Lest We Forget: Why We Had A Financial Crisis - Forbes
"Many actors obviously played a role in this story.
"Some of the actors were in the public sector and some of them were in the private sector.
"But the public sector agencies were acting at behest of the private sector.
"ItÂ’s not as though Congress woke up one morning and thought to itself, 'LetÂ’s abolish the Glass-Steagall Act!' Or the SEC spontaneously happened to have the bright idea of relaxing capital requirements on the investment banks. Or the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency of its own accord abruptly had the idea of preempting state laws protecting borrowers.
"These agencies of government were being strenuously lobbied to do the very things that would benefit the financial sector and their managers and traders.
"And behind it all, was the drive for short-term profits."
Maybe we can all agree to blame the lobbyists?
Yeah, which lobbyists? You mean ACORN and other community groups that lobbied to lower lending standards? Yeah. Absolutely we blame them.
Whoever wrote that article from Forbes, was an idiot.
The very act of the banking business, involves risk. It's fundamental to how loaning money works. You don't know what will happen when you loan money to person X, and if they will repay or not.
Of course the banks are operating the same way they were in the past. If you legislate out risk, there would be no banking industry.
Further, of course reform didn't work. When you bailout banks, what reason do banks have to fundamentally change how they operate?
"WHY BANKS FAILED THE STRESS TEST"
Andrew G Haldane
Executive Director for Financial Stability
Bank of England
13 February 2009
Gave this report:
A few years ago, ahead of the present crisis, the Bank of England and the FSA commenced a series of seminars with financial firms, exploring their stress-testing practices. The first meeting of that group sticks in my mind. We had asked firms to tell us the sorts of stress which they routinely used for their stress-tests.
A quick survey suggested these were very modest stresses. We asked why. Perhaps disaster myopia – disappointing, but perhaps unsurprising? Or network externalities – we understood how difficult these were to capture?
No. There was a much simpler explanation according to one of those present. There was absolutely no incentive for individuals or teams to run severe stress tests and show these to management. First, because if there were such a severe shock, they would very likely lose their bonus and possibly their jobs.
Second, because in that event the authorities would have to step-in anyway to save a bank and others suffering a similar plight.
All of the other assembled bankers began subjecting their shoes to intense scrutiny. The unspoken words had been spoken. The officials in the room were aghast.
Did banks not understand that the official sector would not underwrite banks mismanaging their risks?
Yet history now tells us that the unnamed banker was spot-on. His was a brilliant articulation of the internal and external incentive problem within banks.
You people on the left don't seem to grasp this. You can make a BILLION LAWS.... all trying to mitigate risk, and it's all pointless. No amount of regulation will ever stop banks from making bad choices. No amount of laws will stop this.
The only system that will prevent banks from making bad choices, is letting them fail, and not bailing them out.
This report, where government officials interviewed bank executives, is absolute proof of why everything happened the way it did.
The banker years before the crisis, said they would likely lose their jobs, and the banks would end up bailed out anyway.
When Bear Stearns, one of the original players in the 1997 Sub-prime Freddie Mac Loan scheme, crash... the very first thing that happened was James Cayne, was fired. Alan Schwartz replaced him, but only for a few months, and he was gone. Meanwhile the company was given billions, and ultimately bond holders of Bear Stearns were paid back 100¢ on the dollar by tax payers.
In other words, the bank executives were absolutely right. They knew exactly what would happen. The government would bail them out anyway, and they would lose their jobs, so why bother mitigating risk?
This is the real problem. All that blaw blaw blaw blaw and Glass-Steagall, and leverage ratios, and capital requirements... all of that, doesn't mean anything. It's all completely irrelevant.
As long as the banks know the government will bail them out, they will never do high risk stress tests, because there's no reason to.
Lastly, the article makes some really lame points.
Glass-Steagall had nothing to do with the crash. If it had been left in place, nothing would have changed. As far as I can tell, only 3 of the major banks would have been affected by it, and 2 of those did NOT fail.
Second, relaxing capital requirements on investment banks, is also largely irrelevant. I have yet to find one single example of an investment bank that failed, that had they followed the original capital requirements, would not have failed. If you can tell me which investment bank you think would not have failed, under the original capital requirement rules, by all means post it.
Moreover, investment banks were a fraction of the banks that failed. IndyMac was not an investment bank. Countrywide was not an investment bank. Wachovia (originally First Union, one of the original 1997 sub-prime Freddie Mac lenders), was not an investment bank. AIG was not an investment bank.
All of these, and the majority of all banks that failed, were not investment banks, and did not have their capital requirements relaxed.
Lastly, preempting state laws that protect borrowers, is something I'm against, but honestly it was good from the crisis perspective.
I'm against it, because I'm against the federal government telling anyone what to do. It's not the Federal government's job to determine what protections borrowers have, or what regulations banks must follow.
However, that said.... Borrower protection, is exactly the opposite of what we want. When you protect borrowers from the fallout of making bad loans, that just increases the chances of having people make bad loans.
What do you think "strategic default" means? People intentionally default on their loans, knowing they have protections. They can declare bankruptcy, and walk away from all the debts they owe.
This is one of the reasons Canada has had no real housing price bubble, or housing price crash, because all loans are full recourse. Meaning, if you buy a house with a loan for $200,000, and you decide to strategically default... you end up losing everything. They'll chase you until the end of your life until you pay back that loan.
Consequently people are not likely to make a risky loan. They are not likely to borrow hundreds of thousands, and then walk away... because they'll lose everything, and end up garnished for years.
The article was dumb, and pointless. Focus on the
cause, not irrelevant unimportant side notes, that had nothing to do with the crash.
The cause, was government pushing bad loans. Period.