Okay sounds plausible but in reality we are lead to believe that the captain failed to notify his commander. I would find that hard to believe as he would have to be an idiot. Something smells.
Nobody is saying he failed to notify them. Hell, his immediate boss was on the exact same ship with him.
"Going around your chain of command" has nothing to do with not telling your chain, but by going
above your chain without approval or at least notification beforehand. It is kind of what we know of in the military as the "Open Door Policy". Even the lowest Private in a unit is allowed to go up to the Division Commander if they think issues are not being addressed properly. And nobody above their chain can tell them not to.
However, they do have to
notify their chain that they are going to do so. Simply saying "Sir/Ma'am, I am going to go talk to the Company/Battalion/Regimental/Brigade/Division Commander". They do not even have to say what they are going to talk about, just that they are going to do it.
That is what "Jumping the chain" is. And notice, as I had already said, the memo did not have a single item to say what exactly was not being done to his satisfaction, or more importantly what could have been done to do things better. It was a 4 page complaint, with not a single suggestion of what should be done instead.
That is the problem with his memo.
I can by into the notion that many in his chain of command did not want to touch this problem as they did not want to get the blame or a bad performance review which is a career killer for an officer in any service.
OK, so let's ignore that his immediate supervisor was serving on the exact same ship as he was, and had his offices and stateroom a single flight of stairs below his own.
You are aware of that fact, right? That Captain Crozier was the commander of the Flagship of Carrier Strike Group 9. And the person in charge of that Strike Group is Rear Admiral Stuart Baker. Who as I said had his working and living spaces a 2 minute walk away from that of the Captain's.
And let me charge you once again with what I have been saying over and over again. What could the Navy have done differently? Look., it is so very easy to whine and gripe and complain, it is so very difficult to actually suggest things that would actually improve the situation.
The memo did nothing other than complain, screaming how the Navy was not doing enough. OK, fine. you are now in command of the US Naval Base in Guam, or the Chief of Naval Operations. So tell us, what would you have done that would have resolved this situation?
"What else could/should have been done, and was not being done?" Nobody has yet to answer that for some reason.
This is what I find lacking, even almost a month later. I have made this exact same challenge over and over, and not a single person has ever given a single answer. Just said over and over "not enough was done".
You are throwing out silly claims, which have not a shred of reality. Meanwhile have not shown where exactly things were not being done.
Why would someone presumable in the Navy leak this story?
One of 2 things comes to mind.
First (and primary), it was not somebody in the Navy at all. He sent this out as a "General blast" as we would say, with over 30 recipients. Kinda like those mass emails of the past. And since it was over an unsecured system (NIPR), that allowed anybody to simply "copy and paste" it to anybody else on the Internet.
For one, this was the wrong place to post something with operational information, it should have been transmitted over SIPR, which is the secure system. So there is dick-up number 1. Then you have his whining not enough was being done, but not a single suggestion as to where things could have been improved, that is dick-up number 2.
I bet somebody in the chain did a forward, and they then forwarded it to somebody else, likely in an FRG group. Then that is what went to the press. If I had sent something like this myself, I can guarantee that I would shortly have been visited by CID, and escorted to the US in handcuffs. When I was on deployment I dealt with classified information on a daily basis. Simply by sending this through non-secure systems was criminal in and of itself.
Why would the Navy reliever him because someone else leaked the story.?
Read the above very carefully.
I have read this memo myself, and there is absolutely nothing in it that indicates it is sent through secure (classified) channels. But it should have been, anything that deals with operational status of active units is classified as "Secret" at a minimum, if not "Top Secret" (or higher). The very fact that this was sent unclassified (NIPR - in other words the "regular Internet") shows that a huge mistake in classification was made.
Just to give an idea of my background, I am still active in the military. And I am also in my final 5 years of service (I will reach mandatory retirement before the end of 2024). I have also served under 6 Presidents now. I have had many jobs during my career, and one thing I take dead seriously is security and classification. I also understand how things were done in the past (all classified materials literally locked in a vault which had an armed guard inside of it), and how they are done now (where amazing things are available on the secured systems if you have the authority to access it). That is how SPC Manning did what he did, having access to SIPR he basically had access to all of SIPR that was not "Special Clearance" required.
This should never have been sent "in the clear", and absolutely nothing on the memo shows that it was sent over secured channels. That very act alone irregardless of the content has had people relieved and put in the brig. In short, he would be relieved because he sent it in a way where it could be leaked.
And in case I need to give a bit more background, the communication system of the military is broken down into 2 sections. NIPR or "NIPRNet" is "Non-Classified Internet Protocol Routing Network", In other words, routine non-classified information that literally is sent across the regular Internet. SIPR or "SIPRNet" (Secure Internet Protocol Routing Network) is also sent across "The Internet", but it is highly encrypted, and has rather distinctive headers and footers. A 3 second glance at this memo told me it was sent NIPR, which is a problem in and of itself. You can access the Net freely through any NIPR computer. Hell, I used to post to this very forum through my NIPR system when I was deployed.
But SIPR? Nope, it is a cut-off closed system. The only way you can copy this memo from one to the other would involve doing a slew of things not allowed, like burning a copy to a CD and moving it manually to the NIPR side. The very action of doing so can result in the person sharing the cell next to Mr. Manning for a very long time.