The Judicial Branch] may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments. — Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 78
Hamilton you say? Federalist Paper 78 you say? Why lets dig in.
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.
Alexander Hamilton
Federalist Paper 78
Huh. Its almost as if you never read Federalist Paper 78, have no idea what's in it, and have never once fact checked your claims.
See, Mike, that's the difference between us. You copy and paste lists. I actually do research and read the sources.
Incorrect as usual, and I'm sure you're just as much a "constitutional scholar" as the poop stain in the White House.
Alexander Hamilton argued for a Supreme Court that was confirmed by the Senate and not the House of Representatives saying:
A body so fluctuating and at the same time so numerous, can never be deemed proper for the exercise of that power. Its unfitness will appear manifest to all, when it is recollected that in half a century it may consist of three or four hundred persons. All the advantages of the stability, both of the Executive and of the Senate, would be defeated by this union, and infinite delays and embarrassments would be occasioned.
In retrospect, Hamilton could only have been arguing for input from the States on judiciary appointments since at the time, Senators were appointed by state legislators, not by popular vote. Hamilton pointedly warned of the danger of judges being appointed by popular winds, saying:
the necessity of their [the Senate’s] concurrence would have a powerful, though, in general, a silent operation. It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity. In addition to this, it would be an efficacious source of stability in the administration.
One can only guess that Hamilton might have had a different view of Senate confirmations if the 17th Amendment were already passed. It might also be noted that the Constitution would never have been ratified to begin with had it been written in such way as to give the States no representation whatsoever in Washington D.C.