loinboy, you also left this out of that British info -
“We believe Iraq retains some production equipment, and some small stocks of chemical warfare agent precursors, and may have hidden small quantities of agents and weapons.
And they told Hans Blix to go look for them and in his Feb 2003 report to the UNSC, he said he had not found any.
2. Whether an earlier voluntary disclosure by Iraq of its work on VX could have
contributed to fully clarifying this matter can only be the subject of speculation.
However, it is obvious that the unilateral destruction, admitted by Iraq, prolonged
the verification process,
led to the elimination of physical evidence essential for
complete verification and left serious uncertainties regarding the quantities of VX
produced and its disposition. In 2002, due to these uncertainties, UNMOVIC
identified the issue of VX as one of the remaining unresolved disarmament issues.
In March 2003, it included this issue in the list of key remaining disarmament tasks
(required under the terms of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999)). The Iraq
Survey Group also reported that Iraq had not adequately explained and accounted
for its VX production and weaponization...30. Despite the CouncilÂ’s prohibitions, from 1999 to 2002 Iraq procured materials,
equipment and components from abroad for use in its missile programmes. In
several instances, the items procured were used by Iraq for the production of Al
Samoud 2 missiles that were determined by UNMOVIC in February 2003 to be
proscribed. At least 380 SA-2 missile engines were imported for this programme by
IraqÂ’s prime missile establishment through an Iraqi State-owned trading company
controlled by the Military Industrialization Commission and through a local Iraqi
trading company and a foreign trading company.
31. The same Iraqi governmental trading company was involved, through a
contract with two foreign private companies, in procuring components and
equipment for the manufacture and testing of missile guidance and control systems,
including inertial navigation systems with fibre-optic and laser ring gyroscopes and
Global Positioning System equipment, accelerometers, ancillary items and a variety
of production and testing equipment. One Iraqi trading company was also involved
in the procurement (through private trading companies) of different pieces of
missile-related production equipment and technology. In addition several foreign
private subcontractors were responsible for the implementation of specific parts of
the general contract.
32. From 1999 to 2002, Iraq also procured a variety of dual-use biological and
chemical items and materials without United Nations authorization. They included
the acquisition by Iraq of some corrosion-resistant chemical process equipment and
biological research equipment, such as DNA sequencers, that were used by Iraq for
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non-proscribed purposes. 30. Despite the CouncilÂ’s prohibitions, from 1999 to 2002 Iraq procured materials,
equipment and components from abroad for use in its missile programmes. In
several instances, the items procured were used by Iraq for the production of Al
Samoud 2 missiles that were determined by UNMOVIC in February 2003 to be
proscribed. At least 380 SA-2 missile engines were imported for this programme by
IraqÂ’s prime missile establishment through an Iraqi State-owned trading company
controlled by the Military Industrialization Commission and through a local Iraqi
trading company and a foreign trading company.
31. The same Iraqi governmental trading company was involved, through a
contract with two foreign private companies, in procuring components and
equipment for the manufacture and testing of missile guidance and control systems,
including inertial navigation systems with fibre-optic and laser ring gyroscopes and
Global Positioning System equipment, accelerometers, ancillary items and a variety
of production and testing equipment. One Iraqi trading company was also involved
in the procurement (through private trading companies) of different pieces of
missile-related production equipment and technology. In addition several foreign
private subcontractors were responsible for the implementation of specific parts of
the general contract.
32. From 1999 to 2002, Iraq also procured a variety of dual-use biological and
chemical items and materials without United Nations authorization. They included
the acquisition by Iraq of some corrosion-resistant chemical process equipment and
biological research equipment, such as DNA sequencers, that were used by Iraq for
16
s12005/742
non-proscribed purposes. Although the goods were acquired by Iraq outside the
framework of the mechanisms established under Security Council resolutions, most (not all)
of them were later declared by Iraq to UNMOVIC in October 2002, when Iraq
submitted its backlog of semi-annual monitoring declarations. ...
35. Although the introduction of export licensing by individual States significantly
slowed down and limited Iraq's procurement efforts prior to 1991, it did not stop
them completely. The provisions involving only the licensing of exports on the
grounds of end-user certificates without on-site verification were not able to solve
fully the problem of possible shipments of dual-use items and materials to Iraq.
36.
Iraq has demonstrated its ability to make adjustments and modifications to its
procurement techniques to overcome trade restrictions - to a certain degree even
under sanctions. Such an ability demonstrates that a combination of effective export
control measures taken by all potential suppliers, coupled with an international
mechanism for export/import notifications of dual-use items to Iraq and on-site
verification, is required in order to provide a sufficient degree of confidence that
dual-use items and materials will not be used for proscribed purposes.
".*
This was a report released by UNMOVIC in 2005.
There is much more for anyone that was truly interested in finding out the facts, but most I find only go by what has been hand picked and delivered to them.
