OP's claim is an uneducated, fortune teller's claim. Knowledge is replacing faith worldwide, and Jefferson's tenet of a "wall of separation" is still viable, because it is the State that molds religious belief, not the other way around. Secular Turkey is an example. There are at least three types of secularity, the West being Secularity III:
'In Taylor's account, century-long processes of gradual differentiation facilitate the emergence of a widening range of possible options of belief and unbelief, and, as such, Secularity III. These in turn nourish calls for the retreat of religion from public space: Secularity I. The cultural rise of Secularity III's "conditions of belief" precede amd create the original historic possibility for Secularity I's institutional separation of religion and state in the West. The picture is rather different in most contributions to this volume. While differentiation played a large role in facilitating the emergence of a pluralism of outlooks, both religious and non-religious, it did so often as a consequence of sudden historical breaks, often disruptive and violent, such as the establishment of colonial administrations with all their consequent breaches in notions of authority, meaning, property rights, social organization, cosmology, etc. With independence, political elites often created polities in which positions of exclusive humanism of the option to not believe were hardly publicly available.
The corollary to Taylor's narrative as regards the "why" question therefore lies in the central role of the state in shaping conditions of belief. Constitution-crafters and state makers usually tackled the challenge of plurality through institutional arrangements: some privileged one belief system (e.g., Shi'a Islam in Khomeni's Iran, Sunni Islam in Zia's Pakistan, Orthodox and Conservative Judaism in Israel), others excluded religions from several aspects of public life (e.g., India's Representation of the People Act of 1951 excluded religious rhetoric from election campaigns), or any aspect of public life altogether (e.g. laiklik in early Republican Turkey and atheism in communist China and the USSR)....The emergence of Secularity III or its survival after the inauguration of post-colonial polities was often put in jeopardy by such exclusivist institutional arrangements.'
(Kuenkler and Shankar, Introduction, A Secular Age Beyond the West: Religions, Law and the State in Asia, the Middle East and North Africa)