The Barbary Pirates

Xenophon

Gone and forgotten
Nov 27, 2008
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In your head
Since we have just seen Muslim pirates in the news, I thought this old article of mine might be fitting.


Captain William Bainbridge was very concerned. His command, the brand new frigate USS Philadelphia, 36 guns, was in serious trouble this night of October 31, 1803 in the harbor of Tripoli. The ship's trim hull shuttered as the keel grated against uncharted rocks.

The ship's officers and crew moved swiftly, trying desperately to fill the sails again and heel the ship still further so she might slip loose. But it was to no avail. Bainbridge ordered all surplus cargo dumped overboard, but still the ship refused to budge. She was stuck fast, and Bainbridge (who would be a hero years later in the War of 1812) feared that a calamity of the first order would befall the Unites States, as one of her newest and finest warships was about to be captured by an enemy nation, and he could not prevent it!

Why was he so desperate in his attempts to lighten the vessel immediately? Part of the answer lay in a warning cry of a lookout, "Here they come!" as Tripoli tan gunboats were sighted putting out from under the great fort. And part lay in the reasons for the Philadelphia having been there in the first place. For since the spring of 1801, the United States had been engaged in a war, it's first with a Muslim state, it's first completely overseas, and this time completely a naval one, with the Barbary nation of Tripoli.

The spark that set off this conflict had actually occurred with the capture of the American schooner Maria by Algerine pirates in July 1785. During the next fifteen years there were numerous such incidents, leading to a type of extortion by the Barbary nations of Morocco, Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli in which they exacted tribute from the young United States in return for refraining from attacking American shipping in the Mediterranean Sea. In 1796, the United States permitted the shameful approval of tribute money in the amount of $56,000 to be paid to the powerful Pasha of Tripoli for this purpose, and an even larger sum was paid to Algiers as similar extortion money. The aging George Washington strongly opposed such conduct, but since the United States had scrapped its navy after the revolution, America was helpless and defenseless on the high seas. As a result, Congress ordered the formation of the first United States Navy, and money was quickly voted for the purpose of building a cruiser force of Frigates, and many smaller vessels for inshore work. No longer would ships flying the stars and stripes fall victim to vicious pirates, or the young nation be subjected to humiliation, the cry "Millions for defense, not one cent for tribute!" was on everyone's lips.

By 1801, the American leaders were very angry about the situation with the pirates. When the government refused to consent to any further extortion, the Pasha of Tripoli declared open war on the United States as of May 10. But now things were different, as the United States had ships and men ready and willing to protect her overseas. By July, the United States Navy dispatched a squadron under Commodore Richard Dale to Gibraltar. The flagship was the frigate President, 44, along with the Philadelphia, 36, the Essex, 32, and a 12 gun schooner, the Enterprise.

In March of 1802, after little action, the squadron was disbanded and a stronger one organized to supplement it. The Constellation, 36, Chesapeake, 36, Adams, 28, New York, 36, and John Adams, 28. In 1803, Commodore Edward Preble, who would turn out to be one the finest flag officers in American history, arrived in the staunch American frigate Constitution, 44 guns, with a number of other vessels. Now things began to happen. Preble had purposely brought along small ships like the 12 gun Vixen and the 16 gun Argus- the latter under the command of a man who would become the greatest hero of the young United States, Lieutenant Stephen Decatur jr.

With these smaller ships, Preble instituted a series of raids against the Barbary powers and was ready to concentrate his strength against the worst of these opponents: Tripoli. In late October 1803, the frigate Philadelphia, under the command of William Bainbridge, was dispatched to blockade the port. And it was at this time that the ship, as we have already seen, ran aground while chasing an enemy vessel too close to shore.

As Captain Bainbridge and his crew tried desperately to free the frigate from the shoals, the enemy could be seen approaching in great numbers in the small Tripoli tan gunboats. Everything possible was tried- pumping the bilges dry, heaving the forward guns overboard, chopping down the foremast. None of these emergency moves helped. The cautious enemy gunboats approached so that the way in which the Philadelphia listed was in their favor and the American guns could not be brought to bear. Bainbridge was forced to surrender, with 22 officers and 315 men, and the enemy eventually worked the Philadelphia free at flood tide and towed her into a deeper part of the harbor.

Now Commodore Preble had a new problem on his hands. Not only had he lost one of his finest ships and several hundred of his men, but once the enemy had trained a proper crew, it would use the Philadelphia against the Americans! Preble worked out a daring plan, and for it selected one of his ablest young officers, Lieutenant Stephen Decatur jr.

Earlier in the war, an ancient 60 ton ketch, the Mastico had been captured from the Tripoli tans. Decatur was to sail her, as a "trader", directly into the harbor of Tripoli. The pilot would be a Maltese seaman named Catalano, and on deck would be a number of Americans dressed in Maltese clothing. Below decks however, would be 75 other Americans, with a supply of combustibles for setting fire to the Philadelphia.

Decatur hand picked 84 volunteers, and the first week of February 1804, found the little vessel, now named Intrepid, heading for Tripoli. Now the troubles began. The little vessel was struck by a heavy storm. Food and water began running low. The men were constantly seasick. Since they had no change of clothing, they were constantly wet and miserable. Yet somehow, by February 16, they managed to reach the harbor entrance still afloat. Then a new problem arose.

According to plan, some boats from the 16 gun brig Siren, which lay three miles out to sea, were to move in under cover of darkness and assist Intrepid's men to escape after they had destroyed the Philadelphia. But, following the storm, a calm settled over the ocean, and the Siren's boats could not make the rendezvous in time. Decatur waited as long as he dared, they gave orders to proceed with the mission.

One hundred yards from the Philadelphia, the Intrepid was hailed and ordered to anchor where she was. But Decatur was ready with a ruse that was part of the plan. "Tell them", he instructed the Maltese pilot, "that we lost our anchors in the storm and would like to tie alongside, just overnight".

The ruse worked. Within a few minutes, Catalano had rowed over to the Philadelphia with a line, and several sleepy looking Tripoli tan seamen were actually aiding the American cause by pulling the Intrepid in close. As the ships closed, Decatur gave the signal. Up leaped the Americans, pouring out of the Intrepid's hold.

"Americans!" shouted a pirate on watch on the Philadelphia's deck. As cries echoed through the ship, enemy seamen scrambled topside, many so terrified that they dove overboard rather then fight. Now the Americans were slashing away with Cutlasses, firing pistols, and creating such havoc that within a few minutes 20 of the enemy lay dead and resistance was over.

"Strike out the combustibles!" ordered Decatur. From the deck of the Intrepid, pound after pound of powder and matches was tossed upward. And within twenty minutes, the Philadelphia was a raging inferno. Now the guns at the fort at Tripoli were coming into action, sending round after round wildly across the bay. But the Intrepid was already escaping, making her way to the harbor entrance before the Tripoli forces were able to muster their gunboats to give chase.

The outcome of the incident, one that covered the name of Stephen Decatur with great glory, was that the Pasha of Tripoli was furious. In his great anger, he demanded that the Americans pay him for the loss of the Philadelphia, in the sum of a half million dollars! Upon hearing the ridiculous demand, Commodore Preble laughed outright and asserted that force, not tribute, was the key to making the Barbary nations more respectful of the American flag.

Consequently, he set sail on July 14, 1804, from Syracuse with the Constitution, the Nautilus, the Enterprise, six gunboats, and two mortar boats. His objective: to attack Tripoli's shipping and fortifications and so harass the Pasha that he would be receptive to peace terms. During a five week period in August and part of September he completed five separate attacks with considerable success. Rather then scatter his shots, by attacking the other Barbary powers, he wisely surmised that a victory over Tripoli would in tune lead the other enemy nations to accept American terms.

Shortly after the Intrepid action, however, on September 4, 1804, Preble was replaced by Commodore Samuel Barron.

The strange naval war against Tripoli, while often mentioned as a "little war", was actually far more important to American history then its size and scope would indicate. It taught the United States that a great nation could not exist without a great navy and that honorable peace could never be purchased.

The Pasha soon came to realize, through the navy's continuing attacks, that further conflict could only ruin him. Still, he refused to end the war. The Americans postponed further operations until the spring.

On April 27, 1805, the Tripoli tan port of Derna was attacked by several hundred Arabs on land under the command of Hamet Karamanli, ex-pasha of Tripoli, who wanted his old job back. Karramanli was largely successful because of the assistance of an American civilian, Mr. William Eaton, a consular agent, and Lieutenant O'Bannon, with midshipmen Peck and seven marines from the brig Argus. Seeing an opportunity to improve his position, Barron dispatched the Argus, hornet. and Nautilus to launch a coordinated attack from the sea at the same time. Derna was quickly captured, and held until after the pasha had finally agreed to peace negotiations. The war against Tripoli ended with the signing of the peace treaty on June 10, 1805.

The young United States had won its first overseas war, defeating the forces of tyranny by using the courage and ability of its own people to the utmost ability. We, in these modern times, could learn a lesson from Preble and Decatur, men such as they were could never have stood by and done nothing.
 
I heard Piracy was mentioned in the Constitution.

Lawyers are looking forward to the case of the one pirate that lived. He's only 16 years old.

But where do we send him if we ever let him go?

And how do we try him? Kidnapping? Piracy? He was just a pawn. He is not a captain or anything like that.

This is going to make a great movie.
 
Since we have just seen Muslim pirates in the news, I thought this old article of mine might be fitting.

...

By 1801, the American leaders were very angry about the situation with the pirates. When the government refused to consent to any further extortion, the Pasha of Tripoli declared open war on the United States as of May 10.

...

The strange naval war against Tripoli, while often mentioned as a "little war", was actually far more important to American history then its size and scope would indicate. It taught the United States that a great nation could not exist without a great navy and that honorable peace could never be purchased.

...

Nice piece. Couple clarifications:

It was the election of Thomas Jefferson as president that coincided with the change in US policy on paying tribute, as he was strongly opposed to it.

Nonetheless, as part of the peace deal with the Barbary nations, the US paid them $60,000 for release of US sailors held hostage.
 
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Since we have just seen Muslim pirates in the news, I thought this old article of mine might be fitting.

What do "Muslim pirates" do differently from other pirates that makes it necessary to give them their own category? :eusa_eh:
 
Since we have just seen Muslim pirates in the news, I thought this old article of mine might be fitting.

What do "Muslim pirates" do differently from other pirates that makes it necessary to give them their own category? :eusa_eh:

Hehe, Well, my knee jerk awnser to that question would have been "they have been very sucessfull".

I disagree with a number of points in the article.
In my eyes, Tripoli was hardly "the worst" Barbary state.
Both Marocco and especially Algiers had significantly stronger military, economic and diplomatic potentials.

Secondly, I believe that the actual impact of the US intervention for actually ending Berber piracy was overstated. The accepted line is that Berber piracy was ended by the "French colonisation of Algeria" in 1830 which reduced Algerias population by 30%.
As I read it, the result of the US intervention was at most a return to the Status Quo Ante Bellum.

Concerning the question of what made the Berber pirates so succesfull:

I think there are several reasons:

1. The Berber pirates were protected by the Ottoman Empire, a protection that carried a lot of weight, although the Empires power was greatly reduced in the 19th century.

2. The Barbary areas were often "not worth a war". For a stronger European power like France, Spain, England and Portugal, the conquest of the Barbary coast simply may have not been worth the effort. And especially France had much more "juicy" targets across the Rhine, the same was true for the Spanish Netherlands. Portugal may have lacked the manpower, and England certainly had other things to do too. Italy did not
exist, and Prussia/Austria were lacking the naval potentials and the intent to act there.

3. Most European nations would have hugely prefered to be the sole nation not beeing hit by the Berbers. While f.e. Portugal was, for a time, effective in cutting of the Berbers from the Atlantic, they later choose to stop doing so, in order to make the Berbers annoy other nations. I also think that they are the only nation that actually got money from the Berbers in a "peace deal".

I do not see a big difference between the berber pirates and other privateers, apart from the fact that the Berber pirates operated for a longer timespan, and that the "economy" of the Berber states was more focused on piracy than those of Christian nations, barring the Knights of Malta. This also made them an even less tempting target for conquest. Any christian conqueror would have to find a new employment for a vast segment of the population.

I actually think that Switzerland may by a good comparison here. Also a "poor area" the swiss offered their fighting prowress (made up by young, agressive males) to the highest bidder. The berbers were the same, although religious boundaries made it more difficult for them to be directly employed by Christians.

To a lesser extent, the same thing also applies to Scotland.
A less contempory comparison would be ancient Germania.

I do not see a difference between the Berber states and other "poor countries" which exported aggressive, plundering, young men.
 
Lots of points, so I will answer each in turn.
Hehe, Well, my knee jerk awnser to that question would have been "they have been very sucessfull".

I disagree with a number of points in the article.
In my eyes, Tripoli was hardly "the worst" Barbary state.
Both Marocco and especially Algiers had significantly stronger military, economic and diplomatic potentials.
Potential and reality are different matters, tripoli had the largest navy and the best postion to interfere in shipping lanes, few shipped cargo around africa that needed to hug the coast of Morroco. Algiers simply did not have the postion Tripoli had.

Secondly, I believe that the actual impact of the US intervention for actually ending Berber piracy was overstated. The accepted line is that Berber piracy was ended by the "French colonisation of Algeria" in 1830 which reduced Algerias population by 30%.
As I read it, the result of the US intervention was at most a return to the Status Quo Ante Bellum.
This is simply not true.

After the end of the war of 1812, the United states and britain both sent squadrons that occupied the barbary states and broke their power, LONG before france became involved (some 15 years actually). Great Britain long acknowedged that it was the US Navy that broke the pirates.

Concerning the question of what made the Berber pirates so succesfull:

I think there are several reasons:

1. The Berber pirates were protected by the Ottoman Empire, a protection that carried a lot of weight, although the Empires power was greatly reduced in the 19th century.
A useless protection, the Ottomans were already the sick man of Europe and had zero influence with the western powers.

2. The Barbary areas were often "not worth a war". For a stronger European power like France, Spain, England and Portugal, the conquest of the Barbary coast simply may have not been worth the effort. And especially France had much more "juicy" targets across the Rhine, the same was true for the Spanish Netherlands. Portugal may have lacked the manpower, and England certainly had other things to do too. Italy did not
exist, and Prussia/Austria were lacking the naval potentials and the intent to act there.
This is true, they favored paying as cheaper then mounting an expedition.

3. Most European nations would have hugely prefered to be the sole nation not beeing hit by the Berbers. While f.e. Portugal was, for a time, effective in cutting of the Berbers from the Atlantic, they later choose to stop doing so, in order to make the Berbers annoy other nations. I also think that they are the only nation that actually got money from the Berbers in a "peace deal".
Of course, they were all rivals.

I do not see a big difference between the berber pirates and other privateers, apart from the fact that the Berber pirates operated for a longer timespan, and that the "economy" of the Berber states was more focused on piracy than those of Christian nations, barring the Knights of Malta. This also made them an even less tempting target for conquest. Any christian conqueror would have to find a new employment for a vast segment of the population.
Huge differences.

They raided southern Italy and specifically looked for non-muslims to imprison and use for ramsom and slaves.

I do not see a difference between the Berber states and other "poor countries" which exported aggressive, plundering, young men.
They did not hire themselves out, they served their repective Bey for the lining of his pockets and theirs.
 
Ok, I thought the thread title said The Barby Pirates and thought it was a new pirate themed Barbie. I have got to get more sleep.
 
Well, Marocca had the totally awesome position of beeing the only barbary state beeing able to attack Atlantic shipping wihtout having to get by Gibraltar, this alone made them more "powerfull" than Tripolis.
On a similiar vein, Algiers actually had manpower.

Also, Barbary pirate raid continued until the French intervention.

Last but not least, look at the history of the Barbary pirates.
They were not stopped by the Spanish, who temporally conquered Algiers, initiated Blockades and shelled their capitals.
They were not stopped by the Portugese or English who blockaded them at Gibraltar, and shelled their capitals a bit more.
And you argue that the United States, who actually payed them a ransom to return to the Status Quo Ante Bellum, somehow was what stopped them? From your article, the most daring thing the US did in the first war was blowing their own ship up. Another Bey than used the fact that the Bey in question was a bit distracted to stage a coup (particpants in the coup, 500 Berbers, 8 Marines), ending the first war.

On the other hand, the French invaded their lands, killed a third of the population and moved in French settlers in significant numbers.
If I would be a Pirate Bay, I know which of the 2 things would stop me from pirating :D

Concerning Barbary pirates primarly attacking and enslaving non Moslems:
Well, there was not anyone else they could raid in a profitable way. Going after Ottoman Shipping was obviously not an great option, the earlier Mamelucks were the same. They did some raids on the only non Barbary moslem faction that was around, Mali.

However, the Gold routes going from Mali went overland, and Marocco was profiting from the "peacefull" gold trade too, meaning they did not have a huge incentive to destabilise Mali.
Due to their geographic situation, the 3 other Berber states were far less able to raid Mali, when Mali later collapsed there was not a lot to pillage from them anyway.

Profitable non Moslem targets would have been in India and the far east, getting their was by far to difficult to be worth the effort.
 
Since we have just seen Muslim pirates in the news, I thought this old article of mine might be fitting.

What do "Muslim pirates" do differently from other pirates that makes it necessary to give them their own category? :eusa_eh:

Great question and one that deserves a response... The phrase "Muslim Pirates" accurately describes the religion of the Pirates through the use of the noun "Muslim"; "Muslim" describes the 'who;' wherein "Pirate," the thing, is tied to "MUSLIM" to further identify those who have unjustifiably hijacked commerce and overtly usurped individual rights and innocent life for CENTURIES and projected such as merely a 'sound business model'... Much as "Muslim-terrorists" identifies those who consider mass murder of innocent life to be a sound means to coerce their will upon other cultures...

You see identifying them as "Muslim Pirates" highlights the distinction born in their religion, which would otherwise be obscured if less specific adjectives were used; which would necessarily fail to indicate the simple fact that these individuals IDENTIFY THEMSELVES BY THEIR ISLAM RELIGION!

For instance, other pirates, lets say Red Beard... would not be known as a Christian Pirate... because Red Beard didn't practice Christianity... Thus he didn't practice "Piracy" as a function of his religion. Red Beard didn't strike at commerce to settle a score with the Pharisees... as the Muslims Pirates and Terrorists practice their respective scorges to settle up with the INFIDELS.

Red Beard's crew is not known to board ships while shouting Psalms... or lifting their praise of Christ in song... or even shout cries of worship as they strike down those rascal pharisees... this in contrast to the shouts of "GOD IS GREAT" as do the Muslim Pirates and the same individuals when they're wearing their "Terrorist" hats... Ya see they're one in the same; and this despite the excruciating rationalization which is now being twisted through the media, as a means to misinform 'The People' that 'These guys aren't terrorists... OH NO! They're Pirates and that's a TOTALLY DIFFERENT THING ENTIRELY..."

Ya see the use of the noun "Muslim" nuetralizes that rationalization by correctly identifying the commonality, thus serving to prevent the 'centrist' sheeple from being completely fooled, by the fools.

I hope that answers your question...

And please feel free to treat us to more of your well worn position wherein Islam is a peaceful religion, despite it's LONG AND NOTORIOUS HISTORY AS THE PURE ANTITHESIS OF ANYTHING RESEMBLING such.
 
And the rest of the story?

America continued to pay ransom for people who were taken hostage.

Yeah, that's right, it wasn't like there was only ONE group of Pirates.

But what that did for AMERICAN prestige was still pretty damned impressive.
 

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