montelatici, et al,
You are trying to cherry pick and align the facts that best suits your argument.
1. Article 22 is binding on the signers. The Mandates were a product of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Covenant states:
"To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are
inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.
The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League."
The people inhabiting Palestine were overwhelmingly Muslims or Christians, Article 22 applied to them.
2. Israel started the 1967 war:
"Helms was awakened at 3:00 in the morning on 5 June by a call from the CIA Operations Center. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service had picked up reports that Israel had launched its attack. (OCI soon concluded that the Israelis— contrary to their claims—had fired first.) "
The CIA assessed that Nasser’s military presence in the Sinai was defensive, stating that “Armored striking forces could breach the UAR’s double
defense line in the Sinai in three to four days and drive the Egyptians west of the Suez Canal in seven to nine days. Israel could contain any attacks by Syria or Jordan during this period”
CIA Analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War — Central Intelligence Agency
Note: Chapter 7 of the UN Charter prohibits armed attacks.
(COMMENT)
• Article 22 does not specifically mention "ALL INHABITED PEOPLE."
• The Arab Palestinians have never demonstrated their ability to "stand alone."
• The Arab Palestinians encouraged annexation over the West Bank, and the Military Governorship in Gaza.
• Conflict ignition: After 1945, there are two exception on the matter of "use of force" ---
§ The matter of threat Chapter I, Article 2(4): The threat to use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Israel. The Arab Palestinian threats against Israel are a matter of record. This was supported by the offensive actions: (i) Demanded the UN Emergency Force withdraw, (ii) Egyptian 3d Army rushes through the UNEF lines with 800,000 troops, 1000 tanks and 900 Artillery Pieces. The UNEF I was established to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, including to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces.
§ The authorized self-defense under Chapter VII, Article 51, the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence --- taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
The CIA Analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War was an after the fact view, with the CIA as center stage.
The Reconstructing A Shattered Egyptian Army: War Minister Gen. Mohamed Fawzi’s Memoirs, 1967–1971 puts the Egyptian Army on center stage.
There is more to the way in which the view was seen. In any event, several echelons of intelligence collectors understood that a was was eminent. Egypt, Syria and Jordan were all pushing the right buttons to ignite the conflict.
The Arab-Israeli Six-Day War, June 1967
There were many indications of the coming of this conflict. From 22 May, when Nasser closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, tensions had been mounting, and the possibility of war was universally recognized. Both sides had mobilized and taken numerous other military preparedness measures. Before 1 June US intelligence was on record that Israel was capable of and ready to launch a preemptive and successful attack with little or no warning, and that there was no indication that the UAR was planning to take the military initiative. The US predictions of the likelihood and probable success of an Israeli assault were highly accurate, although the precise timing and tactics of the operation, of course, were not known to US .
The Israelis nonetheless achieved almost total tactical surprise against the Arabs in their attacks on the morning of 5 June, particularly in the decisively effective air strikes. The Israelis screened their plans by a combination of rigid security (there was no leak of their decisions or final military preparations) and an exceptionally well-planned and effective deception campaign. There were several facets of the deception plan, one of which was to lead Egypt to believe that the attack, if it occurred, would be in the southern Sinai rather than the north. In addition, numerous measures were taken in the several days prior to the attack to create the impression that attack was not imminent. These included public statements by newly appointed Defense Minister Moshe Dayan that Israel would rely on diplomacy for the present, the issuance of leave to several thousand Israeli soldiers over the weekend of 3-4 June, public announcements that concurrent Israeli cabinet meetings were concerned only with routine matters, and so forth. In addition, the attack was planned for an hour of the morning when most Egyptian officials would be on their way to work and when the chief of the Egyptian Air Force usually took his daily morning flights.
Most Respectfully,
R
