Cherry picked? I quoted the conclusion. It is funny, reading your replies. The conclusion, the whole book summarized in the authors conclusion.
Uh, you didn't "quote the conclusion"--you cherry-picked two statements
from the multi-page conclusion. You ignored the fact that Hasegawa says that Truman did not need to nuke Japan, that the nukes did not cause Japan to surrender, that nuking Japan did not save American lives, and that the Soviet invasion was the reason Japan surrendered.
You ignored all of those key points and cherry-picked two statements, one of which said that Truman was not a villain, and the other of which said that Japan bore more of the responsibility for the war's destructive ending than did Truman or Stalin.
Now, regarding the claim that Japan started the war with China, leaving aside the important point that there really was no sovereign country of "China" at the time but rather areas controlled by different factions that claimed to be "China," people who claim that Japan started the war must be unaware of a huge body of information on this issue.
The war started in 1937 when full-scale fighting began in Shanghai following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. But that fighting erupted because the Nationalists, led by Chiang Kaishek, decided to break the existing truce and attacked the Japanese district in Shanghai with two divisions. Chiang Kaishek apparently believed he could quickly overwhelm the small Japanese force in the area, but he turned out to be badly mistaken. Unlike the previous time when the Nationalists had picked a fight with the Japanese in Shanghai, this time the Japanese were not willing to agree to a settlement but instead decided it was time to drive the Nationalists out of Shanghai and take control of the city. As Far East expert Peter Harmsen points out, the Japanese had no desire to fight over Shanghai; indeed, senior Japanese generals believed the army was overextended and did not want to try to take Shanghai--they wanted to reach a long-term deal with the Nationalists and pull back into Manchuria:
Japan, on the other hand, only entered the battle reluctantly. The army already felt overstretched in the north of China, and for the wrong reasons. Many Japanese generals considered the Soviet Union to be the main threat and the one that most resources had to be directed towards. The Chinese themselves understood this was the case, and on occasion admitted so in public. “Japan had no wish to fight at Shanghai,” Chinese General Zhang Fakui, one of the top field commanders during the struggle for the city, said in a post-war interview. “It should be simple to see that we took the initiative.” (Storm Clouds Over the Pacific, 1931-1941, Kindle Edition, Casemate Publishers, 2018, loc. 1453)
Nevertheless, FDR and his leftist allies in the press, not to mention the Chinese Communists and Nationalists and the Soviet Union, all claimed that the Japanese taking of Shanghai was another example of Japanese aggression.
Before the fighting began in Shanghai, Japan had made a very reasonable peace offer, and there were plenty of people in the Nationalist camp who thought the offer was a good one. It would have left the Nationalists in control of most of China and would have required only tacit recognition of Japan's state in Manchuria: Manchukuo.
But, soon after Japan announced this peace initiative, Chiang Kaishek recklessly moved four divisions into the area, whereas the Japanese only had a fraction of that number of troops in the area. Naturally, the movement of four divisions into the area alarmed the Japanese, especially given that they had just made a credible and reasonable peace offer. Even then, the Japanese continued their peace initiative, and then Chiang Kaishek attacked the Japanese area of Shanghai, and the war was on.
Some people here don’t seem to understand that the Japanese were “already in Shanghai” because they had a legal right, by treaty, to be there, as did the Americans, the British, the Dutch, and the Germans. Like every other country that had a legal presence in Shanghai, the Japanese had a small force there to protect Japanese citizens in the city. Most Japanese lived in the Shanghai district called Hongkew, and Hongkew became known as Little Tokyo.
We should also keep in mind that during WWI, Japan overtook Britain as the country with the largest number of its citizens living in Shanghai and in China as a whole. By the early 1930s, Japanese citizens in China accounted for about 80% of the foreigners who were living in the country.
Until James Crowley's seminal research on the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in his book
Japan's Quest for Autonomy, nearly everyone believed the Chinese Nationalists' and Communists’ claim that the Japanese army had engineered it. Crowley found strong evidence that this was not the case. Yet, some authors still repeat the myth that the Japanese engineered the incident.
Peter Harmsen examines the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in detail in chapter 3 of his previously mentioned book
Storm Clouds Over the Pacific, 1931-1941. Another good source on the incident is Hata Ikuhiko's chapter "The Marco Polo Bridge Incident, 1937," in
The China Quagmire (Columbia University Press, 1983).