There you go, Kevin!
SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.
(a) AUTHORIZATION- The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States
as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to-- 1. defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq ; and
2. enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq .
(b)
PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION- In connection with the exercise of the authority granted in subsection (a)
to use force the President shall, prior to such exercise or as soon thereafter as may be feasible, but no later than 48 hours after exercising such authority, make available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate
his determination that--
1. reliance by the United States on further diplomatic or other peaceful means alone either (A) will not adequately protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq or (B) is not likely to lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq ; and
2. acting pursuant to this joint resolution is consistent with the United States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorist and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.
Iraqi War Resolution - Text of Iraq Resolution and Roll Call Vote Authorizing War In Iraq
Words mean things.
Bush lied when he said all diplomatic and peaceful means of resolution would not resolve the issue
Hans Blix had asked him to hold up his attack till he had more time to investigate. Bush pushed the attack because he knew his excuse for attacking would disappear if Blix could investigate more
Here are a few things that Hans Blix said.
In his speech to the UN Security Council on 27 January 2003, Blix asked
awkward 'questions that need to be answered'. On chemical weapons he raised
the problem that: 'Some 6,500 chemical bombs containing 1,000 tons of
chemical agents and "several thousand" chemical rocket warheads are
unaccounted for.... Inspectors found a "laboratory quantity" of
thiodiglycol, a precursor of mustard gas.... Iraq has prepared equipment at
a chemical plant previously destroyed by the UN....' On biological weapons
he said: 'Iraq has declared that it produced about 8,500 litres of
[anthrax], which it states it unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.
But Iraq has provided little evidence for this production and no convincing
evidence for its destruction.' He also warned, ominously, that Iraq's
anthrax 'might still exist' .
Indeed, Blix approached the inspections with the attitude that if he and his
team didn't find WMD that still wouldn't be evidence that said WMD did not
exist. Before setting off to inspect Iraq, he told a reporter that 'not
seeing something, not seeing an indication of something, does not lead
automatically to the conclusion that there is nothing'. He put Iraqis
in a no-win situation - if he found weapons there would be war, and if he
didn't find weapons, well, there might still be war. When he finally
delivered his report to the UN he tried to play to both camps, raising
suspicions about Saddam's wicked intentions while also calling for further
inspections to establish the truth. The pro-war lobby saw what they wanted
to see, with one reporter claiming that Blix's report 'greatly strengthened
the American and British case for war'.