Panarin addressed shortcomings with what he termed information-related reform. He offered an interesting plan to correct Russia’s information warfare deficiencies. Panarin is a long-time IW specialist and thus understands quite well the ins and outs of the problem. Overall, he was not impressed with Russia’s use of IW, noting that in regard to the Georgian conflict “the Caucasus demonstrated our utter inability to champion our goals and interests in the world information arena.”Two public groups of Russian experts, Panarin added, had looked at the IW problem in a September round table of the Russian Federation Public Chamber (titled “Information Aggression against Russia: Methods for Countering It”); and an October international conference sponsored by the party “A Just Russia” (titled “Information Warfare in the Modern World”). Panarin concluded that “the geopolitical and geoeconomic role of Russia in the world will be determined to a large extent by whether or not it can create an effective system for information warfare.”
Panarin writes that to win the information war, Russia needs a specialized management system and analytic structures that counter information aggression against Russia. The components of such a system are:
1. Council for Public Diplomacy: includes members of the state structure, media, business, political parties, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and so on headed by Prime Minister Putin.
2. Advisor to the President of Russia for Information and Propaganda Activities: Coordinates activities of the information analysis units of the President’s administration, the Security Council, and several other ministries.
3. State Foreign Affairs Media Holding Company (All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company): The government should subordinate this company to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the American experience can be copied.
4. State Internet Holding Company: Create a domestic media holding company for the publishing of books, video films, video games, and the like for dissemination on the Internet.
5. Information Crisis Action Center: Enable the authorities to present commentaries on unfolding events in a timely, real-time manner to the world information arena. “Homework assignments” must be readied in advance.
6. Information Countermeasure System: Create a system of resources to counter information warfare operations by Russia’s geopolitical enemies.
7. NGOs: network of Russian organizations operating on Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), European Union (EU), and U.S. territories.
8. System for Training Personnel for Conducting Information Warfare: Define which institutions will train individuals in this topic. Most likely candidates at the highest level are the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Russian Civil Service Academy; and at the middle level, Moscow State University, the Higher Economic School, and the Moscow State Institute of International Relations.
Panarin adds that these activities must be unified within the framework of an organizational and analytic system composed of eight parts (diagnostic, analysis and forecasting, organization and management, methodological, consultative, prevention, control, and cooperation); and that information Special Forces must be developed to “prepare for effective operations under conditions of a possible crisis.”29
In summary, Panarin advocated creating his system, strengthening financing for the plan, creating a state/private system for managing activities, creating a state/private system for formulating a positive image of Russia overseas, and expanding the information resources of the Russian speaking populations across the globe.
Chapter 4: RUSSIAN INFORMATION WARFARE THEORY:
THE CONSEQUENCES OF AUGUST 2008
http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengin...-4937-4967-a3f5-38fbc5d76b48/en/Chapter_4.pdf