Was American isolationism taken as a sign of cowardice?

[Otis Mayfield]

And they stockpiled, and made plans for other sources, as the links at the links I posted indicate. As for iron and other metals, they scoured the U.S. junkyards like locusts in the post-WW I decades. This isn't any big secret. One of my grandfather's best friends got wealthy selling scrap metal from the oil patches and railroads to the Japanese in the 1930's; so did a lot of junkyard and wrecking yard owners.

During 1944, the balance of naval power in the Pacific decisively turned against Japan, and by early 1945, its fleet was much depleted and badly hobbled by critical fuel shortages in the home islands. In a desperate attempt to slow the Allied advance, Yamato was dispatched on a one-way mission to Okinawa in April 1945, with orders to beach herself and fight until destroyed, thus protecting the island

Japanese battleship Yamato - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The Yamamoto had enough fuel for a one way trip to Okinawa.

Other ships of the line were docked and used as flak platforms to protect the harbors.

 

[DudleySmith]

During 1944, the balance of naval power in the Pacific decisively turned against Japan, and by early 1945, its fleet was much depleted and badly hobbled by critical fuel shortages in the home islands. In a desperate attempt to slow the Allied advance, Yamato was dispatched on a one-way mission to Okinawa in April 1945, with orders to beach herself and fight until destroyed, thus protecting the island

Japanese battleship Yamato - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The Yamamoto had enough fuel for a one way trip to Okinawa.

Other ships of the line were docked and used as flak platforms to protect the harbors.

Yes, as already pointed out they had a three year supply, as they themselves calculated. By 1944 they were making fuel from pine wood in the home islands.

As it was, the Japanese had their way in the Pacific for a short time, and grabbed most of the oil of the East Indies, despite Allied attempts to destroy those facilities. For a time, the Imperial Navy and Army achieved what Hitler never did - oil independence.

Then they ran into another problem that rendered their possession of the oil fields meaningless - the second oil paradox of the war in the Pacific. The Japanese had an insufficient number of tankers to haul the needed oil to their industrial plants in the home islands and the many outposts spread across their vast empire. For the tankers they did have, they demonstrated an increasing inability to protect them from the attacks of Allied submarines, surface ships and aircraft. Oil had to travel thousands of miles to get from the fields of Balikpapan in Borneo to home ports in Japan. The Allies were lying in wait all along the route.

Immediately after taking command of the Pacific Fleet, Adm. Nimitz came to an agreement with Adm. Ernest King, the Chief of Naval Operations, that "the primary objectives of the Allied armed forces were to safeguard their own supply lines and then drive westward in order to capture bases from which Japan's indispensable 'oil line' might be blocked."

One of the most important ship sinkings of the war occurred when the U.S. submarine Grenadier sank the Taiyo Maru in the summer of 1942. Over 1,000 Japanese petroleum experts and technicians were on board, heading for the Indies to spur oil production. A total of 780 of them perished in the attack. By the end of the war, 110 Japanese tankers had been made victims of American submarines, and joined the Taiyo Maru on the bottom of the Pacific Ocean.

The protective measures the Japanese did attempt to take proved to be of little help. U.S. cryptanalysts had broken the Japanese naval code and were fully informed of tanker schedules and cargoes. The Imperial Navy was slow to respond; it did not establish convoys for the precious tankers until 1943.

...

There were no half-measures during the great Allied counteroffensive in the Pacific War. Gen. Curtis LeMay assigned the entire Guam-based 315th Bombardment Wing to strike at Japanese fuel facilities. By the end of the war, Japanese refinery output was down to six percent of normal, and the civilians in the homeland were reduced to such things as attempting to brew fuel from pine roots.

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www.eiaonline.com

More here, including the Russian sources.

• The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: Oil
• Empire of Japan database: Oil
• The Way To Pearl Harbor: US vs Japan by Yuichi Arima
• Japan's need for oil and the Embargo (1940-1941)
• Empire of Japan (economic and financial data): Natural Resources in occupied areas after 1937
• Choke Hold: The Attack On Japanese Oil in WWII by Stephen L. Wolborsky. Specifically Chapter 2, "The Campaign Against Japanese Oil".
• The Sakhalin Anomaly by Prof. Alexander Igolkin, "Oil of Russia", No. 1, 2004.

Yes, the Soviets still supplied the Japanese with oil while claiming to be our 'allies'.

 

[whitehall]

The USS Enterprise was on the way back to Hawaii after delivering a dozen Wildcats to Wake Island.

The USS Lexington was on the way to Midway with 18 Vindicators. The attack resulted in the ship turning around and returning to Hawaii, not delivering the aircraft.

The USS Saratoga had just finished a six month overhaul at Puget Sound, and was enroute back to San Diego. She did not even have her air group on board, and was to pick up that and fighters for transfer to Hawaii.

So that is the location of each carrier on 7 December. The Saratoga actually had her overhaul cut short, and was sailing without escorts and fighters as they wanted her to start ferry duties as soon as possible. The other 3 Pacific carriers were almost constantly running from Hawaii to various island outposts delivering fighters as quickly as they could. Philippines, Wake, Midway, the US was trying to increase the number of aircraft as quickly as they could.

If one "knows an attack is coming", they do not send out lone carriers by themselves. Especially knowing that once they delivered their fighters they would have almost no air cover for the return trip.

And yes, many had the message before the Japanese ambassador did. But they had to keep the secret of MAGIC for as long as they could. More than anything else, that is ultimately what won the war for the US.

AF is short of water.

Lucky break huh?

 

[Mushroom]

During 1944, the balance of naval power in the Pacific decisively turned against Japan, and by early 1945, its fleet was much depleted and badly hobbled by critical fuel shortages in the home islands. In a desperate attempt to slow the Allied advance, Yamato was dispatched on a one-way mission to Okinawa in April 1945, with orders to beach herself and fight until destroyed, thus protecting the island

The Yamamoto had enough fuel for a one way trip to Okinawa.

Other ships of the line were docked and used as flak platforms to protect the harbors.

Why do you keep switching back and forth between Yamato, and Yamamoto?

And the reason the ship only had that much fuel was because there were not enough escorts to keep it safe. She only had a single cruiser and eight destroyers for escorts, that is nowhere near enough for a capital ship when the enemy has clear air superiority. They knew they could not protect the ship, so the plan was for it to beach itself, therefore it could not be "sunk" and could fight on for as long as possible.

It was not an issue of fuel, it was because most of the escorts were not there anymore. To give an idea, during that time period a US Battleship would also be linked with a Carrier (for the USS New Jersey for example, she was linked with the USS Essex), as well as from 6-8 Cruisers, and from 15-25 Destroyers.

It was not fuel that was the problem, it was that the Japanese Navy no longer had enough ships to protect the capital ships they had remaining. That is why the remaining capital ships were sent alone. Not fuel, it was the lack of ships.

The Germans did the exact same thing, in case you are not aware. Once again, not due to lack of fuel, but they simply did not have enough ships left to form any kind of fleet.

 

[Mushroom]

Lucky break huh?

Lucky break? One ships returning with minimal escort with almost no fighters on the deck, the other primarily with an outdated torpedo bomber? And the last with no fighters at all, and no escort? That had been put in for overhaul back in July?

And the next run for the USS Saratoga was already scheduled to bring over a dozen Corsairs to Subic Bay. Once again, like the other missions of that time with minimal escort so they could return as quickly as they could.

The carriers were indeed almost constantly at sea. Doing their primary job of the era during peacetime. Shuttling fighters to remote bases. If an attack was expected, they would not have had those fighters, or almost no fighters. With few escorts in a place they would be sitting ducks if the Japanese came across them. Or even a single Japanese submarine.

Sorry, I know you are trying to prove this was some kind of conspiracy. But you fail.

 

[Mushroom]

The Japanese had an insufficient number of tankers to haul the needed oil to their industrial plants in the home islands and the many outposts spread across their vast empire. For the tankers they did have, they demonstrated an increasing inability to protect them from the attacks of Allied submarines, surface ships and aircraft. Oil had to travel thousands of miles to get from the fields of Balikpapan in Borneo to home ports in Japan. The Allies were lying in wait all along the route.

Something I pointed out as well.

By 1943, the largest problem Japan was facing was logistical. This in turn impacted all other operations.

The lack of transports soon forced them to pull old WWI (and earlier) destroyers out of mothballs and refit them as "fast transports". The US did this also, but primarily for raids. The Japanese however relied upon these, as they were the only ships that had a chance to slip through the US screens. Along with submarines that were also modified into transports. That was literally all they had by late 1943. Like the Minekaze class destroyers, built from 1919-1921. 14 of the 15 ships had a lot of their weapons stripped, and saw the last half of the war as transports. When the final troops and supplies arrived on Iwo Jima before the battle, there were nowhere near enough because they could once again only send old converted destroyers and submarines. Which held only a fraction of the supplies of a single transport.

That was something that Japan simply did not count on in their planning. The US realized the importance of logistics, and specifically targeted Japanese logistics from the start of the war.

One of the most critical battles that many consider the first nail in the coffin for Japan is one that most have likely never heard of. And that was Operation Hailstone at Truk Lagoon. Where in a three day battle the US took out 2 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 6 other auxiliary ships of the Japanese Navy.

Along with 32 transports. Truk was the major logistics base for the Japanese forces in the Carolines, and the loss of 32 of the 50 merchant ships literally crippled all future operations for Japan in the region. The harbor was almost destroyed, and even the ships not sunk were badly damaged. And the US did not even invade the island, they just left a few submarines to keep them in place and kept going. But the loss of a large part of their remaining logistical ability (including 5 oilers) was a major turning point, and largely marked the end of large Japanese fleet operations.

Those who really study war understand how important logistics are. And it is also obvious when others do not grasp that.

 

[Otis Mayfield]

Something I pointed out as well.

By 1943, the largest problem Japan was facing was logistical. This in turn impacted all other operations.

The lack of transports soon forced them to pull old WWI (and earlier) destroyers out of mothballs and refit them as "fast transports". The US did this also, but primarily for raids. The Japanese however relied upon these, as they were the only ships that had a chance to slip through the US screens. Along with submarines that were also modified into transports. That was literally all they had by late 1943. Like the Minekaze class destroyers, built from 1919-1921. 14 of the 15 ships had a lot of their weapons stripped, and saw the last half of the war as transports. When the final troops and supplies arrived on Iwo Jima before the battle, there were nowhere near enough because they could once again only send old converted destroyers and submarines. Which held only a fraction of the supplies of a single transport.

That was something that Japan simply did not count on in their planning. The US realized the importance of logistics, and specifically targeted Japanese logistics from the start of the war.

One of the most critical battles that many consider the first nail in the coffin for Japan is one that most have likely never heard of. And that was Operation Hailstone at Truk Lagoon. Where in a three day battle the US took out 2 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 6 other auxiliary ships of the Japanese Navy.

Along with 32 transports. Truk was the major logistics base for the Japanese forces in the Carolines, and the loss of 32 of the 50 merchant ships literally crippled all future operations for Japan in the region. The harbor was almost destroyed, and even the ships not sunk were badly damaged. And the US did not even invade the island, they just left a few submarines to keep them in place and kept going. But the loss of a large part of their remaining logistical ability (including 5 oilers) was a major turning point, and largely marked the end of large Japanese fleet operations.

Those who really study war understand how important logistics are. And it is also obvious when others do not grasp that.

They say the Mongols were so successful because of logistics.

Every spring they would take their flocks to the mountains to graze.

Every fall they would take their flocks back to the lowlands.

Thousands of animals, horses, sheep, people etc.

And all along the way, they had to water and feeds these creatures. And protect them. Raids from neighboring tribes were a constant threat as well as wolves, etc.

So a 12-year-old Mongol boy knew more about logistics than many generals.

I think the Japanese knew plenty about logistics. They knew America supplied 80% of their oil, copper and iron.

So they needed America to fold quickly. America would never surrender, but a peace treaty, the Japanese thought, was likely.

So they launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Bloody the American nose. Isolationist America cowered in place, they would fold.

 

[Mushroom]

I think the Japanese knew plenty about logistics. They knew America supplied 80% of their oil, copper and iron.

So they needed America to fold quickly. America would never surrender, but a peace treaty, the Japanese thought, was likely.

So they launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Bloody the American nose. Isolationist America cowered in place, they would fold.

Wrong, once again.

Logistics is much more than just the raw materials. It is also transporting those materials to the factories to make them into the final products, the factories themselves making the products, then transporting them to the battlefields where they could be used.

As we have told and showed you, Japan stored up huge amounts of raw materials prior to the war breaking out. They also had relatively low domestic use of those raw materials, so most of it could be used for the war effort. They also had a large industrial base to convert those raw materials into war goods.

But their biggest issue was transportation. They could not get the food, bullets, guns, and even people from one location to another. This is what you keep missing over and over again, and to be honest I am tired of talking about it. You do not get it, you will never get it, and it is pointless trying to get you to understand this.

You are looking at it all wrong, with an American concept of what Japan wanted. You do not see it how they do, can not see it how they do, and refuse to see it in any way other than your own. But your concept is almost all wrong, and I for one am tired of this. Go ahead and believe whatever you want, if it makes you happy.

 

[Otis Mayfield]

Wrong, once again.

Logistics is much more than just the raw materials. It is also transporting those materials to the factories to make them into the final products, the factories themselves making the products, then transporting them to the battlefields where they could be used.

As we have told and showed you, Japan stored up huge amounts of raw materials prior to the war breaking out. They also had relatively low domestic use of those raw materials, so most of it could be used for the war effort. They also had a large industrial base to convert those raw materials into war goods.

But their biggest issue was transportation. They could not get the food, bullets, guns, and even people from one location to another. This is what you keep missing over and over again, and to be honest I am tired of talking about it. You do not get it, you will never get it, and it is pointless trying to get you to understand this.

You are looking at it all wrong, with an American concept of what Japan wanted. You do not see it how they do, can not see it how they do, and refuse to see it in any way other than your own. But your concept is almost all wrong, and I for one am tired of this. Go ahead and believe whatever you want, if it makes you happy.

"We"


lol

Post a link.

You never back up what you say. Some of what you say is from legend and urban myth.

Prove something.

 

[Mushroom]

Prove something.

How did a relatively poor (by the standards of the United States) nation manage to coordinate offensive naval operations across an extraordinarily wide front in the first six months of 1942? The answer has rarely focused on logistics. In fact, historians have long argued that one of the key U.S. advantages during the war was innovation in the field of underway replenishment. This advantage, especially in the later years of the war, enabled the U.S. Navy to undertake the grand offensives of the island-hopping campaign of 1944.

But maybe that’s not right, or at least it’s not all of the story. In a forthcoming article in the Journal of Military History, David Fuquea argues that the Imperial Japanese Navy had identified underway replenishment as a need as early as the 1920s, and that it had well honed its support capabilities by the beginning of the war. Fuquea establishes both the tactical difficulties associated with underway replenishment, a task that requires tight coordination between two ships transferring flammable material at high speed, and the long-standing historiographical view of Japanese logistics.

The Japanese appreciated the connection between their strategic need for oil and the operational need to keep the fleet fueled. They identified the requirement for fast tankers, and the doctrine and training necessary to use them, as early as 1926. Japan identified a need for fast tankers in the 1930s and subsidized construction of such ships throughout the decade. These tankers required military-grade construction, as conventional commercial ships were neither fast nor robust enough to serve with the fleet. Extensive training and practice came in the months before the Pearl Harbor attack, with many of the finest officers assigned to the oilers needed to keep the aircraft carriers, battleships, and cruisers in service. This work built upon training and doctrine developed in the years before the war.

Were Tankers the Key to Imperial Japan’s Early Wartime Success?

Japan had come to appreciate the value of at-sea replenishment for its navy early on.

thediplomat.com

Oh, this is actually fairly easy.

Maybe Japan’s problem was that no one possessed any basic knowledge of military logistics. They certainly were lacking when it came to realistic assumptions, estimates, and unknown unknowns.

Japan in World War II: Dealing With Known Unknowns

Japan initiated its World War II campaign on the basis of a series of assumptions and unknowns.

warfarehistorynetwork.com

The above is actually quite fascinating, and is a very long article. I just quoted the final paragraph. But all who actually studied the Pacific War quickly keyed in on two facts that spelled doom for Japan. That they were arrogant and refused to believe that their codes could be broken, and that they had all the logistics capability that they needed (and the US did not have the logistics needed to reach the West Pacific).

Yet, you continue to insist that such a simple premise is wrong, I really can't help you there.

 

[Otis Mayfield]

Were Tankers the Key to Imperial Japan’s Early Wartime Success?

Japan had come to appreciate the value of at-sea replenishment for its navy early on.

thediplomat.com

Oh, this is actually fairly easy.

Japan in World War II: Dealing With Known Unknowns

Japan initiated its World War II campaign on the basis of a series of assumptions and unknowns.

warfarehistorynetwork.com

The above is actually quite fascinating, and is a very long article. I just quoted the final paragraph. But all who actually studied the Pacific War quickly keyed in on two facts that spelled doom for Japan. That they were arrogant and refused to believe that their codes could be broken, and that they had all the logistics capability that they needed (and the US did not have the logistics needed to reach the West Pacific).

Yet, you continue to insist that such a simple premise is wrong, I really can't help you there.

Watch this.

 

[Mushroom]

Watch this.

Want to know the funny part? I already had. And commented on it extensively if you look in the thread.

Oh, feel free to look in there, my name is almost the same as I use here.

Here are one of my comments.

The problem here is, Japan started their plans and training to go to war with the US in early Spring 1941. Months before the embargo. And they could not go to war with the UK and Dutch and leave a strong US astride their supply lines. Once they committed to the Southern Strategy, they were locked in and war was coming. With or without the embargo.

That entire video was highly biased, short sighted, and almost made as if an apologist. "Oh, the US did an embargo and made them do it!" Never mind the fact that the orders planning the attack and modifying weapons goes all the way back to February. Long before the embargo was even considered.

Long after the Rape of China, Japan walking out of the League of Nations, the USS Panay, and a huge number of other incidents.

And then, why declare war on the UK? And the Dutch? Did they have some kind of embargo that was secret from the world?

You see, this is why you keep failing. You realize you lost one angle, and just spin into another. That video was laughable when it came up last month, because it explained nothing of what led up to the start of the Pacific War other than "US stopped oil, bad US!". But it was an attack where the plans were ordered way back in January, and the engineering aspects were already underway by February.

This is a mock-up in Japan of Pearl Harbor. It was built back in May-June of 1941, to help plan the attack. And the ships in it were updated almost daily as their movements were tracked and sent by radio back to Japan. Many of the pilots who took part in the attack were walking through this by late June, planning their attack and egress routes.

Back in June of 1941.

Now the photo was taken after the attack, as it shows the placement of the ships on that day. But the lagoon did exist before, and was a key part of attack planning. They simply made it "prettier" so it could be used in a propaganda film. But many pilots after the war talked about training on the mockup long before the attack.

This is months before the freezing of assets, and the oil embargo. Nobody does this much preparation and takes these steps unless they are actually going to conduct an operation. The moment that Japan signed a peace treaty with the Soviet Union, they committed themselves to attacking South. Which meant attacking the Dutch East Indies and the UK. The US still did not matter directly, if not attacked they would likely have remained neutral even as the UK and Australia came under attack.

But continuing to fortify their bases in the Philippines. Where if they jumped in at the wrong time they could cripple the Japanese. Therefore, they had to be removed first.

Yes, I had already seen that video. Seen it, analyzed it, and dismissed it. Because it is making a major flaw, and not even realizing that Japan had its own plan, that was already well under way for 8 months even before the oil embargo.

 

[Otis Mayfield]

Want to know the funny part? I already had. And commented on it extensively if you look in the thread.

Oh, feel free to look in there, my name is almost the same as I use here.

Here are one of my comments.



That entire video was highly biased, short sighted, and almost made as if an apologist. "Oh, the US did an embargo and made them do it!" Never mind the fact that the orders planning the attack and modifying weapons goes all the way back to February. Long before the embargo was even considered.

Long after the Rape of China, Japan walking out of the League of Nations, the USS Panay, and a huge number of other incidents.

And then, why declare war on the UK? And the Dutch? Did they have some kind of embargo that was secret from the world?

You see, this is why you keep failing. You realize you lost one angle, and just spin into another. That video was laughable when it came up last month, because it explained nothing of what led up to the start of the Pacific War other than "US stopped oil, bad US!". But it was an attack where the plans were ordered way back in January, and the engineering aspects were already underway by February.

This is a mock-up in Japan of Pearl Harbor. It was built back in May-June of 1941, to help plan the attack. And the ships in it were updated almost daily as their movements were tracked and sent by radio back to Japan. Many of the pilots who took part in the attack were walking through this by late June, planning their attack and egress routes.

Back in June of 1941.

Now the photo was taken after the attack, as it shows the placement of the ships on that day. But the lagoon did exist before, and was a key part of attack planning. They simply made it "prettier" so it could be used in a propaganda film. But many pilots after the war talked about training on the mockup long before the attack.

This is months before the freezing of assets, and the oil embargo. Nobody does this much preparation and takes these steps unless they are actually going to conduct an operation. The moment that Japan signed a peace treaty with the Soviet Union, they committed themselves to attacking South. Which meant attacking the Dutch East Indies and the UK. The US still did not matter directly, if not attacked they would likely have remained neutral even as the UK and Australia came under attack.

But continuing to fortify their bases in the Philippines. Where if they jumped in at the wrong time they could cripple the Japanese. Therefore, they had to be removed first.

Yes, I had already seen that video. Seen it, analyzed it, and dismissed it. Because it is making a major flaw, and not even realizing that Japan had its own plan, that was already well under way for 8 months even before the oil embargo.

Well, if you want to believe that American isolationism had nothing to do with the attack on Pearl Harbor that's fine.

 

[Mushroom]

Well, if you want to believe that American isolationism had nothing to do with the attack on Pearl Harbor that's fine.

It had nothing to do with Pearl Harbor. Hell, the closest that "Isolationism" affected the US involvement in the war was that many wanted the US to go to war against Germany long before December 1941.

But please tell us, what Isolationism did to cause the attack on Pearl Harbor. This should be fascinating. Probably about as important as the Zimmermann Telegram.

 

[Otis Mayfield]

It had nothing to do with Pearl Harbor. Hell, the closest that "Isolationism" affected the US involvement in the war was that many wanted the US to go to war against Germany long before December 1941.

But please tell us, what Isolationism did to cause the attack on Pearl Harbor. This should be fascinating. Probably about as important as the Zimmermann Telegram.

"Us?"

You got a mouse in your pocket?

 

[AMart]

Republicans were the isolationists and a disaster as always... They also ruined the treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations for political power. Then started the great depression omg that gave rise to Nazis and militarists in Japan. Great job! After world war II they saw the money in the defense industry...

The Treaty of Versailles was way too punitive. It pretty guaranteed a German response equal to Nazi like party.

 

[Colin norris]

The Japanese knew in the early 1940s that there was no way Japan could win a protracted war with America. America supplied 80% of Japan's oil, 80% of Japan's iron, and 80% of Japan's copper for example.

So Japan had to give America a decisive strike that would make America immediately sue for peace. So Japan launched the successful surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

But instead of forcing America to immediately sue for peace, America became enraged.

We didn't understand Japan very well and Japan certainly didn't understand America very well and that lead to mistakes.

What made Japan think America would immediately sue for peace after the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?

It was America's isolationist stance. America wouldn't join others in wars or intervene in foreign affairs.

And Japan mistook this isolationism as a sign of cowardice.

What do you think? True?

America has a bad habit of interfering in others countries wars. We were not involved until pearl harbour and had every right to them engage.
It wasn't cowardice. It was a blunder in investigating what they were up too.

 

[Otis Mayfield]

America has a bad habit of interfering in others countries wars. We were not involved until pearl harbour and had every right to them engage.
It wasn't cowardice. It was a blunder in investigating what they were up too.

The Neutrality Acts were a series of acts passed by the US Congress in the 1930s (specifically 1935, 1936, 1937, and 1939) in response to the growing threats and wars that led to World War II. They were spurred by the growth in isolationism and non-interventionism in the US following the US joining World War I, and they sought to ensure that the US would not become entangled again in foreign conflicts.

Neutrality Acts of the 1930s - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Isolationism meant you were reluctant to fight or even that you would never fight. It just depended on how isolationist you were.

 

[Mushroom]

"Us?"

You got a mouse in your pocket?

Us, the readers of this thread.

Oh, wait, you can't explain to us anything. You just ramble on and avoid actually making any point at all.

 

[Mushroom]

The Neutrality Acts were a series of acts passed by the US Congress in the 1930s

And the very name says it all. "Neutrality".

Notice, it was not the "Isolation Acts".

All that did was declare the US as being neutral. That they would not take a side, and would sell goods to both sides equally. Of course, Germany, Italy, and Japan had little interest in trade with the US, but England jumped in with both feet, as did the Soviets later on.

And that is hardly unique in a war where the US has no direct interest. We were neutral in the various Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean Wars, even WWI and WWII until we were forced into them. And by declaring neutrality and not shipping certain goods on US ships we are actually following common International Law.

So what exactly did that have to do with anything?

Or do you maybe claim that if the US was not neutral, Japan never would have attacked?