We can cut right to the chase. The conclusion of the book is Truman was not at fault nor a villian. I look forward to a discussion of the book. Of course, if it us like all the other books referred to in this OP, mikegriffter1 does not own the book hence.he can only cherry pick google results.
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, author of the highly acclaimed book on Japan's surrender titled Racing the Enemy.
Talk about "cherry picking"! I'm guessing that you didn't even bother to read the article, because therein Hasegawa says the following:
I argue that Soviet entry into the war against Japan alone, without the atomic bombs, might have led to Japan’s surrender before November 1, but that the atomic bombs alone, without Soviet entry into the war, would not have accomplished this. Finally, I argue that had U.S. President Harry Truman sought Stalin’s signature on the Potsdam Proclamation, and had Truman included the promise of a constitutional monarchy in the Potsdam Proclamation, as Secretary of War Henry Stimson had originally suggested, the war might have ended sooner, possibly without the atomic bombs being dropped on Japan.
Anyway, Elektra, a few notes about Eisenhower’s opposition to nuking Japan:
* In 1955, Eisenhower wrote to friend and businessman William Pawley about his discussion on the bomb with Stimson:
On the other hand, when I suggested to Secretary of War Stimson, who was then in Europe, that we avoid using the atomic bomb, he stated that it was going to be used because it would save hundreds of thousands of American lives. (Eisenhower papers, Eisenhower to Pawley, April 9, 1955, in Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, p. 354)
* Eisenhower’s son, John Eisenhower, confirmed in a 1967 interview that Ike told Stimson he was opposed to nuking Japan when the two spoke at Potsdam:
The story has been told, I’m sure, of Dad’s reaction to the atomic bomb when Stimson told him about it at the time of the Potsdam conference. Stimson told Dad about this thing, and Dad was very depressed about this new bomb, although its possibility had been at the back of everybody’s mind. There’d been special efforts to hit heavy-water plants in Trondheim in the bombardment programs. The idea of Hitler developing a bomb that could have turned the tide in this European war was not to be sneezed at completely. So Dad had some idea of it, but he was sorry that it had been developed, and was against its being used. . . .
Dad said [later that night, after the meeting], “Well, again, it’s none of my business, but I’d sure hate to see it used, because Japan’s licked anyway, and they know it.” (John Eisenhower interview with Ed Edwin, February 28, 1967, DDEL, in Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, pp. 356-357)
Now, Elektra, getting back to your “scum” comment, guess which “scum” said the following:
Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.
This was the conclusion of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) (USSBS report, p. 26), which was led by such “scum” and “commies” as:
- Paul Nitze, who went on to serve as Secretary of the Navy and Assistant Secretary of Defense, and who was chosen by President Ronald Reagan to be his chief negotiator at the SALT talks.
- Frank A. McNamee, who received the Decorated Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star, Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster, while in the military, and who served as the deputy director of the Office Civil Defense.
- Frank Searls, from the Office of War Mobilization.
- Theodore P. Wright, an expert on American aviation who served in the Civil Aeronautics Administration until 1948.
- Dr. Louis R. Thompson, director of the National Institutes of Health from 1937 to 1942.
- Dr. Harry Bowman, Drexel Institute.
- Dr. Rensis Likert, Columbia University. During the war he worked for the Office of War Information (OWI).
The Survey's staff included 300 civilians, 350 officers, and 500 enlisted men. The Survey operated from headquarters in Tokyo, with sub-headquarters in Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, and with mobile teams operating in other parts of Japan, the islands of the Pacific, and the Asiatic mainland. The Survey “secured the principal surviving Japanese records and interrogated top Army and Navy officers, Government officials, industrialists, political leaders, and many hundreds of their subordinates throughout Japan. It was thus possible to reconstruct much of wartime Japanese military planning and execution, engagement by engagement and campaign by campaign, and to secure reasonably accurate data on Japan's economy and war production, plant by plant, and industry by industry.”