Rather than quote and yourespond to every argument, I'll just present some facts in the form of bullets:
* It is well documented that General Eisenhower opposed using nukes on Japan, partly because he was aware of the intelligence that indicated that Japan was already soundly beaten and that the Japanese were looking for a way to surrender with a minimum loss of face. In his memoir, Eisenhower stated that he told Secretary of War Stimson that using the atomic bomb on Japan was “completely unnecessary” (
Mandate for Change, pp. 312-313).
Eisenhower’s son later recalled that before the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, his father told him, “I’d sure hate to see it used, because Japan’s licked anyway, and they know it” (Interview with Ed Edwin, February 28, 1967, Eisenhower Library;
Summary: Section C).
Stephen Ambrose states that Eisenhower advised Truman against dropping the A-bomb on Japan (
Eisenhower, Volume 1: Soldier General of the Army, pp. 425-426).
* Somewhat surprisingly, General MacArthur likewise opposed using nukes on Japan. Numerous sources, including MacArthur’s pilot, confirm this. When Norman Cousins interviewed MacArthur, he was surprised to learn that MacArthur was never consulted about using the atomic bomb on Japan and that MacArthur “saw no military justification for the dropping of the bomb.” Added Cousins,
The war might have ended weeks earlier, he [MacArthur] said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor. (The Pathology of Power, p. 71)
* General Carter Clarke, who was in charge of preparing MAGIC summaries in 1945 and who served on General Marshall’s staff, stated,
We brought them [the Japanese] down to an abject surrender through the accelerated sinking of their merchant marine and hunger alone, and then we didn’t need to do it [use the atomic bomb], and we knew we didn’t need to do it, and they knew that we knew that we didn’t need to do it, we used them as an experiment for two atomic bombs. (Clarke interview with Dr. Forrest Pogue, July 6, 1959, p. 29, Pogue Papers, GCMRL; Alperovitz,
The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, p. 359; see also
Hiroshima: Quotes)
* General George C. Kinney, commander of the Army Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific, when asked in a 1969 interview if the decision to use the atomic bomb was militarily and politically wise, he said,
No! I think we had the Japanese licked anyhow. I think they would have quit probably within a week or so of when they did quit. (Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, p. 336)
* Not everyone turned a blind eye to the immorality of our fire-bombing of Japanese cities. For example, General Bonner Fellers, who served on MacArthur’s staff, stated in a June 1945 memorandum that LeMay’s fire-bombing raids on Japanese cities were “one of the most ruthless and barbaric killings of non-combatants in all history” (John Dower,
War Without Mercy, p. 41).
* The fact that by early 1945 Japan was virtually defenseless against air attacks is shown by the fact that by June 1945 we were losing only 0.003 of our bombers in air raids on Japan—in other words, only 3 out of every 1,000 bombers was being shot down (Paul Ham,
Hiroshima Nagasaki: The Real Story of the Atomic Bombings and Their Aftermath, p. 176).
* To give you some idea of Japan’s prostrate state by July 1945, consider these facts (all of these facts are discussed in Ham’s book, among other sources):
-- In July 1945 the Japanese government was forced to impose yet another cut in staple food rations: a cut of 10%, in fact. As a result, the food ration per person fell below 1700 calories, well below the minimum needed to maintain basic health. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, published in 1946, noted,
Undernourishment produced a major increase in the incidence of beriberi and tuberculosis. It also had an important effect on the efficiency and morale of the people, and contributed to absenteeism among workers. (p. 21)
-- Cases of night blindness due to malnutrition became common.
-- Japan was even running so low on rice that the government announced a program to process acorns as a substitute for rice.
-- The food shortage became so bad that the government actually published articles and booklets on how to eat food no one would usually eat, such as “Food Substitution: How to Eat Things People Normally Wouldn’t Eat.” One government booklet advised citizens to eat locusts and insect pupas.
-- Japan was running so low on fuel that the government began exploring pine-root oil as a fuel substitute for aircraft.
-- Japan was running so low on metal that its military aircraft were increasingly made with larger amounts of wood. In fact, in July the government announced it had established a department to make planes out of wood.
-- Starting in early 1944 the lack of metals became so severe, due to the U.S. naval blockade, that the Japanese government was forced to start confiscating and melting bridge railings, metal fences, metal statues (even those in Buddhist temples), gate posts, notice boards, and even household items.
-- Although Japan built underground aircraft factories, raw materials were in such short supply that only 10—yes, just 10—aircraft were manufactured in those factories.
-- In March 1945, imports of crude oil, rubber, coal, and iron ore
ceased.
-- By June 1945, Japan had a grand total of 9,000 planes of any kind. Most of these were trainers or old planes designed for kamikaze raids, and less than half of them were properly equipped for such raids. The majority of those planes could not have been flown anyway due to the lack of fuel.
-- By early 1945, the vast majority of Japan’s merchant vessels had been destroyed.
-- By June 1945, the Japanese naval surface fleet had essentially ceased to exist. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey reported,
After the liberation of the Philippines and the capture of Okinawa, oil imports into Japan were completely cut off; fuel oil stocks had been exhausted, and the few remaining Japanese warships, being without fuel, were decommissioned or were covered with camouflage and used only as antiaircraft platforms. Except for its shore-based Kamikaze airforce and surface and undersea craft adapted for anti-invasion suicide attack, the Japanese Navy had ceased to exist. (p. 11)
-- By June 1945, every major Japanese port was mined by the U.S. Navy. Indeed, U.S. Navy mines closed the Shimonoseki Straights, which cut off naval activity between the Japanese main islands of Honshu and Kyushu. U.S. Navy mines also shut down 18 of Japan’s 21 naval repair yards on the Inland Sea. Hiroshima’s port was shut down. Nagasaki’s port, formerly a major port, became nearly worthless.
-- By early 1945, few Japanese stores remained open because there were so few commercial goods being produced or imported.
-- As mentioned earlier, Japan was virtually defenseless against air attacks. By June 1945, the odds of a U.S. bomber being shot down were 3 out of 1,000.
By June 1945, Japan posed no threat to us. The Japanese were purely on the defensive and their situation was only getting worse by the day because of our virtually total naval embargo and total control of the air. Thus, it should come as no surprise that the United States Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that “in all probability”
Japan would have surrendered before 1 November 1945 even if we had not dropped nukes and even if the Soviets had not invaded:
Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated. (p. 26)
There was no need to kill hundreds of thousands of women and children by nuking Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If Truman had listed to the majority of the senior officials who were advising him, instead of listening to his Japanophobic Secretary of State James Byrnes, the Pacific War could have been ended weeks earlier and hundreds of thousands of lives would have been spared. Even Churchill tried to persuade Truman to clarify the emperor's status in unconditional surrender, but he wouldn't listen because Byrnes screamed against it, and this refusal greatly aided the cause of Japan's hardliners and hamstrung the moderates.