Then how can cable providers offer telephone service?
Because if I recall, all TV, internet, and telephone services a cable company provides (as of now) share the same cable connection, hence "bundles." If you are piggybacking telephone and broadband internet on one cable transmission, that leads me to believe the cable company, as it is so called, can be exempted from Title II, because that qualifies as a single transmission of a service or services, not a transmission of three different services via three different types of transmissions. The only way they could be
regulated under Title II is if the services were distinguishably offered separately from one another, as previously stated.
I'm playing devils advocate here, I mostly agree with you. But this argument doesn't hold water, my home phone and my DSL are carried over the same line, I pay the providers separately, I could use VOIP over my DSL but I can't have the DSL without the phone line.
Well, those are
two different providers using the same line to provide
two separate services though. Meaning that since you are paying for two different services, the exemption won't apply to them. When the same company is providing all the services via the same line, that is one transmission, not two or three providers transmitting three different services.
My argument is that it is the number of entities transmitting their services to you, the end user, is key in whether they are regulated under Title II or not. Charter, in my case is one entity transmitting three different services on the same line, the key here once again, is that there is only one entity providing those services, not three. Meaning that such could be construed as being able to exempt them from Title II.
Nothing would change if I used my phone provider for DSL, I don't because they are more expensive. It wouldn't change the fact that the phone company is primarily a phone provider, just like Comcast is primarily a Cable TV provider which is regulated.
OKTexas
You would be correct. But even still, if you are only one provider providing multiple services, then at least one (i.e. the internet) or all of these services should be exempt from regulation. It leads me to postulate that this is why they bundle services for one fee, instead of three services for three different fees. Because it attempts to slip past FCC regulations, including Title II. In my argument, delivery is key. While you are still a phone provider or a cable provider by title, if you provide more than one service (phone, internet,cable or any variation) how does that
not exempt you from these regulations? AT&T has long been known as a phone company, but now they provide cable and internet.
I sense that there was a lot of maneuvering going on, majorly to do with, get this, the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which influenced a ton of mergers between telcom companies. It was supposed to encourage competition, but because it was so slowly implemented it allowed for people like AT&T and TCI to merge, MCI and Worldcom, so on and so forth to allow some access in the local exchange infrastructure. Simply put, in my opinion, that rendered Title II ineffective.
If a phone company chooses to provide cable service, the phone company itself would face regulation, but would have to abide by FCC open video systems regulations. Therefore, if a cable company decides to both provide internet and phone service, it would face less regulation itself, but has the choice of following FCC telephone and TV regulations and not Title II regulations, as the FCC classified broadband services as an "information service" in 2007.
So, if you look at what a broadband connection as used by Cable Companies is by definition, Tex, it is able to carry multiple types of signals all at once. Technically the term "broadband connection" encompasses all three types of services at once, thusly by the FCC's own definition, it could be classified an "information service" and not under the purview of Title II.
I'm sorry it took so long to respond, I had to do some research on both the 1934 and 1996 acts to buttress my argument.