Henry Stimson, Secretary of War
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/japan/stimson_harpers.pdf
My chief purpose was to end the war in victory with the least possible cost in the lives of the men in the armies which I had helped to raise. In the light of the alternatives which, on a fair estimate, were open to us I believe that no man in our position and subject to our responsibilities, holding in his hands a weapon of such possibilities for accomplishing this purpose and saving those lives, could have failed to use it and afterwards looked his countrymen in the face.
That is obscenely absurd and revisionist. Stimson didn't even really write that article. He was pressured into "writing" it, and then his "draft" was heavily edited by others. By the time he "wrote" it, he was quite ill.
Months before we nuked Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan was already prostrate, starving, and virtually powerless. The home islands were cut off from China. The Japanese people were approaching the point of starvation. Japan was virtually defenseless against air and naval attacks. Consider:
-- In July 1945 the Japanese government was forced to impose yet another cut in staple food rations: a cut of 10%, in fact. As a result, the food ration per person fell below 1700 calories, well below the minimum needed to maintain basic health. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, published in 1946, noted.
Undernourishment produced a major increase in the incidence of beriberi and tuberculosis. It also had an important effect on the efficiency and morale of the people, and contributed to absenteeism among workers. (p. 21)
-- Cases of night blindness due to malnutrition became common.
-- Japan was even running so low on rice that the government announced a program to process acorns as a substitute for rice.
-- The food shortage became so bad that the government actually published articles and booklets on how to eat food no one would usually eat, such as “Food Substitution: How to Eat Things People Normally Wouldn’t Eat.” One government booklet advised citizens to eat locusts and insect pupas.
-- Japan was running so low on fuel that the government began exploring pine-root oil as a fuel substitute for aircraft.
-- By October 1944, many new fighter pilots were being trained with films instead of live flight training in order to save fuel:
The Toho Motion Picture Company constructed a lake in Setagaya and filled it with six-foot models of U.S. warships. Atop a tower a movie camera on a boom took pictures of the vessels from various angles, simulating different speeds of approach. These films were shown as a substitute for flight training in order to save fuel. (John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945, New York: Random House, 2003 Modern Library Paperback Edition, p. 536)
-- Japan was running so low on metal that its military aircraft were increasingly made with larger amounts of wood. In fact, in July the government announced it had established a department to make planes out of wood.
-- Starting in early 1944 the lack of metals became so severe, due to the U.S. naval blockade, that the Japanese government was forced to start confiscating and melting bridge railings, metal fences, metal statues (even those in Buddhist temples), gate posts, notice boards, and even household items.
-- Although Japan built underground aircraft factories, raw materials were in such short supply that only 10—yes, just 10—aircraft were manufactured in those factories.
-- In March 1945, imports of crude oil, rubber, coal, and iron ore
ceased.
-- By June 1945, Japan had a grand total of 9,000 planes of any kind. Most of these were trainers or old planes designed for kamikaze raids, and less than half of them were properly equipped for such raids. Many of those planes could not have been flown anyway due to the lack of fuel.
-- By early 1945, the vast majority of Japan’s merchant vessels had been destroyed.
-- By June 1945, the Japanese Navy’s surface fleet had essentially ceased to exist. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey reported,
After the liberation of the Philippines and the capture of Okinawa, oil imports into Japan were completely cut off; fuel oil stocks had been exhausted, and the few remaining Japanese warships, being without fuel, were decommissioned or were covered with camouflage and used only as antiaircraft platforms. Except for its shore-based Kamikaze air force and surface and undersea craft adapted for anti-invasion suicide attack, the Japanese Navy had ceased to exist. (p. 11)
-- By June 1945, every major Japanese port was mined by the U.S. Navy and the Air Force. Indeed, U.S. Navy mines closed the Shimonoseki Straights, which cut off naval activity between the Japanese main islands of Honshu and Kyushu. U.S. Navy mines also shut down 18 of Japan’s 21 naval repair yards on the Inland Sea. Hiroshima’s port was shut down. Nagasaki’s port, formerly a major port, became nearly worthless.
-- By early 1945, few Japanese stores remained open because there were so few commercial goods being produced or imported.
-- As mentioned earlier, Japan was virtually defenseless against air attacks. By June 1945, the odds of a U.S. bomber being shot down in a bombing raid over Japan were 3 out of 1,000.
Given these facts, it is no surprise that there was such a strong civilian backlash against war veterans and the military in general after the war.
By June 1945, Japan posed no threat to us. The Japanese were purely on the defensive and their situation was only getting worse by the day because of our virtually total naval embargo and total control of the air. Thus, it should come as no surprise that the United States Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that “in all probability”
Japan would have surrendered before 1 November 1945 even if we had not dropped nukes and even if the Soviets had not invaded:
Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated. (p. 26)
So this nonsense that we had to use nukes to "save hundreds of thousands of lives" is gross revisionism of the basest kind. Again, weeks before Hiroshima, we knew from multiple sources that Japan's civilian leaders, including the emperor, wanted to surrender, and that their only condition was that the emperor not be deposed, which was exactly the arrangement that we later accepted--after we had nuked two cities.