. . . and the parties stipulated to the dismissal of that claim.” He observes that the Court typically does not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it nor formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise fact to which it is to be applied.

What is this crap about Justice Stevens and Jim Crow laws?

 

[editec]

You just proved that you don't understand hypocrisy....Oh....how, ironic. Plus, I acknowledged how silly your analogy was.

Plus, this is a state issue, not a federal issue.

It ceases being a state issue when it is found in violation of Constitutional law.

Sadly (in this case) it is.

It appears to me that that state law violates citizens' constitutional right to freedom of assembly, and citizens constitutional right to freedom of speech, too.

I approve of the motive behind the law, but I don't think it will pass constitutional muster.

First off, we disagree with what a Constitutional law is. While I am a aberration and believe in individualism and self-determination of the American people and states, many disagree with me.

However, we live in a day of age of omniscient federal government and SCOTUS so you and your statist friend are correct.

Listen, jerkoff...if I note that something terrible is happening, that doesn't mean I approve of it.


STop inventing enemies and start trying to figure out what the fuck is going on and who is making it happen, lad.

 

[Quantum Windbag]

I don't need to 'try again'. You need to learn how to comprehend.

Justice Stevens:

In the context of election to public office, the distinction between corporate and human speakers is significant. Although they make enormous contributions to our society, corporations are not actually members of it. They cannot vote or run for office. Because they may be managed and controlled by nonresidents, their interests may conflict in fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters. The financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental orientation of corporations raise legitimate concerns about their role in the electoral process. Our lawmakers have a compelling constitutional basis, if not also a democratic duty, to take measures designed to guard against the potentially deleterious effects of corporate spending in local and national races.

The majority’s approach to corporate electioneering marks a dramatic break from our past. Congress has placed special limitations on campaign spending by corporations ever since the passage of the Tillman Act in 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864. We have unanimously concluded that this “reflects a permissible assessment of the dangers posed by those entities to the electoral process,” FEC v. National Right to Work Comm. , 459 U. S. 197, 209 (1982) (NRWC) , and have accepted the “legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation,” id. , at 209–210. The Court today rejects a century of history when it treats the distinction between corporate and individual campaign spending as an invidious novelty born of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce , 494 U. S. 652 (1990) . Relying largely on individual dissenting opinions, the majority blazes through our precedents, overruling or disavowing a body of case law including FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life , Inc., 551 U. S. 449 (2007) (WRTL) , McConnell v. FEC , 540 U. S. 93 (2003) , FEC v. Beaumont , 539 U. S. 146 (2003) , FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life , Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (1986) (MCFL) , NRWC , 459 U. S. 197 , and California Medical Assn. v. FEC , 453 U. S. 182 (1981) .

In his landmark concurrence in Ashwander v. TVA , 297 U. S. 288, 346 (1936) , Justice Brandeis stressed the importance of adhering to rules the Court has “developed … for its own governance” when deciding constitutional questions. Because departures from those rules always enhance the risk of error, I shall review the background of this case in some detail before explaining why the Court’s analysis rests on a faulty understanding of Austin and McConnell and of our campaign finance jurisprudence more generally . 1 I regret the length of what follows, but the importance and novelty of the Court’s opinion require a full response. Although I concur in the Court’s decision to sustain BCRA’s disclosure provisions and join Part IV of its opinion, I emphatically dissent from its principal holding.

I

The Court’s ruling threatens to undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the Nation. The path it has taken to reach its outcome will, I fear, do damage to this institution. Before turning to the question whether to overrule Austin and part of McConnell , it is important to explain why the Court should not be deciding that question.

Scope of the Case

The first reason is that the question was not properly brought before us. In declaring §203 of BCRA facially unconstitutional on the ground that corporations’ electoral expenditures may not be regulated any more stringently than those of individuals, the majority decides this case on a basis relinquished below, not included in the questions presented to us by the litigants, and argued here only in response to the Court’s invitation. This procedure is unusual and inadvisable for a court. 2 Our colleagues’ suggestion that “we are asked to reconsider Austin and, in effect, McConnell ,” ante , at 1, would be more accurate if rephrased to state that “we have asked ourselves” to reconsider those cases.

...

Essentially, five Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the case before us, so they changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to change the law.

The appellant brief specifically asked the court to overrule McConnell, yet Stevens is saying it didn't. Who am I to believe, my own eyes, or a man who would prefer that we still live with Jim Crow laws and segregation just because the court once ruled that they were constitutional?

Commenting on the procedural issues, Justice Stevens said that although there was initially a “facial challenge to the constitutionality of Section 203 [of the Act]” . . . . n its motion for summary judgment . . . Citizens United expressly abandoned its facial challenge. . . and the parties stipulated to the dismissal of that claim.” He observes that the Court typically does not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it nor formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise fact to which it is to be applied.

What is this crap about Justice Stevens and Jim Crow laws?

It isn't crap, Stevens is a big advocate of stare decisis which basically means following precedent even when it is wrong. I also enjoy the way you keep insisting that Stevens saying that the court typically doesn't do something proves it has to go that way. You know that typically does not mean always, don't you? You don't have a problem with SCOTUS when they did that in Roe, you shouldn't have a problem with them doing it in CU.

 

[Bfgrn]

The appellant brief specifically asked the court to overrule McConnell, yet Stevens is saying it didn't. Who am I to believe, my own eyes, or a man who would prefer that we still live with Jim Crow laws and segregation just because the court once ruled that they were constitutional?

Commenting on the procedural issues, Justice Stevens said that although there was initially a “facial challenge to the constitutionality of Section 203 [of the Act]” . . . . n its motion for summary judgment . . . Citizens United expressly abandoned its facial challenge. . . and the parties stipulated to the dismissal of that claim.” He observes that the Court typically does not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it nor formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise fact to which it is to be applied.

What is this crap about Justice Stevens and Jim Crow laws?

It isn't crap, Stevens is a big advocate of stare decisis which basically means following precedent even when it is wrong. I also enjoy the way you keep insisting that Stevens saying that the court typically doesn't do something proves it has to go that way. You know that typically does not mean always, don't you? You don't have a problem with SCOTUS when they did that in Roe, you shouldn't have a problem with them doing it in CU.

Interesting you brought up stare decisis.

One of the issues that concerned some of the senators during Robert's confirmation hearing was whether Judge Roberts’s ideology would cause him to ignore the established principle of stare decisis that says courts should give great weight to judicial precedent and be slow to overturn established law. The reasons for the rule were best expressed by Judge Roberts himself when in response to questions from Senator Arlen Specter he said:

“I do think that it is a jolt to the legal system when you overrule a precedent. Precedent plays an important role in promoting stability and evenhandedness. It is not enough — and the court has emphasized this on several occasions — it is not enough that you may think the prior decision was wrongly decided. That really doesn’t answer the question, it just poses the question.

And you do look at these other factors, like settled expectations, like the legitimacy of the court, like whether a particular precedent is workable or not, whether a precedent has been eroded by subsequent developments. All of those factors go into the determination of whether to revisit a precedent under the principles of stare decisis. . . . If a[n] overruling of a prior precedent is a jolt to the legal system, it is inconsistent with principles of stability. . . . [T]he principles of stare decisis recognize that there are situations when that’s a price that has to be paid.”

On January 21, 2010, in the case of Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, the Chief Justice was part of the 5 person majority that overruled decades of established law to find that the law limiting corporate expenditures in political campaigns is unconstitutional even though, as Justice Stevens observed in his dissent, the Court had adequate grounds to rule in favor of the plaintiffs without holding the statute unconstitutional. Mindful of his senate testimony, the Chief Justice wrote a 14-page mea culpa (in legal parlance called a concurring opinion) explaining why his vote to overrule earlier cases did not overrule his testimony before the U.S. Senate. What was notable about the Chief Justice’s concurring opinion was not so much what he wrote as to how it came to be written.

 

[Mr. Shaman]

"Maybe there really were five justices who didn’t understand that this was bound to happen when Citizens United was handed down in 2010, but, in the wake of these backroom meetings between top funders and their candidates, the justices cannot possibly deny the fact that Citizens United leads to corruption or at least the appearance of it. It’s time for the justices to simply admit they were wrong the first time around and overrule Citizens United."

Roberts: One More Bush Screw-Up

​

 

[Procrustes Stretched]

Why the principles in Citizens United should be expanded

...

because we want to see people like Newt who garner very few votes, stay in the election through the donations of a single individual who himself is against the process he is taking advantage of.

“I’m against very wealthy *people attempting to or influencing elections,” he said. “But as long as it’s doable, I’m going to do it..."

- Sheldon Adelson 'might' give $100 million to help Gingrich - latimes.com

way to fuck things up more: expand the principles in Citizens United

 

[Procrustes Stretched]

schadenfreude: it means enjoying the pain of the GOP while they enjoy the freedoms and liberties of Citizen's United ruling.

 

[editec]

Yeah, I sometimes wonder if the Citizen United decision isn't the DREAD SCOTT decision of our time.

Where this foolish policy will lead the nation I am not sure.

But I doubt its going to lead America to a happy place.

 

[Procrustes Stretched]

Yeah, I sometimes wonder if the Citizen United decision isn't the DREAD SCOTT decision of our time.

Where this foolish policy will lead the nation I am not sure.

But I doubt its going to lead America to a happy place.

Ideological battles like what the SCOTUS did in order to justify the Citizens United ruling are terrible Judicial policy.

here is someone I agree with

"The Court reached to make new constitutional law by ordering a re-argument of a minor case that itself raised no direct challenge to the laws and precedents that it ultimately overruled; dismissed the legitimacy of laws enacted over a century by Congress and state legislatures; equated the free speech protections of individuals and corporations in spite of countless laws and precedents that insisted on meaningful differences; and provided not a shred of evidence of new conditions or harmful effects that justified imposing their own ideological preferences on a body of settled law and social tradition."
- SCOTUS drastically departs from precedent in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission | The Conservation Report

 

[theDoctorisIn]

There are idiots out there that think politicians have their best interests at heart. I cannot stress enough just how stupid that belief is.

Dina Galassini does not seem to pose a threat to Arizona’s civic integrity. But the government of this desert community believes that you cannot be too careful. And state law empowers local governments to be vigilant against the lurking danger that political speech might occur before the speakers notify the government and comply with all the speech rules.
Last October, Galassini became annoyed — like many Ron Paul supporters, she is easily annoyed by government — about the city’s plan to augment its spending with a $29.6 million bond issue, to be voted on by mail by Nov. 8. On Oct. 6, she sent e-mails to 23 friends and acquaintances, urging them to write letters to newspapers and join her in two demonstrations against the bond measure. On Oct. 12, before she could organize the demonstrations, she received a stern letter from the town clerk: “I would strongly encourage you to cease any campaign-related activities until the requirements of the law have been met.”
State law — this is the state of John McCain, apostle of political purification through the regulation of political speech — says that anytime two or more people work together to influence a vote on a ballot measure, they instantly become a “political committee.” This transformation triggers various requirements — registering with the government, filing forms, establishing a bank account for the “committee” even if it has raised no money and does not intend to. This must be done before members of this fictitious “committee” may speak.

States are cracking down on political speech with burdensome laws - The Washington Post

What does this have to do with "Citizen's United"?

 

[zeke]

How is that Citizen United ruling working out for the Rethug party?

Newt should have, would have been gone long ago without his super pac daddy. Think Newts ability to stay in a race based on private money and not public support has been in the Rethugs interest?

Are you not even a little concerned about what promises are made by politicians to the individual or corporation for spending all that unlimited money on their behalf.

Or do you think that the big money players will want nothing in return? Ultra rich folks enjoy spending millions on a political campaign. With no pay back. Not likely.

 

[Dr.Traveler]

While I understand that the op is outlining an obviously ridiculous situation that needs addressing, Citiznes should NOT be expanded but rolled back. Citizens is the reason the GOP will have Mitt Romney as its nominee in the general, and why Obama will win in the General.

If you want to see what Citizens can do to a race, go back and look at Ohio on Super Tuesday.

 

[zeke]

Citiznes should NOT be expanded but rolled back.

Problem as I see it is that the plutocrats worked extremely hard to get this decision and it will be almost impossible to reverse it.

Just like the original Patriot act has morphed into even more possible citizens rights abuses, Citizens United may be just as bad. Or worse, if possible. IMO.

 

[editec]

Citizens United doesn't WORK OUT for Republicans or DEMOCRATS, folks.

It works out for the MASTERS who control both parties.

It is a ruling that serves only BIG CAPITAL and entirely at the expense of the demos.

 

[Procrustes Stretched]

Citizens United doesn't WORK OUT for Republicans or DEMOCRATS, folks.

It works out for the MASTERS who control both parties.

It is a ruling that serves only BIG CAPITAL and entirely at the expense of the demos.

alert!

The BIG CAPITAL and party Masters behind the GOP are livid at what citizens united has done their guy Mitt Romney and the nomination process.

the poster quoted above is a moron on this issue

 

[Bfgrn]

Yeah, I sometimes wonder if the Citizen United decision isn't the DREAD SCOTT decision of our time.

Where this foolish policy will lead the nation I am not sure.

But I doubt its going to lead America to a happy place.

Ideological battles like what the SCOTUS did in order to justify the Citizens United ruling are terrible Judicial policy.

here is someone I agree with

"The Court reached to make new constitutional law by ordering a re-argument of a minor case that itself raised no direct challenge to the laws and precedents that it ultimately overruled; dismissed the legitimacy of laws enacted over a century by Congress and state legislatures; equated the free speech protections of individuals and corporations in spite of countless laws and precedents that insisted on meaningful differences; and provided not a shred of evidence of new conditions or harmful effects that justified imposing their own ideological preferences on a body of settled law and social tradition."
- SCOTUS drastically departs from precedent in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission | The Conservation Report

If you want a clear understanding of this ruling, here is an excellent analysis. The right wing robes have taken the right's 'free market' economic dogma and applied it to caselaw, and overturned 150 years of legislation, caselaw and jurisprudence.

CITIZENS UNITED AS NEOLIBERAL JURISPRUDENCE: THE RESURGENCE OF ECONOMIC THEORY

Two things stand out in the majority opinion: first, it espouses a dogmatic, free market form of economic theory; and second, it is printed on the pages of a judicial opinion that authoritatively defines the terms of the First Amendment. This combination of capitalist ideology and caselaw makes up what I call neoliberal jurisprudence, the use of neoclassical economic theory as judicial reasoning.... “the idea that much of politics could be understood as if it were a market process, and therefore amenable to formalization through neoclassical theory.” Based on the claim that voters and politicians are only out to maximize their own gains, neoliberalism sees “the state [as] merely an inferior means of
attaining outcomes that the market could provide better and more efficiently.” With regard to its instrumental purposes, neoliberalism is based on two realizations: “[t]he [m]arket would not naturally conjure the conditions for its own continued flourishing”; and, accordingly, the state must be “reengineer[ed] . . . in order to guarantee the success of the market and its most important participants, modern corporations.”

For now, it suffices to note that it is a jurisprudence that borrows openly from neoclassical economic theory and that its goals do not include efficiency, for neoliberalism relies not on evidence but on general precepts. Incorporated into caselaw, neoliberalism becomes an explicitly ideological variant of legal philosophy that seeks the creation of an unregulated market for political goods.

A close reading of Citizens reveals that the five conservative Justices of the Roberts Court have redefined democracy on the basis of this free market approach to constitutional values. This much is evident in the principles affirmed by the majority: corporations have a First Amendment right to political speech; a restraint on how that speech is funded is a constraint on speech itself; political speech must occur in an unregulated market; the government is untrustworthy and corporations are trustworthy; the only acceptable role for government in regulating money in politics is to prevent quid pro quo corruption; enhancing the voice of some by restricting the voice of others is unconstitutional; undue influence and unequal access are perfectly democratic and compatible with public trust in the system; and an open market is necessarily competitive and home to diverse viewpoints that inform a vigilant and independent electorate.

http://www.student.virginia.edu/vjspl/18.3/_Kuhner.pdf