MIKEGRIFFITH1: More importantly, Hasegawa argues that the Soviet Union's entry into the war had a much greater impact on Japan's surrender than many historians have previously assumed.
ELEKTRA: And, may I thank you again for again, providing us with a quote that directly contradicts everything you have stated! Racing the Enemy, simply states that Historians had not given the Soviet entry into the war, proper credit. Not that it was the Soviet entry into the war that caused Japan to surrender. When you are right, you are right, right? A greater impact than assumed, not as you stated, the reason why Japan surrendered. Thank you much for destroying your argument.
So now we're back to your refusal to admit when you're wrong. Isn't it odd that everyone else who has read Hasegawa's book has been able to easily see that his main point is that without the Soviet invasion the hardliners would not have agreed to surrender for at least several months? You're the only one who has read and commented on the book who can't grasp, or who won't admit, that this is his central argument. I think Hasegawa makes this point as clear as language can make something--I quote from his book:
Without the Soviet entry into the war, the Japanese would have continued to fight until numerous atomic bombs, a successful allied invasion of the home islands, or continued aerial bombardment, combined with a naval blockade, rendered them incapable of doing so. (p. 298)
How much more plainly do you need him to state this point before you will admit it? Everyone else who reads that statement will conclude that he is saying that if the Soviets had not invaded, the Japanese would have kept fighting until we dropped "numerous" more nukes, or until we invaded the home islands, or until our conventional bombing and our naval blockade made further resistance impossible.
My point all along has been that the nukes did not cause the hardliners to agree to surrender but that the Soviet invasion did. You are a master at missing, or more likely pretending to miss, clear points.
ELEKTRA: Eisenhower? My arguments? I only quoted what Eisenhower wrote. Eisenhower changed his story to fit the political times. You are the one who chooses a book that states what you want to believe. You can't even get the page numbers right! Now that in itself shows you as a charalatan. Eisenhower was not even a general of the pacific. That is how weak your argument is.
The problem is that you simply will not admit when you're caught in error. Any honest, rational person who reads Eisenhower's 1948 account and his 1963 account will readily see that in both accounts he clearly expressed opposition to nuking Japan, and that the only difference between the accounts is that the later one, understandably enough, reveals more information about his statements to Stimson and Stimson's reaction to them. And I would again point out that Ike's 1963 account is supported by his son, by his biographer, by his 1955 letter to William Pawley, and by Gen. Bradley's account of the Stimson meeting.
ELEKTRA: I have replied to every single comment you have made, even though you still refuse to respond in kind.
Oh, yes, you reply, but in many cases you seem unable--or unwilling--to grasp the meaning of plain English. Your ducking and dodging over Hasegawa's book is a prime example of this. Yes, you reply, but most of the time you fail to address the evidence I present. You dismiss evidence but fail to address the evidence--dismissing evidence you don't like is not the same as refuting it.
For example, are you ever going to address the mountain of evidence that nobody in the War Department believed that we would lose 500,000 men if we invaded Japan and that this estimate was recognized as erroneous and baseless? Even the War Department's experts on the subject, the S&P staff officers, stated in an official memorandum that the estimate was "entirely too high" (Waldo Heinrichs and Marc Gallicchio,
Implacable Foes: War in the Pacific, 1944-1945, pp. 567-568).
I'm guessing you don't know that the 500K estimate originated with Herbert Hoover. Ironically, Hoover gave that wild estimate in the hope that it would discourage an invasion and would cause Truman to give the Japanese milder surrender terms. Hoover rightly believed that FDR had needlessly and treasonously provoked Japan to attack us in order to protect the Soviet Union and to enable him to drag America into the war. Hoover opposed the demand for unconditional surrender and argued that the Japanese would surrender if we would modify our surrender terms. So he tried to dissuade Truman from approving an invasion of Japan by telling him that we would lose 500,000 to 1 million soldiers if we invaded.