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No doubt. Eisenhower warned about it 60 fucking years ago, but still no one listens. In fact today, many Americans think it’s patriotic to support the MIC. It’s CRAZY!The MIC is way too powerful and has been for way too long. Cross them at your own risk.
BULLSHIT! LBJ got us in over our heads and Nixon got us out. And that's all you really need to know. I was there were you?Criticism endures that the deal reached in 1973 between the United States and North Vietnam could have been reached as early as 1969, shortly after President Nixon took office. The provisions of the agreement called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam, an exchange of prisoners, and the make-up of a new South Vietnamese government to be decided by a commission made up of South Vietnamese officials and their communist opponents.
When Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger came into office there were hopes that a new diplomacy would lead the US out of the war. Both the President and his adviser entered the White House convinced that growing public disenchantment with overseas involvements, the increasing costs of the arms race, and the emergence of new centers of power around the world, made the old rivalries that the US maintained increasingly damaging. Nixon had pledged in the recent Republican Convention to embark on an era of negotiation rather than confrontation.
Kissinger for his part, had proposed in a paper published in Foreign Affairs just prior to Nixon's inauguration, that the United States 'define' its way out of Vietnam. Since the US needed a victory of sorts to get out while maintaining 'face,' why not define the goal in minimal terms, and aim at something that could be easily accomplished. Kissinger wrote that there should be a sharp distinction between military and political objectives. The political questions about the future makeup of the South Vietnamese government, the fate of the Thieu regime, the future timing and form of elections, would be left to Saigon and the National Liberation Front (NLF). The US and the regime in Hanoi, as outside powers, would step back from the internal process of South Vietnamese and NLF negotiations.
View attachment 330079
Once in office, Nixon and Kissinger reverted to a harder line. The new course for "Vietnamization" and "Peace With Honor" could not include the dishonorable abandonment of our South Vietnamese allies. The Paris Peace talks would not be conducted on the "double-track" that Kissinger had just proposed, but in endless general sessions where every issue would be discussed by every party. Elections and guarantees for self-determination in the South would only be achieved as the result of American efforts.
The old arguments won out, the United States couldn't be seen as unilaterally withdrawing from Vietnam. That act would weaken its honor and cripple its ability to bargain with both its allies and, more importantly, its Cold War enemies. As Kissinger stated to a group of editor in Chicago in September, 1970, "A great deal of the peace and stability [in the world] depends on the confidence other people have in the American promise and in the American performance. If the United States utterly fails in something that it has undertaken with so much effort, it is bound to affect the judgment of other countries as to the degree to which the United States can be significant in their areas.”
Kissinger later admitted that the administration's policy had to appease both the political Right, who were substantial in number, and felt that we shouldn't lose; and the political opponents of the war who welcomed the unilateral withdraw of US troops, but rather than grant the Nixon administration time to develop a new strategy simply increased pressure for more military drawdowns.
Nixon and Kissinger were caught up in the old assumptions that America's unchallengeable might and her record of success in conflicts was what preserved the peace. The cost of maintaining that record was the continued maintenance of a long frustrating war against an enemy that insisted on total victory. So the war continued.
Why couldn’t Nixon have gotten the same deal in 1969 without escalating the war?Bu
BULLSHIT! LBJ got us in over our heads and Nixon got us out. And that's all you really need to know. I was there were you?Criticism endures that the deal reached in 1973 between the United States and North Vietnam could have been reached as early as 1969, shortly after President Nixon took office. The provisions of the agreement called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam, an exchange of prisoners, and the make-up of a new South Vietnamese government to be decided by a commission made up of South Vietnamese officials and their communist opponents.
When Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger came into office there were hopes that a new diplomacy would lead the US out of the war. Both the President and his adviser entered the White House convinced that growing public disenchantment with overseas involvements, the increasing costs of the arms race, and the emergence of new centers of power around the world, made the old rivalries that the US maintained increasingly damaging. Nixon had pledged in the recent Republican Convention to embark on an era of negotiation rather than confrontation.
Kissinger for his part, had proposed in a paper published in Foreign Affairs just prior to Nixon's inauguration, that the United States 'define' its way out of Vietnam. Since the US needed a victory of sorts to get out while maintaining 'face,' why not define the goal in minimal terms, and aim at something that could be easily accomplished. Kissinger wrote that there should be a sharp distinction between military and political objectives. The political questions about the future makeup of the South Vietnamese government, the fate of the Thieu regime, the future timing and form of elections, would be left to Saigon and the National Liberation Front (NLF). The US and the regime in Hanoi, as outside powers, would step back from the internal process of South Vietnamese and NLF negotiations.
View attachment 330079
Once in office, Nixon and Kissinger reverted to a harder line. The new course for "Vietnamization" and "Peace With Honor" could not include the dishonorable abandonment of our South Vietnamese allies. The Paris Peace talks would not be conducted on the "double-track" that Kissinger had just proposed, but in endless general sessions where every issue would be discussed by every party. Elections and guarantees for self-determination in the South would only be achieved as the result of American efforts.
The old arguments won out, the United States couldn't be seen as unilaterally withdrawing from Vietnam. That act would weaken its honor and cripple its ability to bargain with both its allies and, more importantly, its Cold War enemies. As Kissinger stated to a group of editor in Chicago in September, 1970, "A great deal of the peace and stability [in the world] depends on the confidence other people have in the American promise and in the American performance. If the United States utterly fails in something that it has undertaken with so much effort, it is bound to affect the judgment of other countries as to the degree to which the United States can be significant in their areas.”
Kissinger later admitted that the administration's policy had to appease both the political Right, who were substantial in number, and felt that we shouldn't lose; and the political opponents of the war who welcomed the unilateral withdraw of US troops, but rather than grant the Nixon administration time to develop a new strategy simply increased pressure for more military drawdowns.
Nixon and Kissinger were caught up in the old assumptions that America's unchallengeable might and her record of success in conflicts was what preserved the peace. The cost of maintaining that record was the continued maintenance of a long frustrating war against an enemy that insisted on total victory. So the war continued.
I wasn't doing the negotiating and neither was any dumbass on this board including you, shitforbrains.Why couldn’t Nixon have gotten the same deal in 1969 without escalating the war?Bu
BULLSHIT! LBJ got us in over our heads and Nixon got us out. And that's all you really need to know. I was there were you?Criticism endures that the deal reached in 1973 between the United States and North Vietnam could have been reached as early as 1969, shortly after President Nixon took office. The provisions of the agreement called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam, an exchange of prisoners, and the make-up of a new South Vietnamese government to be decided by a commission made up of South Vietnamese officials and their communist opponents.
When Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger came into office there were hopes that a new diplomacy would lead the US out of the war. Both the President and his adviser entered the White House convinced that growing public disenchantment with overseas involvements, the increasing costs of the arms race, and the emergence of new centers of power around the world, made the old rivalries that the US maintained increasingly damaging. Nixon had pledged in the recent Republican Convention to embark on an era of negotiation rather than confrontation.
Kissinger for his part, had proposed in a paper published in Foreign Affairs just prior to Nixon's inauguration, that the United States 'define' its way out of Vietnam. Since the US needed a victory of sorts to get out while maintaining 'face,' why not define the goal in minimal terms, and aim at something that could be easily accomplished. Kissinger wrote that there should be a sharp distinction between military and political objectives. The political questions about the future makeup of the South Vietnamese government, the fate of the Thieu regime, the future timing and form of elections, would be left to Saigon and the National Liberation Front (NLF). The US and the regime in Hanoi, as outside powers, would step back from the internal process of South Vietnamese and NLF negotiations.
View attachment 330079
Once in office, Nixon and Kissinger reverted to a harder line. The new course for "Vietnamization" and "Peace With Honor" could not include the dishonorable abandonment of our South Vietnamese allies. The Paris Peace talks would not be conducted on the "double-track" that Kissinger had just proposed, but in endless general sessions where every issue would be discussed by every party. Elections and guarantees for self-determination in the South would only be achieved as the result of American efforts.
The old arguments won out, the United States couldn't be seen as unilaterally withdrawing from Vietnam. That act would weaken its honor and cripple its ability to bargain with both its allies and, more importantly, its Cold War enemies. As Kissinger stated to a group of editor in Chicago in September, 1970, "A great deal of the peace and stability [in the world] depends on the confidence other people have in the American promise and in the American performance. If the United States utterly fails in something that it has undertaken with so much effort, it is bound to affect the judgment of other countries as to the degree to which the United States can be significant in their areas.”
Kissinger later admitted that the administration's policy had to appease both the political Right, who were substantial in number, and felt that we shouldn't lose; and the political opponents of the war who welcomed the unilateral withdraw of US troops, but rather than grant the Nixon administration time to develop a new strategy simply increased pressure for more military drawdowns.
Nixon and Kissinger were caught up in the old assumptions that America's unchallengeable might and her record of success in conflicts was what preserved the peace. The cost of maintaining that record was the continued maintenance of a long frustrating war against an enemy that insisted on total victory. So the war continued.
You were there, you should know
You were the one who said you were thereI
I wasn't doing the negotiating and neither was any dumbass on this board including you, shitforbrains.Why couldn’t Nixon have gotten the same deal in 1969 without escalating the war?Bu
BULLSHIT! LBJ got us in over our heads and Nixon got us out. And that's all you really need to know. I was there were you?Criticism endures that the deal reached in 1973 between the United States and North Vietnam could have been reached as early as 1969, shortly after President Nixon took office. The provisions of the agreement called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam, an exchange of prisoners, and the make-up of a new South Vietnamese government to be decided by a commission made up of South Vietnamese officials and their communist opponents.
When Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger came into office there were hopes that a new diplomacy would lead the US out of the war. Both the President and his adviser entered the White House convinced that growing public disenchantment with overseas involvements, the increasing costs of the arms race, and the emergence of new centers of power around the world, made the old rivalries that the US maintained increasingly damaging. Nixon had pledged in the recent Republican Convention to embark on an era of negotiation rather than confrontation.
Kissinger for his part, had proposed in a paper published in Foreign Affairs just prior to Nixon's inauguration, that the United States 'define' its way out of Vietnam. Since the US needed a victory of sorts to get out while maintaining 'face,' why not define the goal in minimal terms, and aim at something that could be easily accomplished. Kissinger wrote that there should be a sharp distinction between military and political objectives. The political questions about the future makeup of the South Vietnamese government, the fate of the Thieu regime, the future timing and form of elections, would be left to Saigon and the National Liberation Front (NLF). The US and the regime in Hanoi, as outside powers, would step back from the internal process of South Vietnamese and NLF negotiations.
View attachment 330079
Once in office, Nixon and Kissinger reverted to a harder line. The new course for "Vietnamization" and "Peace With Honor" could not include the dishonorable abandonment of our South Vietnamese allies. The Paris Peace talks would not be conducted on the "double-track" that Kissinger had just proposed, but in endless general sessions where every issue would be discussed by every party. Elections and guarantees for self-determination in the South would only be achieved as the result of American efforts.
The old arguments won out, the United States couldn't be seen as unilaterally withdrawing from Vietnam. That act would weaken its honor and cripple its ability to bargain with both its allies and, more importantly, its Cold War enemies. As Kissinger stated to a group of editor in Chicago in September, 1970, "A great deal of the peace and stability [in the world] depends on the confidence other people have in the American promise and in the American performance. If the United States utterly fails in something that it has undertaken with so much effort, it is bound to affect the judgment of other countries as to the degree to which the United States can be significant in their areas.”
Kissinger later admitted that the administration's policy had to appease both the political Right, who were substantial in number, and felt that we shouldn't lose; and the political opponents of the war who welcomed the unilateral withdraw of US troops, but rather than grant the Nixon administration time to develop a new strategy simply increased pressure for more military drawdowns.
Nixon and Kissinger were caught up in the old assumptions that America's unchallengeable might and her record of success in conflicts was what preserved the peace. The cost of maintaining that record was the continued maintenance of a long frustrating war against an enemy that insisted on total victory. So the war continued.
You were there, you should know
Not negotiating asshole, having my ass shot at.You were the one who said you were thereI
I wasn't doing the negotiating and neither was any dumbass on this board including you, shitforbrains.Why couldn’t Nixon have gotten the same deal in 1969 without escalating the war?Bu
BULLSHIT! LBJ got us in over our heads and Nixon got us out. And that's all you really need to know. I was there were you?Criticism endures that the deal reached in 1973 between the United States and North Vietnam could have been reached as early as 1969, shortly after President Nixon took office. The provisions of the agreement called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam, an exchange of prisoners, and the make-up of a new South Vietnamese government to be decided by a commission made up of South Vietnamese officials and their communist opponents.
When Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger came into office there were hopes that a new diplomacy would lead the US out of the war. Both the President and his adviser entered the White House convinced that growing public disenchantment with overseas involvements, the increasing costs of the arms race, and the emergence of new centers of power around the world, made the old rivalries that the US maintained increasingly damaging. Nixon had pledged in the recent Republican Convention to embark on an era of negotiation rather than confrontation.
Kissinger for his part, had proposed in a paper published in Foreign Affairs just prior to Nixon's inauguration, that the United States 'define' its way out of Vietnam. Since the US needed a victory of sorts to get out while maintaining 'face,' why not define the goal in minimal terms, and aim at something that could be easily accomplished. Kissinger wrote that there should be a sharp distinction between military and political objectives. The political questions about the future makeup of the South Vietnamese government, the fate of the Thieu regime, the future timing and form of elections, would be left to Saigon and the National Liberation Front (NLF). The US and the regime in Hanoi, as outside powers, would step back from the internal process of South Vietnamese and NLF negotiations.
View attachment 330079
Once in office, Nixon and Kissinger reverted to a harder line. The new course for "Vietnamization" and "Peace With Honor" could not include the dishonorable abandonment of our South Vietnamese allies. The Paris Peace talks would not be conducted on the "double-track" that Kissinger had just proposed, but in endless general sessions where every issue would be discussed by every party. Elections and guarantees for self-determination in the South would only be achieved as the result of American efforts.
The old arguments won out, the United States couldn't be seen as unilaterally withdrawing from Vietnam. That act would weaken its honor and cripple its ability to bargain with both its allies and, more importantly, its Cold War enemies. As Kissinger stated to a group of editor in Chicago in September, 1970, "A great deal of the peace and stability [in the world] depends on the confidence other people have in the American promise and in the American performance. If the United States utterly fails in something that it has undertaken with so much effort, it is bound to affect the judgment of other countries as to the degree to which the United States can be significant in their areas.”
Kissinger later admitted that the administration's policy had to appease both the political Right, who were substantial in number, and felt that we shouldn't lose; and the political opponents of the war who welcomed the unilateral withdraw of US troops, but rather than grant the Nixon administration time to develop a new strategy simply increased pressure for more military drawdowns.
Nixon and Kissinger were caught up in the old assumptions that America's unchallengeable might and her record of success in conflicts was what preserved the peace. The cost of maintaining that record was the continued maintenance of a long frustrating war against an enemy that insisted on total victory. So the war continued.
You were there, you should know
Would t you know what was being negotiated?
Oh....because when Hawk posted about the negotiations, you said you were there and he wasn’t, implying you had inside informationNot negotiating asshole, having my ass shot at.You were the one who said you were thereI
I wasn't doing the negotiating and neither was any dumbass on this board including you, shitforbrains.Why couldn’t Nixon have gotten the same deal in 1969 without escalating the war?Bu
BULLSHIT! LBJ got us in over our heads and Nixon got us out. And that's all you really need to know. I was there were you?Criticism endures that the deal reached in 1973 between the United States and North Vietnam could have been reached as early as 1969, shortly after President Nixon took office. The provisions of the agreement called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam, an exchange of prisoners, and the make-up of a new South Vietnamese government to be decided by a commission made up of South Vietnamese officials and their communist opponents.
When Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger came into office there were hopes that a new diplomacy would lead the US out of the war. Both the President and his adviser entered the White House convinced that growing public disenchantment with overseas involvements, the increasing costs of the arms race, and the emergence of new centers of power around the world, made the old rivalries that the US maintained increasingly damaging. Nixon had pledged in the recent Republican Convention to embark on an era of negotiation rather than confrontation.
Kissinger for his part, had proposed in a paper published in Foreign Affairs just prior to Nixon's inauguration, that the United States 'define' its way out of Vietnam. Since the US needed a victory of sorts to get out while maintaining 'face,' why not define the goal in minimal terms, and aim at something that could be easily accomplished. Kissinger wrote that there should be a sharp distinction between military and political objectives. The political questions about the future makeup of the South Vietnamese government, the fate of the Thieu regime, the future timing and form of elections, would be left to Saigon and the National Liberation Front (NLF). The US and the regime in Hanoi, as outside powers, would step back from the internal process of South Vietnamese and NLF negotiations.
View attachment 330079
Once in office, Nixon and Kissinger reverted to a harder line. The new course for "Vietnamization" and "Peace With Honor" could not include the dishonorable abandonment of our South Vietnamese allies. The Paris Peace talks would not be conducted on the "double-track" that Kissinger had just proposed, but in endless general sessions where every issue would be discussed by every party. Elections and guarantees for self-determination in the South would only be achieved as the result of American efforts.
The old arguments won out, the United States couldn't be seen as unilaterally withdrawing from Vietnam. That act would weaken its honor and cripple its ability to bargain with both its allies and, more importantly, its Cold War enemies. As Kissinger stated to a group of editor in Chicago in September, 1970, "A great deal of the peace and stability [in the world] depends on the confidence other people have in the American promise and in the American performance. If the United States utterly fails in something that it has undertaken with so much effort, it is bound to affect the judgment of other countries as to the degree to which the United States can be significant in their areas.”
Kissinger later admitted that the administration's policy had to appease both the political Right, who were substantial in number, and felt that we shouldn't lose; and the political opponents of the war who welcomed the unilateral withdraw of US troops, but rather than grant the Nixon administration time to develop a new strategy simply increased pressure for more military drawdowns.
Nixon and Kissinger were caught up in the old assumptions that America's unchallengeable might and her record of success in conflicts was what preserved the peace. The cost of maintaining that record was the continued maintenance of a long frustrating war against an enemy that insisted on total victory. So the war continued.
You were there, you should know
Would t you know what was being negotiated?
Does it hurt being as fucking stupid as you are?Oh....because when Hawk posted about the negotiations, you said you were there and he wasn’t, implying you had inside informationNot negotiating asshole, having my ass shot at.You were the one who said you were thereI
I wasn't doing the negotiating and neither was any dumbass on this board including you, shitforbrains.Why couldn’t Nixon have gotten the same deal in 1969 without escalating the war?Bu
BULLSHIT! LBJ got us in over our heads and Nixon got us out. And that's all you really need to know. I was there were you?Criticism endures that the deal reached in 1973 between the United States and North Vietnam could have been reached as early as 1969, shortly after President Nixon took office. The provisions of the agreement called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam, an exchange of prisoners, and the make-up of a new South Vietnamese government to be decided by a commission made up of South Vietnamese officials and their communist opponents.
When Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger came into office there were hopes that a new diplomacy would lead the US out of the war. Both the President and his adviser entered the White House convinced that growing public disenchantment with overseas involvements, the increasing costs of the arms race, and the emergence of new centers of power around the world, made the old rivalries that the US maintained increasingly damaging. Nixon had pledged in the recent Republican Convention to embark on an era of negotiation rather than confrontation.
Kissinger for his part, had proposed in a paper published in Foreign Affairs just prior to Nixon's inauguration, that the United States 'define' its way out of Vietnam. Since the US needed a victory of sorts to get out while maintaining 'face,' why not define the goal in minimal terms, and aim at something that could be easily accomplished. Kissinger wrote that there should be a sharp distinction between military and political objectives. The political questions about the future makeup of the South Vietnamese government, the fate of the Thieu regime, the future timing and form of elections, would be left to Saigon and the National Liberation Front (NLF). The US and the regime in Hanoi, as outside powers, would step back from the internal process of South Vietnamese and NLF negotiations.
View attachment 330079
Once in office, Nixon and Kissinger reverted to a harder line. The new course for "Vietnamization" and "Peace With Honor" could not include the dishonorable abandonment of our South Vietnamese allies. The Paris Peace talks would not be conducted on the "double-track" that Kissinger had just proposed, but in endless general sessions where every issue would be discussed by every party. Elections and guarantees for self-determination in the South would only be achieved as the result of American efforts.
The old arguments won out, the United States couldn't be seen as unilaterally withdrawing from Vietnam. That act would weaken its honor and cripple its ability to bargain with both its allies and, more importantly, its Cold War enemies. As Kissinger stated to a group of editor in Chicago in September, 1970, "A great deal of the peace and stability [in the world] depends on the confidence other people have in the American promise and in the American performance. If the United States utterly fails in something that it has undertaken with so much effort, it is bound to affect the judgment of other countries as to the degree to which the United States can be significant in their areas.”
Kissinger later admitted that the administration's policy had to appease both the political Right, who were substantial in number, and felt that we shouldn't lose; and the political opponents of the war who welcomed the unilateral withdraw of US troops, but rather than grant the Nixon administration time to develop a new strategy simply increased pressure for more military drawdowns.
Nixon and Kissinger were caught up in the old assumptions that America's unchallengeable might and her record of success in conflicts was what preserved the peace. The cost of maintaining that record was the continued maintenance of a long frustrating war against an enemy that insisted on total victory. So the war continued.
You were there, you should know
Would t you know what was being negotiated?
Not negotiating asshole, having my ass shot at.You were the one who said you were thereI
I wasn't doing the negotiating and neither was any dumbass on this board including you, shitforbrains.Why couldn’t Nixon have gotten the same deal in 1969 without escalating the war?Bu
BULLSHIT! LBJ got us in over our heads and Nixon got us out. And that's all you really need to know. I was there were you?Criticism endures that the deal reached in 1973 between the United States and North Vietnam could have been reached as early as 1969, shortly after President Nixon took office. The provisions of the agreement called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam, an exchange of prisoners, and the make-up of a new South Vietnamese government to be decided by a commission made up of South Vietnamese officials and their communist opponents.
When Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger came into office there were hopes that a new diplomacy would lead the US out of the war. Both the President and his adviser entered the White House convinced that growing public disenchantment with overseas involvements, the increasing costs of the arms race, and the emergence of new centers of power around the world, made the old rivalries that the US maintained increasingly damaging. Nixon had pledged in the recent Republican Convention to embark on an era of negotiation rather than confrontation.
Kissinger for his part, had proposed in a paper published in Foreign Affairs just prior to Nixon's inauguration, that the United States 'define' its way out of Vietnam. Since the US needed a victory of sorts to get out while maintaining 'face,' why not define the goal in minimal terms, and aim at something that could be easily accomplished. Kissinger wrote that there should be a sharp distinction between military and political objectives. The political questions about the future makeup of the South Vietnamese government, the fate of the Thieu regime, the future timing and form of elections, would be left to Saigon and the National Liberation Front (NLF). The US and the regime in Hanoi, as outside powers, would step back from the internal process of South Vietnamese and NLF negotiations.
View attachment 330079
Once in office, Nixon and Kissinger reverted to a harder line. The new course for "Vietnamization" and "Peace With Honor" could not include the dishonorable abandonment of our South Vietnamese allies. The Paris Peace talks would not be conducted on the "double-track" that Kissinger had just proposed, but in endless general sessions where every issue would be discussed by every party. Elections and guarantees for self-determination in the South would only be achieved as the result of American efforts.
The old arguments won out, the United States couldn't be seen as unilaterally withdrawing from Vietnam. That act would weaken its honor and cripple its ability to bargain with both its allies and, more importantly, its Cold War enemies. As Kissinger stated to a group of editor in Chicago in September, 1970, "A great deal of the peace and stability [in the world] depends on the confidence other people have in the American promise and in the American performance. If the United States utterly fails in something that it has undertaken with so much effort, it is bound to affect the judgment of other countries as to the degree to which the United States can be significant in their areas.”
Kissinger later admitted that the administration's policy had to appease both the political Right, who were substantial in number, and felt that we shouldn't lose; and the political opponents of the war who welcomed the unilateral withdraw of US troops, but rather than grant the Nixon administration time to develop a new strategy simply increased pressure for more military drawdowns.
Nixon and Kissinger were caught up in the old assumptions that America's unchallengeable might and her record of success in conflicts was what preserved the peace. The cost of maintaining that record was the continued maintenance of a long frustrating war against an enemy that insisted on total victory. So the war continued.
You were there, you should know
Would t you know what was being negotiated?
Well, then tell us about the negotiationsDoes it hurt being as fucking stupid as you are?Oh....because when Hawk posted about the negotiations, you said you were there and he wasn’t, implying you had inside informationNot negotiating asshole, having my ass shot at.You were the one who said you were thereI
I wasn't doing the negotiating and neither was any dumbass on this board including you, shitforbrains.Why couldn’t Nixon have gotten the same deal in 1969 without escalating the war?Bu
BULLSHIT! LBJ got us in over our heads and Nixon got us out. And that's all you really need to know. I was there were you?Criticism endures that the deal reached in 1973 between the United States and North Vietnam could have been reached as early as 1969, shortly after President Nixon took office. The provisions of the agreement called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam, an exchange of prisoners, and the make-up of a new South Vietnamese government to be decided by a commission made up of South Vietnamese officials and their communist opponents.
When Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger came into office there were hopes that a new diplomacy would lead the US out of the war. Both the President and his adviser entered the White House convinced that growing public disenchantment with overseas involvements, the increasing costs of the arms race, and the emergence of new centers of power around the world, made the old rivalries that the US maintained increasingly damaging. Nixon had pledged in the recent Republican Convention to embark on an era of negotiation rather than confrontation.
Kissinger for his part, had proposed in a paper published in Foreign Affairs just prior to Nixon's inauguration, that the United States 'define' its way out of Vietnam. Since the US needed a victory of sorts to get out while maintaining 'face,' why not define the goal in minimal terms, and aim at something that could be easily accomplished. Kissinger wrote that there should be a sharp distinction between military and political objectives. The political questions about the future makeup of the South Vietnamese government, the fate of the Thieu regime, the future timing and form of elections, would be left to Saigon and the National Liberation Front (NLF). The US and the regime in Hanoi, as outside powers, would step back from the internal process of South Vietnamese and NLF negotiations.
View attachment 330079
Once in office, Nixon and Kissinger reverted to a harder line. The new course for "Vietnamization" and "Peace With Honor" could not include the dishonorable abandonment of our South Vietnamese allies. The Paris Peace talks would not be conducted on the "double-track" that Kissinger had just proposed, but in endless general sessions where every issue would be discussed by every party. Elections and guarantees for self-determination in the South would only be achieved as the result of American efforts.
The old arguments won out, the United States couldn't be seen as unilaterally withdrawing from Vietnam. That act would weaken its honor and cripple its ability to bargain with both its allies and, more importantly, its Cold War enemies. As Kissinger stated to a group of editor in Chicago in September, 1970, "A great deal of the peace and stability [in the world] depends on the confidence other people have in the American promise and in the American performance. If the United States utterly fails in something that it has undertaken with so much effort, it is bound to affect the judgment of other countries as to the degree to which the United States can be significant in their areas.”
Kissinger later admitted that the administration's policy had to appease both the political Right, who were substantial in number, and felt that we shouldn't lose; and the political opponents of the war who welcomed the unilateral withdraw of US troops, but rather than grant the Nixon administration time to develop a new strategy simply increased pressure for more military drawdowns.
Nixon and Kissinger were caught up in the old assumptions that America's unchallengeable might and her record of success in conflicts was what preserved the peace. The cost of maintaining that record was the continued maintenance of a long frustrating war against an enemy that insisted on total victory. So the war continued.
You were there, you should know
Would t you know what was being negotiated?
I'm pretty much up on it already. Enough to know it started as far back as Wilson and we were involved mostly because of a bunch of frankophilian fuck sticks who were trying to help the frogs dominate another nation and be imperialistic assholes. Basically we started out help the wrong fucking side. Ho was a nationalist more than he was a communist. Hell he wrote his constitution around our own. We were sucked by assholes on both sides, democrat and republican over the course of a lot of years from the end of WWI through WWII and right up to and through the course of our involvement in Vietnam from Wilson right up till the end. But it became our football game entirely under LBJ.Not negotiating asshole, having my ass shot at.You were the one who said you were thereI
I wasn't doing the negotiating and neither was any dumbass on this board including you, shitforbrains.Why couldn’t Nixon have gotten the same deal in 1969 without escalating the war?Bu
BULLSHIT! LBJ got us in over our heads and Nixon got us out. And that's all you really need to know. I was there were you?Criticism endures that the deal reached in 1973 between the United States and North Vietnam could have been reached as early as 1969, shortly after President Nixon took office. The provisions of the agreement called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam, an exchange of prisoners, and the make-up of a new South Vietnamese government to be decided by a commission made up of South Vietnamese officials and their communist opponents.
When Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger came into office there were hopes that a new diplomacy would lead the US out of the war. Both the President and his adviser entered the White House convinced that growing public disenchantment with overseas involvements, the increasing costs of the arms race, and the emergence of new centers of power around the world, made the old rivalries that the US maintained increasingly damaging. Nixon had pledged in the recent Republican Convention to embark on an era of negotiation rather than confrontation.
Kissinger for his part, had proposed in a paper published in Foreign Affairs just prior to Nixon's inauguration, that the United States 'define' its way out of Vietnam. Since the US needed a victory of sorts to get out while maintaining 'face,' why not define the goal in minimal terms, and aim at something that could be easily accomplished. Kissinger wrote that there should be a sharp distinction between military and political objectives. The political questions about the future makeup of the South Vietnamese government, the fate of the Thieu regime, the future timing and form of elections, would be left to Saigon and the National Liberation Front (NLF). The US and the regime in Hanoi, as outside powers, would step back from the internal process of South Vietnamese and NLF negotiations.
View attachment 330079
Once in office, Nixon and Kissinger reverted to a harder line. The new course for "Vietnamization" and "Peace With Honor" could not include the dishonorable abandonment of our South Vietnamese allies. The Paris Peace talks would not be conducted on the "double-track" that Kissinger had just proposed, but in endless general sessions where every issue would be discussed by every party. Elections and guarantees for self-determination in the South would only be achieved as the result of American efforts.
The old arguments won out, the United States couldn't be seen as unilaterally withdrawing from Vietnam. That act would weaken its honor and cripple its ability to bargain with both its allies and, more importantly, its Cold War enemies. As Kissinger stated to a group of editor in Chicago in September, 1970, "A great deal of the peace and stability [in the world] depends on the confidence other people have in the American promise and in the American performance. If the United States utterly fails in something that it has undertaken with so much effort, it is bound to affect the judgment of other countries as to the degree to which the United States can be significant in their areas.”
Kissinger later admitted that the administration's policy had to appease both the political Right, who were substantial in number, and felt that we shouldn't lose; and the political opponents of the war who welcomed the unilateral withdraw of US troops, but rather than grant the Nixon administration time to develop a new strategy simply increased pressure for more military drawdowns.
Nixon and Kissinger were caught up in the old assumptions that America's unchallengeable might and her record of success in conflicts was what preserved the peace. The cost of maintaining that record was the continued maintenance of a long frustrating war against an enemy that insisted on total victory. So the war continued.
You were there, you should know
Would t you know what was being negotiated?
Well, half a century has passed. Perhaps it is time you finally take a few hours to study ... what you were doing there thousands of miles from home, and why you were “getting your ass shot at.”
Are you and right winger butt buddies? It sure looks like it.Not negotiating asshole, having my ass shot at.You were the one who said you were thereI
I wasn't doing the negotiating and neither was any dumbass on this board including you, shitforbrains.Why couldn’t Nixon have gotten the same deal in 1969 without escalating the war?Bu
BULLSHIT! LBJ got us in over our heads and Nixon got us out. And that's all you really need to know. I was there were you?Criticism endures that the deal reached in 1973 between the United States and North Vietnam could have been reached as early as 1969, shortly after President Nixon took office. The provisions of the agreement called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam, an exchange of prisoners, and the make-up of a new South Vietnamese government to be decided by a commission made up of South Vietnamese officials and their communist opponents.
When Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger came into office there were hopes that a new diplomacy would lead the US out of the war. Both the President and his adviser entered the White House convinced that growing public disenchantment with overseas involvements, the increasing costs of the arms race, and the emergence of new centers of power around the world, made the old rivalries that the US maintained increasingly damaging. Nixon had pledged in the recent Republican Convention to embark on an era of negotiation rather than confrontation.
Kissinger for his part, had proposed in a paper published in Foreign Affairs just prior to Nixon's inauguration, that the United States 'define' its way out of Vietnam. Since the US needed a victory of sorts to get out while maintaining 'face,' why not define the goal in minimal terms, and aim at something that could be easily accomplished. Kissinger wrote that there should be a sharp distinction between military and political objectives. The political questions about the future makeup of the South Vietnamese government, the fate of the Thieu regime, the future timing and form of elections, would be left to Saigon and the National Liberation Front (NLF). The US and the regime in Hanoi, as outside powers, would step back from the internal process of South Vietnamese and NLF negotiations.
View attachment 330079
Once in office, Nixon and Kissinger reverted to a harder line. The new course for "Vietnamization" and "Peace With Honor" could not include the dishonorable abandonment of our South Vietnamese allies. The Paris Peace talks would not be conducted on the "double-track" that Kissinger had just proposed, but in endless general sessions where every issue would be discussed by every party. Elections and guarantees for self-determination in the South would only be achieved as the result of American efforts.
The old arguments won out, the United States couldn't be seen as unilaterally withdrawing from Vietnam. That act would weaken its honor and cripple its ability to bargain with both its allies and, more importantly, its Cold War enemies. As Kissinger stated to a group of editor in Chicago in September, 1970, "A great deal of the peace and stability [in the world] depends on the confidence other people have in the American promise and in the American performance. If the United States utterly fails in something that it has undertaken with so much effort, it is bound to affect the judgment of other countries as to the degree to which the United States can be significant in their areas.”
Kissinger later admitted that the administration's policy had to appease both the political Right, who were substantial in number, and felt that we shouldn't lose; and the political opponents of the war who welcomed the unilateral withdraw of US troops, but rather than grant the Nixon administration time to develop a new strategy simply increased pressure for more military drawdowns.
Nixon and Kissinger were caught up in the old assumptions that America's unchallengeable might and her record of success in conflicts was what preserved the peace. The cost of maintaining that record was the continued maintenance of a long frustrating war against an enemy that insisted on total victory. So the war continued.
You were there, you should know
Would t you know what was being negotiated?
Well, half a century has passed. Perhaps it is time you finally take a few hours to study ... what you were doing there thousands of miles from home, and why you were “getting your ass shot at.”
The illegal Iraq invasion.OK, I’ll biteI will go one further and say we should never have been there in the first place. That was Americas second biggest mistake in the lat 75 yearsWe should have gotten out in 1964
What was the biggest?
actually, Nixon tried to sabotage LBJs peace negotiationsCriticism endures that the deal reached in 1973 between the United States and North Vietnam could have been reached as early as 1969, shortly after President Nixon took office. The provisions of the agreement called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam, an exchange of prisoners, and the make-up of a new South Vietnamese government to be decided by a commission made up of South Vietnamese officials and their communist opponents.
When Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger came into office there were hopes that a new diplomacy would lead the US out of the war. Both the President and his adviser entered the White House convinced that growing public disenchantment with overseas involvements, the increasing costs of the arms race, and the emergence of new centers of power around the world, made the old rivalries that the US maintained increasingly damaging. Nixon had pledged in the recent Republican Convention to embark on an era of negotiation rather than confrontation.
Kissinger for his part, had proposed in a paper published in Foreign Affairs just prior to Nixon's inauguration, that the United States 'define' its way out of Vietnam. Since the US needed a victory of sorts to get out while maintaining 'face,' why not define the goal in minimal terms, and aim at something that could be easily accomplished. Kissinger wrote that there should be a sharp distinction between military and political objectives. The political questions about the future makeup of the South Vietnamese government, the fate of the Thieu regime, the future timing and form of elections, would be left to Saigon and the National Liberation Front (NLF). The US and the regime in Hanoi, as outside powers, would step back from the internal process of South Vietnamese and NLF negotiations.
View attachment 330079
Once in office, Nixon and Kissinger reverted to a harder line. The new course for "Vietnamization" and "Peace With Honor" could not include the dishonorable abandonment of our South Vietnamese allies. The Paris Peace talks would not be conducted on the "double-track" that Kissinger had just proposed, but in endless general sessions where every issue would be discussed by every party. Elections and guarantees for self-determination in the South would only be achieved as the result of American efforts.
The old arguments won out, the United States couldn't be seen as unilaterally withdrawing from Vietnam. That act would weaken its honor and cripple its ability to bargain with both its allies and, more importantly, its Cold War enemies. As Kissinger stated to a group of editor in Chicago in September, 1970, "A great deal of the peace and stability [in the world] depends on the confidence other people have in the American promise and in the American performance. If the United States utterly fails in something that it has undertaken with so much effort, it is bound to affect the judgment of other countries as to the degree to which the United States can be significant in their areas.”
Kissinger later admitted that the administration's policy had to appease both the political Right, who were substantial in number, and felt that we shouldn't lose; and the political opponents of the war who welcomed the unilateral withdraw of US troops, but rather than grant the Nixon administration time to develop a new strategy simply increased pressure for more military drawdowns.
Nixon and Kissinger were caught up in the old assumptions that America's unchallengeable might and her record of success in conflicts was what preserved the peace. The cost of maintaining that record was the continued maintenance of a long frustrating war against an enemy that insisted on total victory. So the war continued.
www.politico.com
www.usmessageboard.com
Nixon sabotaged the peace negotiations:Bu
BULLSHIT! LBJ got us in over our heads and Nixon got us out. And that's all you really need to know. I was there were you?Criticism endures that the deal reached in 1973 between the United States and North Vietnam could have been reached as early as 1969, shortly after President Nixon took office. The provisions of the agreement called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam, an exchange of prisoners, and the make-up of a new South Vietnamese government to be decided by a commission made up of South Vietnamese officials and their communist opponents.
When Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger came into office there were hopes that a new diplomacy would lead the US out of the war. Both the President and his adviser entered the White House convinced that growing public disenchantment with overseas involvements, the increasing costs of the arms race, and the emergence of new centers of power around the world, made the old rivalries that the US maintained increasingly damaging. Nixon had pledged in the recent Republican Convention to embark on an era of negotiation rather than confrontation.
Kissinger for his part, had proposed in a paper published in Foreign Affairs just prior to Nixon's inauguration, that the United States 'define' its way out of Vietnam. Since the US needed a victory of sorts to get out while maintaining 'face,' why not define the goal in minimal terms, and aim at something that could be easily accomplished. Kissinger wrote that there should be a sharp distinction between military and political objectives. The political questions about the future makeup of the South Vietnamese government, the fate of the Thieu regime, the future timing and form of elections, would be left to Saigon and the National Liberation Front (NLF). The US and the regime in Hanoi, as outside powers, would step back from the internal process of South Vietnamese and NLF negotiations.
View attachment 330079
Once in office, Nixon and Kissinger reverted to a harder line. The new course for "Vietnamization" and "Peace With Honor" could not include the dishonorable abandonment of our South Vietnamese allies. The Paris Peace talks would not be conducted on the "double-track" that Kissinger had just proposed, but in endless general sessions where every issue would be discussed by every party. Elections and guarantees for self-determination in the South would only be achieved as the result of American efforts.
The old arguments won out, the United States couldn't be seen as unilaterally withdrawing from Vietnam. That act would weaken its honor and cripple its ability to bargain with both its allies and, more importantly, its Cold War enemies. As Kissinger stated to a group of editor in Chicago in September, 1970, "A great deal of the peace and stability [in the world] depends on the confidence other people have in the American promise and in the American performance. If the United States utterly fails in something that it has undertaken with so much effort, it is bound to affect the judgment of other countries as to the degree to which the United States can be significant in their areas.”
Kissinger later admitted that the administration's policy had to appease both the political Right, who were substantial in number, and felt that we shouldn't lose; and the political opponents of the war who welcomed the unilateral withdraw of US troops, but rather than grant the Nixon administration time to develop a new strategy simply increased pressure for more military drawdowns.
Nixon and Kissinger were caught up in the old assumptions that America's unchallengeable might and her record of success in conflicts was what preserved the peace. The cost of maintaining that record was the continued maintenance of a long frustrating war against an enemy that insisted on total victory. So the war continued.
www.politico.com
not illegal at allThe illegal Iraq invasion.OK, I’ll biteI will go one further and say we should never have been there in the first place. That was Americas second biggest mistake in the lat 75 yearsWe should have gotten out in 1964
What was the biggest?
He is a shill on the governments payroll same as wrongwinger,you do know Nixon expanded the war in Vietnam right and could have ended it in 69 if he wanted to and sabotaged lbj Paris peace talks delaying the end of the war right. Had he had His way,it would have gone on much longer if not for the American people’s march on Washington putting pressure on him.sad that the people wont stand up to the government anymore as they did back then,Bu
BULLSHIT! LBJ got us in over our heads and Nixon got us out. And that's all you really need to know. I was there were you?Criticism endures that the deal reached in 1973 between the United States and North Vietnam could have been reached as early as 1969, shortly after President Nixon took office. The provisions of the agreement called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam, an exchange of prisoners, and the make-up of a new South Vietnamese government to be decided by a commission made up of South Vietnamese officials and their communist opponents.
When Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger came into office there were hopes that a new diplomacy would lead the US out of the war. Both the President and his adviser entered the White House convinced that growing public disenchantment with overseas involvements, the increasing costs of the arms race, and the emergence of new centers of power around the world, made the old rivalries that the US maintained increasingly damaging. Nixon had pledged in the recent Republican Convention to embark on an era of negotiation rather than confrontation.
Kissinger for his part, had proposed in a paper published in Foreign Affairs just prior to Nixon's inauguration, that the United States 'define' its way out of Vietnam. Since the US needed a victory of sorts to get out while maintaining 'face,' why not define the goal in minimal terms, and aim at something that could be easily accomplished. Kissinger wrote that there should be a sharp distinction between military and political objectives. The political questions about the future makeup of the South Vietnamese government, the fate of the Thieu regime, the future timing and form of elections, would be left to Saigon and the National Liberation Front (NLF). The US and the regime in Hanoi, as outside powers, would step back from the internal process of South Vietnamese and NLF negotiations.
View attachment 330079
Once in office, Nixon and Kissinger reverted to a harder line. The new course for "Vietnamization" and "Peace With Honor" could not include the dishonorable abandonment of our South Vietnamese allies. The Paris Peace talks would not be conducted on the "double-track" that Kissinger had just proposed, but in endless general sessions where every issue would be discussed by every party. Elections and guarantees for self-determination in the South would only be achieved as the result of American efforts.
The old arguments won out, the United States couldn't be seen as unilaterally withdrawing from Vietnam. That act would weaken its honor and cripple its ability to bargain with both its allies and, more importantly, its Cold War enemies. As Kissinger stated to a group of editor in Chicago in September, 1970, "A great deal of the peace and stability [in the world] depends on the confidence other people have in the American promise and in the American performance. If the United States utterly fails in something that it has undertaken with so much effort, it is bound to affect the judgment of other countries as to the degree to which the United States can be significant in their areas.”
Kissinger later admitted that the administration's policy had to appease both the political Right, who were substantial in number, and felt that we shouldn't lose; and the political opponents of the war who welcomed the unilateral withdraw of US troops, but rather than grant the Nixon administration time to develop a new strategy simply increased pressure for more military drawdowns.
Nixon and Kissinger were caught up in the old assumptions that America's unchallengeable might and her record of success in conflicts was what preserved the peace. The cost of maintaining that record was the continued maintenance of a long frustrating war against an enemy that insisted on total victory. So the war continued.
The illegal Iraq invasion.The illegal Iraq invasion.OK, I’ll biteI will go one further and say we should never have been there in the first place. That was Americas second biggest mistake in the lat 75 yearsWe should have gotten out in 1964
What was the biggest?
from YOUR link:The illegal Iraq invasion.The illegal Iraq invasion.OK, I’ll biteI will go one further and say we should never have been there in the first place. That was Americas second biggest mistake in the lat 75 yearsWe should have gotten out in 1964
What was the biggest?
Legality of the Iraq War - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
wiki---hahahhahahahwidely debated
www.merriam-webster.com
