BaronVonBigmeat
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- Sep 20, 2005
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(Taken from the December 2006 issue of International Speculator, at www.dougcasey.com)
The Users Guide to Fiscal Calamity
By Bud Conrad and the Editors of Casey Research
As even recent subscribers know, here at Casey Research we believe that the U.S.and by extension the worldis heading inexorably toward a financial crisis on a scale to match or exceed the Great Depression that was announced by the 1929 stock market crash.
Were not cheerleaders for hard times. We dont invoke the Great Depression just to make our hearts beat faster. Instead we point to it as proof that from time to time truly extreme events happen. And when they do, most people get hurt while a few profit extraordinarily.
Even a little foresight can help you join the few. Of course, economic foresight is squinty at best; but if nothing else, it rewards you with a context for your portfolio decisions. So in this article, we are going to examine some of the features of the Great Depression and then discuss the differences that, this time around, argue for an inflationary crisis, with consumer prices doubling repeatedly, rather than a 1930s-style deflation, when consumer prices dropped by one-third.
What, Me Worry?
The Dow Jones Industrial Average recently reached a new high. Employment is ticking along at just 4.4%. How, then, could a major financial crisis be lurking just over the horizon?
What would you say if someone told you that just before the Great Depression, U.S. unemployment was at its lowest levels ever?
And the stock market? As you can see from the chart below, heading into 1929 youd be called a grouch if you werent optimistic. But optimism would have cost you dearly: those who bought stocks in the waning months of the 1929 rally had to wait almost 30 years just to break even. Those who bought real estate in the hot Florida and California markets had to wait even longer.
And Then Theres This
Of course, while history shows repeating economic cycles, they never repeat exactly.
In the way of similarities, leading up to the 1929 crash was a string of fat years for speculative stocksmuch like the dot-com boom leading up to 2000. But unlike the 1929 crash, the dot-com bust seems to have hurt only the participants, not the bystanders. In fact, many pundits see the sharp sell-off in equities in 2000 as akin to opening a safety valve. It reduced the stock market excesses built up over a 20-year bull market without causing a general economic meltdown.
Yet two important factors suggest that the 2000 correction was only a foreshockand that it left the economy ready for the big quake.
A. Dividend Yields. Dividend yield is a widely followed indicator of stock market valuation. The lower a stocks dividend yield--the income it throws off measured as a percentage of the stocks price--the more richly the stock is being valued. By that indicator, stocks are just a tick off record highs and are pricier today than just before the 1929 crash.
B. Correction, what correction? If you look at housing and stocks as a piecetogether they now represent the bulk of household wealththe correction of 2000 was merely a bump in the road. Thats because the Feds loose monetary policy did so much to bid up real estate prices. By contrast, in 1929 housing crumbled just before stocks and then was damaged further by the scramble for liquidity. They went down together as the deflation proceeded. But following the 2000 stock market peak, what stocks were taking away, the housing market was replacing. The next chart reveals a bubble intact a bubble waiting for a pin.
Speaking of Housing
The wild stock market leading up to the fall of 1929 now serves screen writers as a period-piece cliché. But there was also a housing bubble of historic proportions in the 1920s. In 1925, housing investment in relation to the size of the whole economy was even bigger than it is today.
This Time Its Different
Overpriced stocks a bubble in financial assets a weakening housing market it all sounds deflationary. So why are we expecting an inflationary crisis?
To answer that, we have to look at some of the key differences between then and now.
A. Now a fiat currency. From 1879 to 1934, the U.S. dollar was redeemable for gold, at $20.67 per ounce. Even until 1971, it was redeemable for gold by foreign central banks, at $35 per ounce. There were bouts of inflation from time to time, but with the dollars tie to gold, they were self-limiting and invariably were followed by periods of declining prices. (The deflation of the 1930s seemed unremarkable when it began--but later accelerated as the Fed ignored the sharp contraction of the money supply.)
The dollars grounding in gold ended in 1971, and the Fed gained unlimited power to expand the money supply. Today there is no brake on money creation except the Federal Reserves fear of price inflationwhich tends to take a back seat to its fear of recession. During the Greenspan days, the Fed used its money creation power to make massive foreign purchases of U.S. government Treasuries. This pumped up prices of stocks and other financial assets and fed the bubble in the housing market. Foreigners have been complicit in the process by taking their trade surpluses and buying Treasuries, agencies, and corporate bonds, in the process providing a ready source of credit for creating mortgages to drive houses higher.
So, far from seeing the kind of credit collapse that occurred in the Great Depression, this time around we have seen a massive credit expansion.
B. Government entitlements. Back in the 1920s, there was relatively little in the way of a government safety net and certainly nothing like the politically entrenched entitlement programs of our modern welfare state. Social Security and Medicare alone have the government on the hook for $36 trillion.
And the piper wont wait to be paid. As previously discussed, fully 78 million baby boomersabout 26% of the entire populationare now either in, or approaching, retirement age. But they are doing so with historic levels of debt and, on the average, woefully inadequate net worth (over 25% will have a net worth less than $50,000) much of which is based on deflating home values. But every one of them has a mailbox thats just right for receiving government checks.
The pressure on the government to continue handing out checks wont ease; it will build. Faced with the option of defaulting on its obligationspolitical suicideor inflating those obligations away, the government can be counted on to take the time-honored and far more politically acceptable path of inflation.
C. War. In the 1920s, people thought the war to end all wars had been fought, never to be repeated. Military spending was cut to the bone.
Today the U.S. and its few remaining allies are embroiled in a global war with Islam. The early cost estimate for Iraq alone is $1.3 trillion. As we see it, even with the recent swing towards the Demopublicans, the worst is still ahead. All our stomping around in the worlds messiest neighborhoods has helped recruit the next wave of dedicated jihadists, armed with a slew of new and battle-tested guerilla warfare methodologies increasing the odds of another 9/11-scale attack against the U.S. And when it happens, the political parties will fall all over themselves trying to prove themselves the tougher cops, leading to yet more conflict. The Forever War means continued high military spending even though the U.S. already spends more on defense than the rest of the worlds governments combined.
D. Energy Dependence. In the 1920s, the U.S. was energy independent. Today it is not. To keep the lights on, the U.S. must keep shipping money out of the country to energy producers, adding to the unprecedented trade deficits discussed below.
F. Derivatives. Derivatives are investment contracts tied to the price movements of underlying instruments, most commonly bonds and currencies. The market for them is huge, and they come in a rain forest of varieties. Financial institutions use them to hand off risk to other parties. Speculators use them to make bets. And hedge funds use them to create leveraged plays.
The numbers in the following chart are astounding; please note that the totals are trillions, not billions. The $370 trillion notional value of outstanding derivatives is staggering28 times the $13 trillion annual output of the entire U.S. economy.
Admirers claim that the rapidly expanding use of derivatives helps to decrease overall economic risk by shifting particular risks toward the investors that can most easily bear them. Its a nice idea. And its not really a bad idea. But its launched a very big ship that has never had a real shakedown cruise. Derivatives may give an appearance of decreasing risk on a case-by-case basis, but when taken together, the risks to the economic system are not decreased but made worse.
A typical participant in the derivatives market is busy buying with one hand and selling something slightly different with the other. Whatever risk he takes on, he tries to offset with a derivative from someone else. And that someone else is doing the same thing with another someone else. And so on. The simple fact is that no one knows where the long rows of dominoes begin or end, or just how much shaking it would take to knock over the least stable of them.
To take just one example: Credit Default Swaps (CDS) provide guarantees against a bond defaulting. They carry the rating of the party granting the guarantee, which is usually AA. But if such an issuer were forced to make good on a big default, its credit rating could drop, lowering the value of every other piece of paper it has guaranteedmany of which are wrapped up in derivatives sold by other issuers many of which are wrapped up in derivatives sold by still other issuers. The chain reaction could run far beyond the initial default.
By mid-2006, CDS issues had grown to $16 trillion, a 100% increase over the year before.
The individuals who manage banks and dealers in the derivatives market don't want rules so confining that they can't do business. We suspect most of the derivative operations are sturdy enough to withstand anything that has happened in the lifetimes of the people who run them. But they're not ready for anything rougher than that. If "6 sigma" is their standard, 7 sigma has implicitlybut dangerouslybeen assigned a probability of zero.
What happens when unprecedented events make the markets even more volatile? No building can be made absolutely quakeproof.
Almost makes one long for the simpler days of the late 1920s
The Users Guide to Fiscal Calamity
By Bud Conrad and the Editors of Casey Research
As even recent subscribers know, here at Casey Research we believe that the U.S.and by extension the worldis heading inexorably toward a financial crisis on a scale to match or exceed the Great Depression that was announced by the 1929 stock market crash.
Were not cheerleaders for hard times. We dont invoke the Great Depression just to make our hearts beat faster. Instead we point to it as proof that from time to time truly extreme events happen. And when they do, most people get hurt while a few profit extraordinarily.
Even a little foresight can help you join the few. Of course, economic foresight is squinty at best; but if nothing else, it rewards you with a context for your portfolio decisions. So in this article, we are going to examine some of the features of the Great Depression and then discuss the differences that, this time around, argue for an inflationary crisis, with consumer prices doubling repeatedly, rather than a 1930s-style deflation, when consumer prices dropped by one-third.
What, Me Worry?
The Dow Jones Industrial Average recently reached a new high. Employment is ticking along at just 4.4%. How, then, could a major financial crisis be lurking just over the horizon?
What would you say if someone told you that just before the Great Depression, U.S. unemployment was at its lowest levels ever?
And the stock market? As you can see from the chart below, heading into 1929 youd be called a grouch if you werent optimistic. But optimism would have cost you dearly: those who bought stocks in the waning months of the 1929 rally had to wait almost 30 years just to break even. Those who bought real estate in the hot Florida and California markets had to wait even longer.
And Then Theres This
Of course, while history shows repeating economic cycles, they never repeat exactly.
In the way of similarities, leading up to the 1929 crash was a string of fat years for speculative stocksmuch like the dot-com boom leading up to 2000. But unlike the 1929 crash, the dot-com bust seems to have hurt only the participants, not the bystanders. In fact, many pundits see the sharp sell-off in equities in 2000 as akin to opening a safety valve. It reduced the stock market excesses built up over a 20-year bull market without causing a general economic meltdown.
Yet two important factors suggest that the 2000 correction was only a foreshockand that it left the economy ready for the big quake.
A. Dividend Yields. Dividend yield is a widely followed indicator of stock market valuation. The lower a stocks dividend yield--the income it throws off measured as a percentage of the stocks price--the more richly the stock is being valued. By that indicator, stocks are just a tick off record highs and are pricier today than just before the 1929 crash.
B. Correction, what correction? If you look at housing and stocks as a piecetogether they now represent the bulk of household wealththe correction of 2000 was merely a bump in the road. Thats because the Feds loose monetary policy did so much to bid up real estate prices. By contrast, in 1929 housing crumbled just before stocks and then was damaged further by the scramble for liquidity. They went down together as the deflation proceeded. But following the 2000 stock market peak, what stocks were taking away, the housing market was replacing. The next chart reveals a bubble intact a bubble waiting for a pin.
Speaking of Housing
The wild stock market leading up to the fall of 1929 now serves screen writers as a period-piece cliché. But there was also a housing bubble of historic proportions in the 1920s. In 1925, housing investment in relation to the size of the whole economy was even bigger than it is today.
This Time Its Different
Overpriced stocks a bubble in financial assets a weakening housing market it all sounds deflationary. So why are we expecting an inflationary crisis?
To answer that, we have to look at some of the key differences between then and now.
A. Now a fiat currency. From 1879 to 1934, the U.S. dollar was redeemable for gold, at $20.67 per ounce. Even until 1971, it was redeemable for gold by foreign central banks, at $35 per ounce. There were bouts of inflation from time to time, but with the dollars tie to gold, they were self-limiting and invariably were followed by periods of declining prices. (The deflation of the 1930s seemed unremarkable when it began--but later accelerated as the Fed ignored the sharp contraction of the money supply.)
The dollars grounding in gold ended in 1971, and the Fed gained unlimited power to expand the money supply. Today there is no brake on money creation except the Federal Reserves fear of price inflationwhich tends to take a back seat to its fear of recession. During the Greenspan days, the Fed used its money creation power to make massive foreign purchases of U.S. government Treasuries. This pumped up prices of stocks and other financial assets and fed the bubble in the housing market. Foreigners have been complicit in the process by taking their trade surpluses and buying Treasuries, agencies, and corporate bonds, in the process providing a ready source of credit for creating mortgages to drive houses higher.
So, far from seeing the kind of credit collapse that occurred in the Great Depression, this time around we have seen a massive credit expansion.
B. Government entitlements. Back in the 1920s, there was relatively little in the way of a government safety net and certainly nothing like the politically entrenched entitlement programs of our modern welfare state. Social Security and Medicare alone have the government on the hook for $36 trillion.
And the piper wont wait to be paid. As previously discussed, fully 78 million baby boomersabout 26% of the entire populationare now either in, or approaching, retirement age. But they are doing so with historic levels of debt and, on the average, woefully inadequate net worth (over 25% will have a net worth less than $50,000) much of which is based on deflating home values. But every one of them has a mailbox thats just right for receiving government checks.
The pressure on the government to continue handing out checks wont ease; it will build. Faced with the option of defaulting on its obligationspolitical suicideor inflating those obligations away, the government can be counted on to take the time-honored and far more politically acceptable path of inflation.
C. War. In the 1920s, people thought the war to end all wars had been fought, never to be repeated. Military spending was cut to the bone.
Today the U.S. and its few remaining allies are embroiled in a global war with Islam. The early cost estimate for Iraq alone is $1.3 trillion. As we see it, even with the recent swing towards the Demopublicans, the worst is still ahead. All our stomping around in the worlds messiest neighborhoods has helped recruit the next wave of dedicated jihadists, armed with a slew of new and battle-tested guerilla warfare methodologies increasing the odds of another 9/11-scale attack against the U.S. And when it happens, the political parties will fall all over themselves trying to prove themselves the tougher cops, leading to yet more conflict. The Forever War means continued high military spending even though the U.S. already spends more on defense than the rest of the worlds governments combined.
D. Energy Dependence. In the 1920s, the U.S. was energy independent. Today it is not. To keep the lights on, the U.S. must keep shipping money out of the country to energy producers, adding to the unprecedented trade deficits discussed below.
F. Derivatives. Derivatives are investment contracts tied to the price movements of underlying instruments, most commonly bonds and currencies. The market for them is huge, and they come in a rain forest of varieties. Financial institutions use them to hand off risk to other parties. Speculators use them to make bets. And hedge funds use them to create leveraged plays.
The numbers in the following chart are astounding; please note that the totals are trillions, not billions. The $370 trillion notional value of outstanding derivatives is staggering28 times the $13 trillion annual output of the entire U.S. economy.
Admirers claim that the rapidly expanding use of derivatives helps to decrease overall economic risk by shifting particular risks toward the investors that can most easily bear them. Its a nice idea. And its not really a bad idea. But its launched a very big ship that has never had a real shakedown cruise. Derivatives may give an appearance of decreasing risk on a case-by-case basis, but when taken together, the risks to the economic system are not decreased but made worse.
A typical participant in the derivatives market is busy buying with one hand and selling something slightly different with the other. Whatever risk he takes on, he tries to offset with a derivative from someone else. And that someone else is doing the same thing with another someone else. And so on. The simple fact is that no one knows where the long rows of dominoes begin or end, or just how much shaking it would take to knock over the least stable of them.
To take just one example: Credit Default Swaps (CDS) provide guarantees against a bond defaulting. They carry the rating of the party granting the guarantee, which is usually AA. But if such an issuer were forced to make good on a big default, its credit rating could drop, lowering the value of every other piece of paper it has guaranteedmany of which are wrapped up in derivatives sold by other issuers many of which are wrapped up in derivatives sold by still other issuers. The chain reaction could run far beyond the initial default.
By mid-2006, CDS issues had grown to $16 trillion, a 100% increase over the year before.
The individuals who manage banks and dealers in the derivatives market don't want rules so confining that they can't do business. We suspect most of the derivative operations are sturdy enough to withstand anything that has happened in the lifetimes of the people who run them. But they're not ready for anything rougher than that. If "6 sigma" is their standard, 7 sigma has implicitlybut dangerouslybeen assigned a probability of zero.
What happens when unprecedented events make the markets even more volatile? No building can be made absolutely quakeproof.
Almost makes one long for the simpler days of the late 1920s