Prove your assertion. What we do know for a fact is that presidents have the authority to declassify documents.
Declassifying while being President is one thing. They are then reclassified, as needed.
Taking any WH documents, they belong to the Federal Government and not to WH officials, once you leave office to your new home is another.
Here are some of the consequences of not knowing where any WH documents are, if they have been classified or reclassified:
The Department of State handles, processes, and stores thousands of classified documents each day at overseas posts and at the Main State headquarters building. Countless meetings are held where classified information is discussed. Gathering, analyzing, and distributing information is central to the Department’s mission to implement U.S. foreign policy. This information routinely includes national security concerns such as intelligence information, sensitive matters relating to bilateral and multilateral relations, and other national security issues. The information is disseminated through a variety of media, including electronic mail, computer systems, hard copy, telephone, fax machines, and meetings.
Regardless of the means by which such information is disseminated, it is essential that it be limited to authorized personnel with appropriate security clearances who have been adequately briefed on protecting such information. Compromising classified information— inadvertently or intentionally—particularly highly classified intelligence information, could result in:
- the loss of vital sources of information to U.S. policy makers and military planners;
- the arrest, torture, or death of sources or other individuals;
- the waste of huge outlays of funds for research and development of data collection methods; and
- serious damage to the Government's relationships with other governments.
The Department acknowledges the threat to national security and has established policies and procedures to minimize the potential compromise of classified information. Employees and contractors receive background investigations before being cleared to handle classified information; there are guards and access controls -- at the perimeter entrances to Main State and in many offices; procedures are in place for distributing classified material to individuals; employees receive briefings on handling classified information; and there are procedures in place for identifying individuals who violate security protocols.
Department regulations require that the executive director of each bureau ensure that a principal unit security officer (PUSO) is designated. The USO's duty is to make sure classified information is handled according to regulations, and to work with office staff to ensure that all employees are aware of security requirements and procedures. By regulation, the ultimate responsibility for safeguarding classified information rests with each organizational unit supervisor. The Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) also states that "each employee having access to and/or possession of classified material is responsible for the maintenance of the security of such material."
The OIG recognizes that there is an inevitable tension between those charged with collecting and protecting intelligence information and those who must use that information to formulate and conduct foreign policy.
This report describes Department policies and procedures for protecting classified information at the Main. State headquarters building, and the extent to which security measures have been effective in preventing the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
State Department Office of Inspector General Audit, September 1999
sgp.fas.org
