www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer_preview.asp?idArticle=4932&R=A09E
With the Nominations of Condoleeza Rice as secretary of State and Stephen Hadley to replace her as National Security Adsvisor, the shape of the supreme command of Bush II is pretty clear: Rumsfeld is staying; Bush II will be like Bush I, only more so.
It's not that the neocon cabal ispreparing for the next invasion or that the "hardliners have won" In some sense, the hardliners "won" in the moment of the president's immediate reaction to the September 11 attacks. And the true neocons remain largely outside the administration. But President Bush has at last decided to try and take charge of his foreign polciy bureaucracy.
The resignation of Colin Powell has been amoment to reflect on a man of near-mythic stature in Washinton, a dedicated public servant both in uniform and out. He remains immensly popular, an image to Americans of the fundamental decency of our society. He's also been physically courageous, not least in the past year as he has battled disease, and is yet perpetually a public gentleman.
At the same time he has been a reflection of the failing conventional wisdom of the Cold War era. To be sure, Powell has been more alert to changing international circumstances than some of his peers-think Brent Scowcroft--but his failures have not simply been bueraucratic--they have been genuinely strategic. A creature of the status quo, his isolation in the administration was not so much his lack of ideology, but a lack of imagination. The Bush Doctrine may bear the imprint of the deepest traditions of American strategic culture, but it bears afew of Powell's fingerprints.
Nor can it be said that he ran his department all that well. It is one thing to debate policy and to disagree, quite another to tell all to Bob Woodward, even as part of aconscious effort to spin the Washington establishment. More importantly, Powell's example encouraged his subordinates to undercut the president in the press. Pundits are now bemoaning the loss of "independence" at the State Department--but the Constitution's seperation of powers aren't meant to extend to the executive branch.
So it's resonable to expect the same quality of complaint we now see under Porter Goss at the CIA (though perhaps with less intensity) once Dr Rice takes charge at Foggy Bottom. By naming his closest confidant to be chief diplomat, President Bush has told the foreign service professionals that he's now paying attention and keeping score...........
With the Nominations of Condoleeza Rice as secretary of State and Stephen Hadley to replace her as National Security Adsvisor, the shape of the supreme command of Bush II is pretty clear: Rumsfeld is staying; Bush II will be like Bush I, only more so.
It's not that the neocon cabal ispreparing for the next invasion or that the "hardliners have won" In some sense, the hardliners "won" in the moment of the president's immediate reaction to the September 11 attacks. And the true neocons remain largely outside the administration. But President Bush has at last decided to try and take charge of his foreign polciy bureaucracy.
The resignation of Colin Powell has been amoment to reflect on a man of near-mythic stature in Washinton, a dedicated public servant both in uniform and out. He remains immensly popular, an image to Americans of the fundamental decency of our society. He's also been physically courageous, not least in the past year as he has battled disease, and is yet perpetually a public gentleman.
At the same time he has been a reflection of the failing conventional wisdom of the Cold War era. To be sure, Powell has been more alert to changing international circumstances than some of his peers-think Brent Scowcroft--but his failures have not simply been bueraucratic--they have been genuinely strategic. A creature of the status quo, his isolation in the administration was not so much his lack of ideology, but a lack of imagination. The Bush Doctrine may bear the imprint of the deepest traditions of American strategic culture, but it bears afew of Powell's fingerprints.
Nor can it be said that he ran his department all that well. It is one thing to debate policy and to disagree, quite another to tell all to Bob Woodward, even as part of aconscious effort to spin the Washington establishment. More importantly, Powell's example encouraged his subordinates to undercut the president in the press. Pundits are now bemoaning the loss of "independence" at the State Department--but the Constitution's seperation of powers aren't meant to extend to the executive branch.
So it's resonable to expect the same quality of complaint we now see under Porter Goss at the CIA (though perhaps with less intensity) once Dr Rice takes charge at Foggy Bottom. By naming his closest confidant to be chief diplomat, President Bush has told the foreign service professionals that he's now paying attention and keeping score...........
