a.
In 2008, states reported that their public-employee pensions were underfunded by a total of $438 billion. But independent estimates say the underfunding is closer to $3 trillion. Why? The states make up estimates of return at unbelievable levels: the median investment return factored in by state pensions is 8% a year!
AEI - The Market Value of Public-Sector Pension Deficits
These "independent assessments" are done by economists who disagree with how the actuarial liability is calculated. The ideological right would like to have you believe that by referring to these economists as "independent," it implies that those calculating actuarial liabilities are somehow compromised. But this is false. In fact, the actuarial discount rate that pensions use to calculate the level of funding comes from both extensive study and experience, and is widely accepted in the actuarial profession. It is the economists who make this argument, not the actuaries, who are out of the mainstream. It is the mainstream actuaries who have looked at over a century of data to calculate the discount rates who are in line with mainstream thought. This is the problem with the economists' argument
Discounting liabilities at the plan's projected rate of return has intuitive appeal, but financial economists and the practice of financial markets object to using an interest rate derived from riskyinvestments to discount the value of a riskless liability. As University of Illinois finance professor Jeffrey R. Brown and Federal Reserve economist David W. Wilcox write, "Finance theory is unambiguous that the discount rate used to value future pension obligations should reflect the riskiness of the liabilities."
"Finance theory" once held that bonds should yield at a lower rate than stocks. Why? Because academics argued that bonds were less risky than stocks. Of course, this thinking has changed over time, both in academia and in practice, as investors came to realize that stocks had a growth component, and thus yield on stocks should be lower since capital retained was invested at a higher rate of growth. And since 1957, except for brief periods of extreme panic, the yield on stocks has been below the yield on bonds.
"Finance theory" has had spectacular failures as of late. Finance theory articulates that markets are efficient, and that the "right" price is the price in the market. This leads to a circular argument - the right price is the price in the market so the price in the market price. This is best embodied in the Efficient Market Hypothesis, which states that all prices reflect known information. It was under this false premise that lead most economists to believe that home prices were fairly valued in 2006, even though many of us in the investment business thought the economists making this argument were nuts, relying on fundamentally flawed models and assumptions to support their arguments. We were right. The economists were wrong.
So according to "finance theory", because pension funds are guaranteed, they should be discounted at the guaranteed rate of return. This, like the EMH, is fundamentally flawed thinking.
First, the academic assumes that because the benefits are guaranteed and states cannot declare bankruptcy, they are riskless. This is false. It assumes that the only risk is bankruptcy. It is not. First, because states cannot declare bankruptcy now, does not mean they will not be able to in the future. It also assumes that geopolitical events do not affect the status of a state. What if a state breaks into two? What if a state succeeds from the union? What if Russia fires nuclear missiles at us? Sounds far-fetched? Sure. But so did 20 Arabs with box-cutters turning the world on its head on Sept 10, 2001.
More benignly, and again exposing the flaw in the economists' thinking, is the risk of inflation. An economist, premised on the EMH, would argue that inflation expectations are embedded in market prices. Inflation expectations in the market are now low. An economist would say that is an accurate forecast of future inflation. But what if it is not? Economists are notoriously bad at forecasting anything. That's not to pick on economists - we are all notoriously bad at forecasting anything. But the risk of inflation and volatility of future liabilities, i.e. adjustments for inflation-indexing, etc., are very real because the future is inherently unknowable.
But there are practical problems with the economists' arguments. The biggest ones are that it would either 1.) lead to dramatic over-funding of pension plans, and 2.) lead to higher taxes, both of which are inefficient.
The reason why actuaries use a higher discount rate is because asset returns are higher. The AEI economist notes in his paper that this effectively leads to a mismatch in the volatility of assets and liabilities. But this is only a problem if the pension fund has to be liquidated right now. In real life, that never happens. In real life, pension funds are long-lived institutions with extremely long life spans. The effects of long duration assets are enormous.
Let's take the AEI economist at his word. Let's take a look at two scenarios. First, we follow what the economist says and discount the liabilities at the risk-free rate, which we can say is 4%. Since by implication this requires investing in nothing but government bonds, our return will be 4%. If the pension fund is fully-funded and has $100 million in assets, in 50 years, the pension plan will be worth $610 million earning 4% per year.
Now, let's follow the advice of the actuary who recommends we discount liabilities at 8%. A plan that invests in assets to earn 8% a year will invest in stocks and bonds and other assets. Over long periods of time, stocks have earned 10% per year while a basket of corporate and government bonds have earned ~6% per year. So the 8% per year that government (and corporate) pension funds have earned is fairly accurate. After 50 years, $100 million invested at 8% will be worth $4.59 billion.
So let's review. Here are the values of the pension funds after 50 years following the advice of the economists and actuaries.
Scenario 1, listen to the AEI economist and invest at 4% - $610 million.
Scenario 2, listen to the actuaries and invest at 8% - $4.59 billion.
Now, which is better?
I don't know about you, but I'd take scenario 2. The employees will be richer and taxpayers will be taxed less.
Now, the economist will say "The $610 million is more guaranteed, the $4.59 billion is not." True, sort of. It won't be guaranteed if inflation jumps. Scenario 2 will produce a higher real return than Scenario 1 in a higher inflation scenario, and will do a much better job at protecting the plan assets. However, the odds have having 750%, or $4 billion, more is relatively high as long as the American economy grows at about the same rate as it has for two centuries.
The AEI economist also appears to have made a flawed assessment of the probabilities of meeting pension funds meeting their actuarial returns. He uses Monte Carlo analysis to calculate the probability of pension funds earning their actuarial return. Frankly, I have no idea his methodologies, but the fact that he calculates that a fully funded pension only has a 40% chance of meeting its obligations makes me think he is using flawed assumptions. There is a theory in finance that assumed the expected rate of return from stocks for any one individual is 0%, simply because the market is bigger than any one individual, and like sitting at a roulette table, eventually, the market will take your money from you since your losses will outstrip your gains. My guess is his line of reasoning somewhere along these lines. If fully-funded pension plans have only a 40% chance of being able to meet all their obligations, the economy is in serious trouble. In reality, if the economy grows at trend, the odds of a fully funded plan being able to meet all its obligations are extremely high.
Economic theories have been found out to be enormously flawed over the past decade. Following the advice of these economists would be extremely damaging as it would unnecessarily cost pension plans - and taxpayers - enormous amounts of money.