Rev. by Hugh Murray
In his special message on civil rights of 28 February 1963, President John Kennedy declared, “Our Constitution is color blind, . . .” (69) Rev. Martin Luther King, in his speech at the March on Washington in August 1963 dreamt of a day when his daughters would be judged by “the content of their character and not by the color of their skin.” (91) To enshrine these ideals Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964. During the debate before passage Sen. Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.) declared:
there is nothing in it [the bill] that will give any power to the Commission [EEOC] or to any court to require hiring, firing, or promotion of employees in order to meet a racial “quota” or to achieve a racial balance . . . .
In fact, the very opposite is true . . . . Title VII is designed to encourage hiring on the basis of ability and qualifications, not race and religion. (151)
Senators favouring the bill, like Joshua Clark (D-Penn.) and Clifford Case (R-NJ.), defended it in similar language.(151)
To insure against distortion two major amend-ments were incorporated into the bill. Sen. Everett Dirksen (R-Ill.) amended it so that only “intentional” discrimination would be prohibited (147), while Sen. John Tower (R-Tex.) guaranteed that employers could continue to use, or to institute, professional tests, like the General Aptitude Tests, which were commonly conducted so businesses could ascertain, hire, and promote more able workers. (149-50)
By 1972—in the name of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—most tests were under challenge or aban-doned, while quotas (under the euphemisms “goals and timetables”) were being instituted throughout American industry, education, and government employment. Blacks and women were being hired, promoted, and given other special privileges such as scholarships, even then they were less qualified than white males. How did this perversion of the Civil Rights Act come about? That is the story of Graham’s The Civil Rights Era.
Graham, a supporter of affirmative action, de-fends the reversal of meanings that occurred in the name of the Civil Rights Act; yet, Graham has written an excellent book because he includes facts and quo-tations that may embarrass his case. He seeks to be objective in portraying what occurred, and he achieves this better than previous authors.
Unfortunately, some were determined to subvert the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and not just segregationists who quickly lost their battle to maintain apartheid in the South. More important in the assault upon the new law were a small number of strategically placed ideologues of the Left. These zealots, some of whom worked for the Equal Opportunity Commission, did not want the agency to function as created. Graham initially sees no “conspiracy” in what occurred, “not a grand design but rather an honest groping.”(191) Nevertheless, Graham himself finally relates: “The early EEOC thus functioned as quiet co-conspirators with the agency’s critics on the left. . . .” (236)
Graham also describes this “groping” toward “group” theories:
To move radically beyond the complaint model, the definition . . . [of discrimination] would have to be extended beyond the INTENT standard of the common law tradition, which was stipulated by Congress in Title VII, towards an EFFECT standard. This would require a shift in criteria from invidious intent on the part of discriminators to harmful impact upon members of the affected class. Such a radical shift was implicit in newly current metaphor of “institutional racism.” (191)
Alfred Blumrosen, who became the EEOC’s liaison chief for federal, state agencies, admitted that his “creative” reading of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was “contrary to the plain meaning,” (195) but why worry? Graham adds that by 1965 when the Bank of America instituted quota hiring under a euphemism, “the standard refrain of the EEO bureaucracies: affirmative action had nothing to do with racial quotas.