The Nuking of Nagasaki: Even More Immoral and Unnecessary than Hiroshima

You believe the following:

1. Total war is what you do in war.
2. Mass murdering civilians in war is entirely justified and should be utilized as needed, to win the war.
3. The nuking of Japan was necessary to end the war and was entirely justified.
4. Unconditional surrender is what our leaders demanded and it must be imposed, no matter the costs.
5. Occupying Japan was necessary.
6. The mass murder committed by the Japanese, justifies the US government mass murdering Japanese civilians.
7. The Japanese were unprovoked by FDR and committed a sneak attack on Pear Harbor, in which the US was caught off guard.
8. Since they attacked a military base sneakily and were entirely unprovoked, the US government has the right to murder and destroy all of Japan.

Please let me know which points I got wrong?
Waking up?
That’s really sad. It merely proves you aren’t informed and you are a terrible blood thirsty warmonger.

Is it any wonder our government pursues nonstop war, when so many Americans think as you do?

A nation founded on limited government and nonintervention is neither, and amazingly many Americans still revere it.
Oops, A man so afraid of war is easily hurt with words. You should never fight for freedom let alone post on message boards.
Yes you love war, which only proves you are a complete idiot.
I love freedom, you prove you are a coward.
LOL.

Freedom is not war and it is not mass murdering defenseless civilians. It is most certainly is not doing the bidding of the ruling class.

Why don’t statist know this fundamental truth?
 
Only the parts you dictate are fact, are fact? You quote and cite a book for weeks and when I open my copy of the book and literally show what it states it is now wrong.
Well there you again, another source you used in confidence you now discredit. If I keep at you, you will eventually discredit all your sources.

This is getting silly. You have quoted a few lines from the book and have interpreted them rather expansively, to say the least, whereas I have quoted numerous substantial statements from the book, and you have done nothing but duck and dodge in response to those quotes. I have proven that Hasegawa's research supports my position on virtually key point I have made.

You made a big deal over Hasegawa's statement that Japan's leaders bear more of the "responsibility" for the destructive end of the war than do Truman and Stalin, as if this statement somehow addresses or refutes all the facts that I've cited from Hasegawa's book.

You don't seem to understand the difference between "responsibility" and "guilt/blame." I am responsible for my children's conduct, but not necessarily guilty of it or to blame for it. A military commander is responsible for the conduct of his troops, even when they perform actions without his knowledge or consent. Hasegawa's opinion that Japan's leaders bear more responsibility for the war's end than do Truman and Stalin does not change the fact that he also says that Truman did not need to nuke Japan, that the nukes did not end the war, that the nukes did not save American lives, that Truman failed to pursue alternatives to nuking, that the Japanese would have surrendered soon after the Soviet invasion without nukes being used, etc., etc.

I don't happen to agree with Hasegawa on the assignment of responsibility, but this is not a major issue. Similarly, it does not bother me that Hasegawa opines that Truman was not a "villain." I myself am unsure whether Truman acted out of malice or out of ignorance and incompetence, or a mix of both. There are two or three other issues where I disagree with Hasegawa, but on the whole he and I agree about 85% of the time. The central point is that Hasegawa argues that Truman did not need to nuke Japan, that there were alternatives to nuking that Truman refused to pursue, that the atomic bombings did not end the war nor save American lives, etc., etc.

Finally, regarding the B-32 that was "shot down" over Tokyo on August 18, you are correct that there were only two B-32s, but neither bomber was shot down. It is rather telling that the 17 Japanese fighters that intercepted the two B-32s did not shoot down either of them, contrary to what you seemed to imply. Neither bomber was shot down, but one of the crew members was mortally wounded during the aerial combat. Furthermore, we flew B-32s over Tokyo the day before, on August 17, and they were intercepted and shot at but were not shot down. The Japanese did not know that the B-32s were doing recon missions because we didn't bother to tell them.

After Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been nuked by two small formations of three bombers each, the Japanese were understandably alarmed by the sight of two B-32s over Tokyo, in addition to the fact that we had carried out a huge bombing raid on Osaka on August 14, after Japan had surrendered.
 
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Whatever labored, embarrassing arguments one can make for the nuking of Hiroshima cannot be made for the nuking of Nagasaki just three days later. From my article "Did We Really Need to Use the Atomic Bomb Against Japan?":

On August 9, 1945, just three days after we nuked Hiroshima, and before Japan’s leaders had sufficient time to process and respond to our nuclear attack on Hiroshima, we dropped an atomic bomb on the city of Nagasaki, which was home to Japan’s largest Christian population. The atomic bombing of Nagasaki was even more inexcusable than the nuking of Hiroshima. . . .

On August 9, we nuked Nagasaki, just three days after Hiroshima, and hours after the Soviets began to maul the Japanese army in Manchuria,, and while Japan’s civilian leaders were understandably absorbed with trying to process what had happened to Hiroshima and with responding to the Soviet attack in Manchuria. Surely Truman and other high officials knew that three days was not enough time for Japan’s government to formulate a formal response to the unprecedented use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and to the Soviet invasion in Manchuria. Even McGeorge Bundy, who helped Henry Stimson write his defense of the atomic bombing of Japan, acknowledged that Truman was too quick to nuke Nagasaki:​

"It is hard to see that much could have been lost if there had been more time between the two bombs. . . . Such a delay would have been relatively easy, and I think right." (https://miketgriffith.com/files/immoraluse.pdf)
The Japanese were not even able to get a scientific team to Hiroshima until August 7, the day after the attack. Meanwhile, Japan's leaders were getting conflicting, fragmentary information about what had happened in Hiroshima. Some Army officials were telling the government that the bombing of Hiroshima was merely a very large conventional bombing raid, and they were suppressing information about the kinds of wounds that had been inflicted. There was no Internet back then, no fax machines, no Skype.

Surely it was obscene for us to nuke Nagasaki just three days, 72 hours, after we had nuked Hiroshima.
Japs shoulda surrendered sooner.
 
Whatever labored, embarrassing arguments one can make for the nuking of Hiroshima cannot be made for the nuking of Nagasaki just three days later. From my article "Did We Really Need to Use the Atomic Bomb Against Japan?":

On August 9, 1945, just three days after we nuked Hiroshima, and before Japan’s leaders had sufficient time to process and respond to our nuclear attack on Hiroshima, we dropped an atomic bomb on the city of Nagasaki, which was home to Japan’s largest Christian population. The atomic bombing of Nagasaki was even more inexcusable than the nuking of Hiroshima. . . .

On August 9, we nuked Nagasaki, just three days after Hiroshima, and hours after the Soviets began to maul the Japanese army in Manchuria,, and while Japan’s civilian leaders were understandably absorbed with trying to process what had happened to Hiroshima and with responding to the Soviet attack in Manchuria. Surely Truman and other high officials knew that three days was not enough time for Japan’s government to formulate a formal response to the unprecedented use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and to the Soviet invasion in Manchuria. Even McGeorge Bundy, who helped Henry Stimson write his defense of the atomic bombing of Japan, acknowledged that Truman was too quick to nuke Nagasaki:​

"It is hard to see that much could have been lost if there had been more time between the two bombs. . . . Such a delay would have been relatively easy, and I think right." (https://miketgriffith.com/files/immoraluse.pdf)
The Japanese were not even able to get a scientific team to Hiroshima until August 7, the day after the attack. Meanwhile, Japan's leaders were getting conflicting, fragmentary information about what had happened in Hiroshima. Some Army officials were telling the government that the bombing of Hiroshima was merely a very large conventional bombing raid, and they were suppressing information about the kinds of wounds that had been inflicted. There was no Internet back then, no fax machines, no Skype.

Surely it was obscene for us to nuke Nagasaki just three days, 72 hours, after we had nuked Hiroshima.
Japs shoulda surrendered sooner.
They tried to surrender but Dirty Harry ignored them, so that he could nuke them. He really liked mass murdering defenseless Japanese women and children. Plus he wanted to impress Uncle Joe.
 
Whatever labored, embarrassing arguments one can make for the nuking of Hiroshima cannot be made for the nuking of Nagasaki just three days later. From my article "Did We Really Need to Use the Atomic Bomb Against Japan?":

On August 9, 1945, just three days after we nuked Hiroshima, and before Japan’s leaders had sufficient time to process and respond to our nuclear attack on Hiroshima, we dropped an atomic bomb on the city of Nagasaki, which was home to Japan’s largest Christian population. The atomic bombing of Nagasaki was even more inexcusable than the nuking of Hiroshima. . . .

On August 9, we nuked Nagasaki, just three days after Hiroshima, and hours after the Soviets began to maul the Japanese army in Manchuria,, and while Japan’s civilian leaders were understandably absorbed with trying to process what had happened to Hiroshima and with responding to the Soviet attack in Manchuria. Surely Truman and other high officials knew that three days was not enough time for Japan’s government to formulate a formal response to the unprecedented use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and to the Soviet invasion in Manchuria. Even McGeorge Bundy, who helped Henry Stimson write his defense of the atomic bombing of Japan, acknowledged that Truman was too quick to nuke Nagasaki:​

"It is hard to see that much could have been lost if there had been more time between the two bombs. . . . Such a delay would have been relatively easy, and I think right." (https://miketgriffith.com/files/immoraluse.pdf)
The Japanese were not even able to get a scientific team to Hiroshima until August 7, the day after the attack. Meanwhile, Japan's leaders were getting conflicting, fragmentary information about what had happened in Hiroshima. Some Army officials were telling the government that the bombing of Hiroshima was merely a very large conventional bombing raid, and they were suppressing information about the kinds of wounds that had been inflicted. There was no Internet back then, no fax machines, no Skype.

Surely it was obscene for us to nuke Nagasaki just three days, 72 hours, after we had nuked Hiroshima.
Japs shoulda surrendered sooner.
They tried to surrender but Dirty Harry ignored them, so that he could nuke them. He really liked mass murdering defenseless Japanese women and children. Plus he wanted to impress Uncle Joe.
you're a fucking liar.
 
Whatever labored, embarrassing arguments one can make for the nuking of Hiroshima cannot be made for the nuking of Nagasaki just three days later. From my article "Did We Really Need to Use the Atomic Bomb Against Japan?":

On August 9, 1945, just three days after we nuked Hiroshima, and before Japan’s leaders had sufficient time to process and respond to our nuclear attack on Hiroshima, we dropped an atomic bomb on the city of Nagasaki, which was home to Japan’s largest Christian population. The atomic bombing of Nagasaki was even more inexcusable than the nuking of Hiroshima. . . .

On August 9, we nuked Nagasaki, just three days after Hiroshima, and hours after the Soviets began to maul the Japanese army in Manchuria,, and while Japan’s civilian leaders were understandably absorbed with trying to process what had happened to Hiroshima and with responding to the Soviet attack in Manchuria. Surely Truman and other high officials knew that three days was not enough time for Japan’s government to formulate a formal response to the unprecedented use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and to the Soviet invasion in Manchuria. Even McGeorge Bundy, who helped Henry Stimson write his defense of the atomic bombing of Japan, acknowledged that Truman was too quick to nuke Nagasaki:​

"It is hard to see that much could have been lost if there had been more time between the two bombs. . . . Such a delay would have been relatively easy, and I think right." (https://miketgriffith.com/files/immoraluse.pdf)
The Japanese were not even able to get a scientific team to Hiroshima until August 7, the day after the attack. Meanwhile, Japan's leaders were getting conflicting, fragmentary information about what had happened in Hiroshima. Some Army officials were telling the government that the bombing of Hiroshima was merely a very large conventional bombing raid, and they were suppressing information about the kinds of wounds that had been inflicted. There was no Internet back then, no fax machines, no Skype.

Surely it was obscene for us to nuke Nagasaki just three days, 72 hours, after we had nuked Hiroshima.
Japs shoulda surrendered sooner.
They tried to surrender but Dirty Harry ignored them, so that he could nuke them. He really liked mass murdering defenseless Japanese women and children. Plus he wanted to impress Uncle Joe.
you're a fucking liar.
You’re a fucking uninformed idiot. Get informed.
 
This is getting silly. You have quoted a few lines from the book and have interpreted them rather expansively, to say the least, whereas I have quoted numerous substantial statements from the book, and you have done nothing but duck and dodge in response to those quotes. I have proven that Hasegawa's research supports my position on virtually key point I have made.
I have responded much to your comments. When your first few lines prove to be lies, that makes all you state a lie.

When a few of your quotes proves your post wrong, what more can I do.

Ducking and dodging, that is what you have done. Care for a list of posts you never ever responded to!

And again, I quoted the conclusion of the book which placed the blame for the atomic bombs squarely as the responsibility of the actions the Japanese took. Call the conclusion anything you like. Either way it is the conclusion of the book you brought into this OP.

You dont like the conclusion your book established? Then quit using google and actually read the book! You dont need to be blindsided.
 
They tried to surrender but Dirty Harry ignored them, so that he could nuke them. He really liked mass murdering defenseless Japanese women and children. Plus he wanted to impress Uncle Joe.
They tried surrendering by killing a 1000 men? Really? go ahead and explain how that works.
Sorry I can’t explain anything to someone of your exceedingly low intelligence. It just can’t be done.

KILL...KILL...KILL...
 
[

Sorry I can’t explain anything to someone of your exceedingly low intelligence. It just can’t be done.

KILL...KILL...KILL...
You can not explain anything to anyone of any intelligence. That is your failure, another of your pathetic shortcomings. The inability to articulate your opinion so others are able to comprehend.
 
As I've said, I agree with about 85% of Hasegawa's position, or, to put it another way, Hasegawa's research supports about 85% of my position.

The only substantive issue where I disagree with Hasegawa to a substantial degree is his argument that Japan would not have surrendered before November 1 without a Soviet invasion and without nukes.

Hasegawa acknowledges that the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) reached the opposite conclusion, but he contends that the USSBS got it wrong and that some of the Survey's evidence contradicted their conclusion (pp. 294-295).

It is true that some of the Japanese officials whom the USSBS interviewed said Japan would have kept fighting after November 1 with a Soviet invasion and without nukes, while others said the opposite. The USSBS and Hasegawa each weighed the conflicting evidence and simply reached different conclusions.

Yet, Hasegawa himself notes that Soviet intelligence reported in April 1945 that the new Japanese cabinet and other officials believed that, at best, Japan could only continue fighting until December (pp. 56-57).

Anyway, on the most crucial points, I agree with Hasegawa, namely, that Truman did not need to nuke Japan, that the atomic bombings did not save American lives, that Truman failed to pursue alternatives to nuking, that the nukes did not cause Japan to surrender, and that Japan surrendered because of the Soviet invasion.
 
As I've said, I agree with about 85% of Hasegawa's position, or, to put it another way, Hasegawa's research supports about 85% of my position.
As you dictate. You certainly are an arrogant prick. Hasegawa's supports your position? Hasegawa' wrote his book to support your position,? Yet, you call using his conclusion cherry picking? You are wrong, history is a bitch, you can't win against the facts.
 
It is true that some of the Japanese officials whom the USSBS interviewed said Japan would have kept fighting after November 1 with a Soviet invasion and without nukes, while others said the opposite. The USSBS and Hasegawa each weighed the conflicting evidence and simply reached different conclusions.

In the first sentence, "with a Soviet invasion" should read "without a Soviet invasion."
 
Cherry picked? I quoted the conclusion. It is funny, reading your replies. The conclusion, the whole book summarized in the authors conclusion.

Uh, you didn't "quote the conclusion"--you cherry-picked two statements from the multi-page conclusion. You ignored the fact that Hasegawa says that Truman did not need to nuke Japan, that the nukes did not cause Japan to surrender, that nuking Japan did not save American lives, and that the Soviet invasion was the reason Japan surrendered.

You ignored all of those key points and cherry-picked two statements, one of which said that Truman was not a villain, and the other of which said that Japan bore more of the responsibility for the war's destructive ending than did Truman or Stalin.

Now, regarding the claim that Japan started the war with China, leaving aside the important point that there really was no sovereign country of "China" at the time but rather areas controlled by different factions that claimed to be "China," people who claim that Japan started the war must be unaware of a huge body of information on this issue.

The war started in 1937 when full-scale fighting began in Shanghai following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. But that fighting erupted because the Nationalists, led by Chiang Kaishek, decided to break the existing truce and attacked the Japanese district in Shanghai with two divisions. Chiang Kaishek apparently believed he could quickly overwhelm the small Japanese force in the area, but he turned out to be badly mistaken. Unlike the previous time when the Nationalists had picked a fight with the Japanese in Shanghai, this time the Japanese were not willing to agree to a settlement but instead decided it was time to drive the Nationalists out of Shanghai and take control of the city. As Far East expert Peter Harmsen points out, the Japanese had no desire to fight over Shanghai; indeed, senior Japanese generals believed the army was overextended and did not want to try to take Shanghai--they wanted to reach a long-term deal with the Nationalists and pull back into Manchuria:

Japan, on the other hand, only entered the battle reluctantly. The army already felt overstretched in the north of China, and for the wrong reasons. Many Japanese generals considered the Soviet Union to be the main threat and the one that most resources had to be directed towards. The Chinese themselves understood this was the case, and on occasion admitted so in public. “Japan had no wish to fight at Shanghai,” Chinese General Zhang Fakui, one of the top field commanders during the struggle for the city, said in a post-war interview. “It should be simple to see that we took the initiative.” (Storm Clouds Over the Pacific, 1931-1941, Kindle Edition, Casemate Publishers, 2018, loc. 1453)​

Nevertheless, FDR and his leftist allies in the press, not to mention the Chinese Communists and Nationalists and the Soviet Union, all claimed that the Japanese taking of Shanghai was another example of Japanese aggression.

Before the fighting began in Shanghai, Japan had made a very reasonable peace offer, and there were plenty of people in the Nationalist camp who thought the offer was a good one. It would have left the Nationalists in control of most of China and would have required only tacit recognition of Japan's state in Manchuria: Manchukuo.

But, soon after Japan announced this peace initiative, Chiang Kaishek recklessly moved four divisions into the area, whereas the Japanese only had a fraction of that number of troops in the area. Naturally, the movement of four divisions into the area alarmed the Japanese, especially given that they had just made a credible and reasonable peace offer. Even then, the Japanese continued their peace initiative, and then Chiang Kaishek attacked the Japanese area of Shanghai, and the war was on.

Some people here don’t seem to understand that the Japanese were “already in Shanghai” because they had a legal right, by treaty, to be there, as did the Americans, the British, the Dutch, and the Germans. Like every other country that had a legal presence in Shanghai, the Japanese had a small force there to protect Japanese citizens in the city. Most Japanese lived in the Shanghai district called Hongkew, and Hongkew became known as Little Tokyo.

We should also keep in mind that during WWI, Japan overtook Britain as the country with the largest number of its citizens living in Shanghai and in China as a whole. By the early 1930s, Japanese citizens in China accounted for about 80% of the foreigners who were living in the country.

Until James Crowley's seminal research on the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in his book Japan's Quest for Autonomy, nearly everyone believed the Chinese Nationalists' and Communists’ claim that the Japanese army had engineered it. Crowley found strong evidence that this was not the case. Yet, some authors still repeat the myth that the Japanese engineered the incident.

Peter Harmsen examines the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in detail in chapter 3 of his previously mentioned book Storm Clouds Over the Pacific, 1931-1941. Another good source on the incident is Hata Ikuhiko's chapter "The Marco Polo Bridge Incident, 1937," in The China Quagmire (Columbia University Press, 1983).
 
Uh, you didn't "quote the conclusion"--you cherry-picked two statements from the multi-page conclusion.

You ignored the fact that Hasegawa says that Truman did not need to nuke Japan, that the nukes did not cause Japan to surrender, that nuking Japan did not save American lives, and that the Soviet invasion was the reason Japan surrendered.
.
Cherry picking, cherry picking, call it what you wish. We all see that you do nothing but pick up rotten fruit from the ground.

I did not quote the conclusion but I did quote from the conclusion, you say?

You are truly a fool. Your posts are literally unfocused and rambling. They do not address one singular aspect of the Pacific War. They contain bits and pieces of many different things. Trying to get you to focus on one aspect has been impossible.

I guess that is my fault, I should of.asked you to focus on one aspect before running off in ten different directions.

How am I to address an entire book in one post? Of course I picked parts that prove points that you will not be able to answer. Of course I do not address entire chapters in one post.

Cherry picking? I am far from done as to quoting the book to prove how wrong you are. Yes, you are scatterbraines. Me, I am targeting your obvious failures that destroys your opinion which is based on propaganda.
 
Japs shoulda surrendered sooner.

I take it you haven't read the rest of the thread. The peace faction, which included the emperor, his aides, and several senior military officials, was trying to bring about a surrender months before Hiroshima, and some Japanese officials began to initiate peace feelers with American officials through third parties in April, three months before Hirosima. I detailed some of these approaches in a previous reply. These peace feelers, and others, are discussed in detail by John Toland in The Rising Sun, by Lester Brooks in Behind Japan’s Surrender, and by Gar Alperovitz in The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb.

But Truman, ignorantly doing Stalin's bidding, refused to follow up on any of these peace feelers, even though he was aware of them.
 
I take it you haven't read the rest of the thread. The peace faction, which included the emperor, his aides, and several senior military officials, was trying to bring about a surrender months before Hiroshima, and some Japanese officials began to initiate peace feelers with American officials through third parties in April, three months before Hirosima. I detailed some of these approaches in a previous reply. These peace feelers, and others, are discussed in detail by John Toland in The Rising Sun, by Lester Brooks in Behind Japan’s Surrender, and by Gar Alperovitz in The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb.

But Truman, ignorantly doing Stalin's bidding, refused to follow up on any of these peace feelers, even though he was aware of them.
More bullshit. Peace feelers?

The Supreme Council never authorized anybody to negotiate peace. You stated nothing happened in Japan without the Supreme Council first authorizing any action. Have you forgotten this?

John Toland? I thinks you should read the book before you think that John Toland will help you here. It clearly spells out in The Rising Sun that the Japanese were not going to surrender and the the Japanese seeking peace were far from being authorized to seek peace.

John Tolands book will show that Dulles was authorized to negotiate peace but the Japanese who approached did not have an official agreement and were acting as renegades.

No serious peace offer was ever made by the Japanese, anything and everything was vague. But go ahead and cite something specific, instead of offering you poor paraphrasing of something you found with google.
 
It is true that some of the Japanese officials whom the USSBS interviewed said Japan would have kept fighting after November 1 with a Soviet invasion and without nukes, while others said the opposite. The USSBS and Hasegawa each weighed the conflicting evidence and simply reached different conclusions.

In the first sentence, "with a Soviet invasion" should read "without a Soviet invasion."
Speculating on what could or would of happened. Had the USA not dropped the bombs, the Soviet Union would not of declared war on Japan.

Russia had to race to get into the war, after dragging its feet for so many months, years. Once the bombs started to drop, Russia new Japan was beat and it would be a matter of days before they surrendered directly to the USA. Hence, Russia entered the war so that they could gain territory.

Without the bombs, it is doubtful Russia would of declared war against Japan. They were waiting for the end, so that they would not have to spend their resources needlessly. Why waste men's lives when the USA had lives to waste.
 

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