What's new
US Message Board 🦅 Political Discussion Forum

Register a free account today to become a member! Once signed in, you'll be able to participate on this site by adding your own topics and posts, as well as connect with other members through your own private inbox!

Historian Mark Solonin : Koba (sralin) and his USSA Marxist empire prepared attack on Germany, clear


Gold Member
Sep 3, 2017
Reaction score
Historian Mark Solonin : Koba (sralin) and his USSA Marxist empire prepared attack on Germany, clear evidence

"... and out of pity I pay." Well, you remember this joke. So now I am in the same disheveled feelings. My opponent re-takes the position of a “whipping boy”. Moreover, the whipping of the lung (for me) and cruel. To use such a situation is somehow awkward, not patsansky. On the other hand, my mother (who worked as a teacher all her life) told me: “You cannot leave a word with an error on the blackboard, the error is imprinted in the consciousness of the students, any mistake must be corrected.” Mom needs to obey. So:

1. “He (ie, Mark Solonin) did not even understand what I said. And I (i.e.Alexey Venediktov) said the following. "There is not a single document that testifies to the preparation of the attack of the Soviet Union on Nazi Germany in June of the 41st year and, in general, in the summer of the 41st year."
Well, why so substitute, Alexei Alekseevich? This is the internet. This is not a rock inscription that can be easily destroyed by blowing up a rock. The Internet remembers everything. You forgot? OK, I'm not lazy, I quote your words a second time:
“There is not a single paper testifying to the development of an operational plan for a war with Nazi Germany. There is not a single paper, not a single order on the development of the operational, no operational group has been created that creates this plan. There is nothing. There is simply nothing ... We are talking about an operational plan, about an attack. He is not there. There is no order to appoint people who should develop this plan. There is no schedule for this plan, there is no approval of the commanders in the areas of attack. There is nothing. It’s just not there, it doesn’t exist in nature ... "

Where is the "June 41st"? Where is the "summer of the 41st"? You denied having developed an operational plan for a strategic offensive against Germany. Point. The timing of the start of the operation was not discussed at all.

2. My opponent undertakes to quote one of 13 documents (in their totality reflecting both the Big Plan itself and the successive stages of its development), which I mentioned. The April (1941) Directive of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense was selected for the development of a plan for the operational deployment of troops of the Western Special Military District (future Western Front). The choice is clear (this document was published by A.N. Yakovlev in the late 90s and is easily found on the Web), but unsuccessful. It would be better to take a similar Directive for the Baltic PSB (the future North-Western Front) - there generally only defensive tasks have been set!

True, neither I, nor any other person who has at least minimal knowledge in the field of military affairs and military history, agrees that the defensive tasks assigned at the INITIAL stage of the operation to SOME units and formations on SOME sectors of the front can be considered " a refutation of the fact of the existence of a strategic offensive plan. Those with slightly more than minimal knowledge even cite paragraph 369 of the Red Army Field Manual (PU-39): “The defense pursues the goal of stubborn resistance to smash or tie the advance of the superior enemy forces with lesser forces in this direction, in order to ensure freedom of action for their troops in other directions or in the same direction, but at a different time. ”

3. Having undertaken to quote the April Directive on the development of a plan for the operational deployment of troops of the Western PSB, my opponent does this in a way that struck me to the core. Alexey Alekseevich, our readers - they can read! Why are you so substituting? "The stubborn defense of the armies of the right wing of the front in the area of the river. Neman, Lugin, Ostrolensk firmly cover the Lida and Volkovysk-Baranovichi directions, ”and so on. Everywhere is "defense."

Etc? Is defense everywhere? True? We read the document: “2. By blowing the left wing of the front in a general direction to Siedlec, Radom assist the South-Western Front to defeat the Lublin-Radom group of the enemy. The immediate task of the front is to seize the Siedlets, Lukov area and capture the crossings over the river. Wisla further bear in mind actions on the Radom with the aim of completely encircling the Lublin enemy grouping, in cooperation with the South-Western Front. ” Sedlec, Lublin, Radom - where is this? In which country? This is a “defense” to what depth (how many hundreds of kilometers) in a westerly direction?

So, we figured out the task of the left flank. And what should the center of the Western Front do at this time? We read further: "3. To ensure the main strike of the front, deliver an auxiliary strike in the direction of Warsaw, with the task of capturing Warsaw and taking out the defense on the river. Narew. " Warsaw - in which country? To defend (covering the right flank of the main strike force of the front!) At the turn of the Narev River - in what territory is it planned?

4. "In the operational plan, everything was cover, first - cover." Yes sir. “During the period of mobilization and concentration of troops - stubborn defense, relying on fortified areas, firmly covering our borders.” Namely, stubborn defense! But this is no longer worn, dear Alexei Alekseevich, even the sane part of the Stalinists from the use of such an argument has long been unlearned ...

Defense plan and cover plan. This chapter is called in my book. Check it out. It explains in detail what the difference is, and why the operation of covering the concentration and deployment of troops (a five-word term) and the defensive operation are two big differences. I do not want to crumple a serious question with a hasty retelling. BUT - the document you have chosen provides a clear example of these two big differences. We read:
“By 1941, the Military Council and the headquarters of the Western PSB should develop in the General Staff of the SC:
a) cover and defense plan for the entire period of concentration;
b) a plan for the concentration and deployment of front forces;
c) a plan for the first operation of 13 and 4 armies and a defense plan for 3 and 10 armies. ”
The 3rd and right flank of the 10th Army - this is precisely the very right flank of the Western Front, which has been assigned defensive tasks. So, the developer of the Directive, as well as the executor, understands that the plan for covering the concentration and deployment of troops, and the plan for the first operation (offensive for the 13th and 4th Armies, defensive for the 3rd and 10th) are different documents with different composition of participants, with different terms and tasks.

The presence of a plan to cover the concentration and deployment of troops is absolutely necessary (this is Feng Shui), and the cover operation (by definition) is always defensive - BUT this does not at all follow that the troops are concentrated and deployed always for defense. You will laugh, but an operation to cover the concentration and deployment of troops was also provided during the preparation for the joint invasion of Iran with the British (August 1941) - that is, in a situation where the enemy’s preemptive strike (the impoverished army was backward at that time in Persia) was slightly more likely than the fall of the moon to Earth.

5. My opponent pounds (himself) with a ladle on the forehead: “What do we see? Once again, this is not for newspapers, not for propaganda. This is a secret document, strictly secret, in one copy, to Pavlov, Tymoshenko, Zhukov. The first paragraph. “Non-aggression pacts between the USSR and Germany,” write Tymoshenko and Zhukov, “between the USSR and Italy at the present time, we can assume that they ensure a peaceful situation on our western borders." This is not the Pravda newspaper, it is a secret document. "The USSR does not think of attacking Germany and Italy," the chief of the General Staff writes to the chief of the future Western Front
I am in the know - but thanks for reminding me. This is a very interesting (significant) moment. I wrote about this almost 8 years ago (published in Military-Industrial Courier No. 25 (442) of June 27, 2012). The Internet remembers everything. I quote myself:

“Comparing documents at the district level with the general plan for the strategic deployment of the Red Army, we immediately notice one remarkable difference. District documents (directives of the people's commissar of defense and plans for the operational deployment of the district / front troops developed on the basis of these directives) begin with one standard phrase, literally verbatim (or with tiny, purely stylistic differences, such as: "meaning" instead of "taking into account" ) repeating from document to document: “Non-aggression pacts between the USSR and Germany, between the USSR and Italy at the present time, it can be assumed, ensure a peaceful situation on our western borders. The USSR does not think of attacking Germany and Italy. These states, apparently, also do not think to attack the USSR in the near future. ”
But in the main documents, in the plans for the strategic deployment of the Red Army, which the people's commissar Tymoshenko submits to Stalin, there is nothing like this props! Starting in the summer of 1940 (the first of the documents listed above), only Germany (and its weak allies: Finland, Romania, Hungary) is called as a probable adversary ... Simply put, in an effort to conceal their true intentions as much as possible ( in particular, after a radical change in these intentions after the collapse of France), Stalin misinformed even his own senior commanding staff - down to the level of generals at the headquarters of the western districts / fronts. ” (end of self-citations)

6. There would be a stop, but my opponent pushes himself further: “We remember this. Yes, there was a game, a strategic war game (January 1941 - M.S.) based on, attention, an approved operational plan. How did this game begin? The fact that the so-called “western” strike at the “eastern”, that is, from a blow from west to east, from aggression. This is how the game began. That's what happened in this operational plan! ”

You remember - and we remember. We even know how you remember this: from “Memoirs and Reflections” by G.K. Zhukov. The total circulation of more than 1 million copies. Everyone remembers. Everyone “knows” that there was such a game, Zhukov “played” for the Germans, surrounded and defeated the “Eastern” troops, and the situation of the game, as without a shadow of shame recalls the reflecting Marshal of Victory, tragically anticipated that defeat of the Western Front that actually happened in June 41st year.

Only all this lies. I am writing about this with bitterness. G.K. he has great services to our people, for only the 53rd year he needs to erect a monument ... But the truth is more expensive. The truth is accessible to all comers (and memorized by anyone who is at least a little in the subject) since 1993, from the publication of an article by Colonel P.N. Bobyleva in the Military History Journal (numbers 6,7,8). Quietly and politely, thoroughly, strictly according to the primary documents (and how they just weren’t burned?) The colonel explained that the marshal had misinterpreted EVERYTHING.

There were two “games." Two, not one. The script and course of the first Zhukov distorted beyond recognition, he completely forgot about the second.

Yes, the games were most closely tied to the development of an operational plan of war against Germany. The plans of arr. 40th year (the “August”, “September” and “October” are known) the “northern” and “southern” options were considered, i.e. offensive from Western Belarus and Lithuania through East Prussia to Berlin, or a strike from the tip of the “Lviv ledge” (Western Ukraine) to Krakow, Katowice and further to Prague and Budapest). During the first of two January (1941) "games" worked out the "northern version". As one would expect, the offensive of the "eastern" choked among the lakes and swamps of Mazovia. Zhukov commanded the “Western” there and, indeed, was able to launch a RESPONSE (!) Counterattack and even bite several dozen kilometers into Soviet territory (which can be compared with the monstrous rout of June 41, when the Germans ended up in Minsk on the seventh day of the war, t. e. 400 km from the border, as if ridiculous).

Success came only when modeling the “southern variant” - in the second January “game”. Zhukov forgot both about her and the fact that it was he (!) Who commanded the "Oriental" in this game. The most interesting thing in this game is not even that it was stopped after the “eastern” broke out to Katowice and Budapest (after which the position of the “western” and “southwest” was considered hopeless). The most important thing is that red dashed curve (see map diagram). According to the scenario of the “game”, the main strike group of the “eastern” was deployed to advance the WESTERN borders of the USSR, i.e. crossing the border and “seizing profitable borders” (as in the text of the operational plan of the South-Western Front) was carried out from the very first hours of the war, without even waiting for the completion of mobilization and concentration of troops. Here it is, active Soviet defense - the most defensive in the world.
" Google Översätt

M . Solonin books, contacts

Mark Solonin. Historian's personal webpage.Mark Solonin
www.solonin.org › ...

25 juni 2019 - Mark Solonin - historian's personal webpage. Author of bestsellers about the beginning of the nazi-soviet war at 22th june 1941. Presented the ...


Gold Member
Sep 3, 2017
Reaction score
Maskal (Russian) Specialist Lays Bare Stalin's Plan to Conquer Europe

It sometimes happens that the most significant historical works are virtually ignored by the mainstream press, and consequently reach few readers. Such is the case with many revisionist studies, including this important work by a former Soviet military intelligence officer who defected to the West in 1978. Even before the appearance of this book, he had already established a solid reputation with the publication of five books, written under the pen name of Viktor Suvorov, on the inner workings of the Soviet military, and particularly its intelligence operations.

In Icebreaker Suvorov takes a close look at the origins and development of World War II in Europe, and in particular the background to Hitler’s “Operation Barbarossa” attack against the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Since its original publication in Russian (entitled Ledokol) in France in 1988, it has been published in an astonishing 87 editions in 18 languages. In spite of its importance to the historical record, Icebreaker has received very little attention in the United States. The few reviews that have appeared here have been almost entirely brief and dismissive — a shameful treatment that reflects the cowardice and intellectual irresponsibility of a “politically correct” scholarly establishment.

According to the conventional view, Hitler’s perfidious attack abruptly forced a neutral and aloof Soviet Russia into war. This view further holds that a surprised Stalin had naively trusted the deceitful German Führer. Rejecting this view as political propaganda, Suvorov shows Stalin’s personal responsibility for the war’s outbreak and progression. Above all, this book details the vast Soviet preparations for an invasion of Europe in the summer of 1941 with the goal of Sovietizing central and western Europe. Suvorov is not alone in his view. It is also affirmed by a number of non-Russian historians, such as American scholar R. H. S. Stolfi in his 1991 study Hitler’s Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted(reviewed by me in the Nov.-Dec. 1995 Journal).

In spite of rigid Soviet censorship, Suvorov has succeeded in digging up many nuggets of valuable information from publicly available Soviet writings that confirm his central thesis. Icebreaker is based on the author’s meticulous scouring of such published sources as memoirs of wartime Soviet military leaders, and histories of individual Soviet divisions, corps, armies, fleets, and air units.

‘Second Imperialist War’
A central tenet of Soviet ideology was that the Soviet Union, as the world’s first Marxist state and bulwark of “workers’ power,” would eventually liberate all of humanity from the yoke of capitalism and fascism (the “last resort of monopoly capitalism”). While Soviet leaders might disagree about the circumstances and timing of this process of global liberation, none doubted the importance of this objective. As Suvorov notes:

“For Lenin, as for Marx, world revolution remained the guiding star, and he did not lose sight of this goal. But according to the minimum program, the First World War would only facilitate a revolution in one country. How, then, would the world revolution take place thereafter? Lenin gave a clear-cut answer to this question in 1916: as a result of the second imperialist war …”

Initially the “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” was made up of only a handful of constituent republics. Lenin and the other Soviet leaders intended that more republics would be added to the USSR until it encompassed the entire globe. Thus, writes Suvorov, “the declaration accompanying the formation of the USSR was a clear and direct declaration of war on the rest of the world.”

Hitler understood this much better than did the leaders of Britain, France or the United States. During a conversation in 1937 with Lord Halifax, one of Britain’s most important officials, he said: “In the event of a general war [in Europe], only one country can win. That country is the Soviet Union.” In Icebreaker, Suvorov explains how in 1939 Stalin exploited the long-simmering dispute between Germany and Poland over Danzig and the “Polish Corridor” to provoke a “second imperialist war” that would enormously expand the Soviet empire.

Stalin anticipated a drawn-out war of attrition in which Germany, France and Britain would exhaust themselves in a devastating conflict that would also spark Communist uprisings across Europe. And as the Soviet premier expected, “Icebreaker” Germany did indeed break up the established order in Europe. But along with nearly everyone else outside of Germany, he was astonished by the speed and thoroughness with which Hitler subdued not only Poland, but also France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Yugoslavia and Greece. Dashing Kremlin expectations that a “second imperialist war” would quickly usher in a Soviet Europe, by July 1940 Hitler was effectively master of the continent.


Throughout history, every army has had a basic mission, one that requires corresponding preparations. An army whose mission is basically defensive is accordingly trained and equipped for defensive war. It heavily fortifies the country’s frontier areas, and employs its units in echeloned depth. It builds defensive emplacements and obstacles, lays extensive minefields, and digs tank traps and ditches. Military vehicles, aircraft, weapons and equipment suitable for defending the country are designed, produced and supplied. Officers and troops are trained in defense tactics and counter-offensive operations.

An army whose mission is aggressive war acts very differently. Officers and troops are trained for offensive operations. They are supplied with weapons and equipment designed for attack, and the frontier area is prepared accordingly. Troops and their materiel are massed close to the frontier, obstacles are removed, and minefields are cleared. Maps of the areas to be invaded are issued to officers, and the troops are briefed on terrain problems, how to deal with the population to be conquered, and so forth.

Carefully examining the equipping, training and deployment of Soviet forces, as well as the numbers and strengths of Soviet weaponry, vehicles, supplies and aircraft, Suvorov establishes in great detail that the Red Army was organized and deployed in the summer of 1941 for attack, not defense.

Peculiar Tanks
Germany entered war in 1939 with 3,195 tanks. As Suvorov points out, this was fewer than a single Soviet factory in Kharkov, operating on a “peacetime” basis, was turning out every six months.

By 1941 everyone recognized the tank as the primary weapon of an army of attack in a European land war. During this period, Suvorov shows, the Soviets were producing large quantities of the well armed “Mark BT” tank, predecessor of the famed T34 model. “BT” were the initials for the Russian words “high speed tank.” The first of this series had a top speed of 100 kilometers per hour, impressive even by today’s standards. But as Suvorov goes on to note, this weapon had a peculiarity:

“Having said so many positive things about the numbers and quality of Soviet tanks, one must note one minor drawback. It was impossible to use these tanks on Soviet territory …Mark BT tanks could only be used in an aggressive war, only in the rear of the enemy and only in a swift offensive operation, in which masses of tanks suddenly burst into enemy territory …

“The Mark BT tanks were quite powerless on Soviet territory. When Hitler began Operation Barbarossa, practically all the Mark BT tanks were cast aside. It was almost impossible to use them off the roads, even with caterpillar tracks. They were never used on wheels. The potential of these tanks was never realized, but it certainly could never have been realized on Soviet territory. The Mark BT was created to operate on foreign territory only and, what is more, only on territory where there were good roads …

“To the question, where could the enormous potential of these Mark BT tanks be successfully realized, there is only one answer: in central and southern Europe. The only territories where tanks could be used, after their caterpillar tracks were removed, were Germany, France and Belgium … Caterpillar tracks are only a means for reaching foreign territory. For instance, Poland could be crossed on caterpillar tracks which, once the German autobahns had been reached, could then be discarded in favor of wheels, on which operations would then proceed …

“It is said that Stalin’s tanks were not ready for war. That was not so. They were not ready for a defensive war on their own territory. They were, however, designed to wage war on others.”

more numbers, statistic, facts: Russian Specialist Lays Bare Stalin’s Plan to Conquer Europe

USMB Server Goals

Total amount

New Topics

Most reactions - Past 7 days

Forum List