I stumbled across this fascinating article on how American and Japanese textbooks discuss Hiroshima. The article is titled “Re-visiting Hiroshima: The Role of US and Japanese History Textbooks in the Construction of National Memory,” and it was written by Dr. Keith Crawford, the head of educational research at Edge Hill College in England, and was published in the
Asia Pacific Education Review in 2003 (Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 108-117). Here is a telling excerpt from it:
There is evidence that voices in the US were raised against the decision to drop the bomb but none of this appears in the US texts.
[Manhattan Project scientist] Szilard claims that the US Government was aware that “Japan was essentially defeated and that we could win the war in another six months” (Szilard, 1949, p. 14). Admiral Strauss (1962), special assistant to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, has argued that Japan was on the brink of defeat and that this was known in the USA and Japan. Shigenori Togo, Japan’s Foreign Minister, claimed that by June 1945 war production was fragmenting, food shortages were acute and that government ministers were telling him that Japan was defeated, he concludes that “It is certain that we would have surrendered ... even without the bomb” (Togo, 1956, p. 217).
A number of high-profile military leaders were against dropping the bomb. Dwight Eisenhower said “...the Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn’t necessary to hit them with that awful thing” (Newsweek, November 11, 1963). Norman Cousins, a consultant to General Douglas MacArthur during the American occupation of Japan, writes:
“When I asked General MacArthur about the decision to drop the bomb, I was surprised to learn he had not even been consulted. What, I asked, would his advice have been? He replied that he saw no military justification for the dropping of the bomb” (Cousins, 1947, p. 65).
In July 1945, Paul Nitze, Vice Chairman of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, given the task of writing a strategy for the air attack on Japan, wrote “While I was working on the new plan of air attack... concluded that even without the atomic bomb… Japan would capitulate by November 1945” (Nitze, 1945, pp. 36-37). . . .
Joseph Grew, a US State Department expert on Japanese affairs at the time, has since claimed that “...it is quite clear that the civilian advisers to the Emperor were working towards surrender long before the Potsdam Proclamation ... for they knew that Japan as a defeated nation”(Grew, 1952, p. 1425). The US were able to intercept Japan’s communications system and among messages intercepted was one from Togo to the Japanese ambassador in Moscow urging him to inform the Russians that Japan wanted the war to end. However, at that time the USA knew two things that the Japanese government did not; first, that the bomb existed and had been successfully tested; second that the Soviet Union was about to enter the war against Japan.
Grew acknowledges that the Japanese military were fundamentally against unconditional surrender, but argues that had Truman said that this would not mean the removal of the Emperor “... the atomic bomb might never have had to be used...” (Grew, 1952, p. 1427). Ellis Zacharias, Deputy Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, wrote “What prevented them [the Japanese] from suing for peace … was their uncertainty on two scores. First, they wanted to know the meaning of unconditional surrender and the fate we planned for Japan after defeat. Second, they tried to obtain from us assurances that the Emperor could remain on the throne after surrender” (Ellis, 1945, p. 17). Japan’s Prime Minister Suzuki announced on 9th June 1945, “Should the Emperor system be abolished, they [the Japanese people] would lose all reason for existence. ‘Unconditional surrender’, therefore, leaves us no choice but to go on fighting to the last man” (Pacific War Research Society 1949, p. 69). Togo, noted, in July 12th 1945 that as long as America insisted on unconditional surrender, “.. our country has no alternative but to see it [the war] through in an all-out effort” (U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 1, p. 873, pp. 875-876).
The U.S. government knew of the Emperor’s importance. Grew explained this to Truman on 28th May 1945. (pp. 112-113)