Our elite forces killed "by" the Taliban

[Wicked Jester]

damn taliban. Bunch of candy asses. If only the liberals would get out of our way, we could really kick their asses instead of playing slap-dick all the time!

yeah well, i sure remember during several ff's a god damn liberal poppin' up and tellin' us how to conduct ourselves among the enemy..........you know, kill 'em softly with dignity and respect.

no shit, there i was. Up to my elbow in suntan lotion and mre spoons when jane fucking fonda showed up to take charge of my company as the new company commander.

I shit you not. It fucking happened. I was there. You think i would make this shit up?

lmao!

 

[The Gadfly]

I edited my post about it.

I don't agree. They still value symbolism.

In any event, it may very well be true, as you suggest, that it IS very unlikely.

That would make me feel a little better. Not a lot. But at least a bit.

Pffft. A Chinook is a big fat target. If you are a Taliban fighter with an RPG and you have a reasonable chance of hitting one, you are going to take that shot whether you know it's full of SEALs or completely empty. It doesn't equate to a grand conspiracy. Shit happens in combat.

I doubt this was a set up. I suspect it was just bad luck.

That last would be my guess at this point, Geaux. As for the rest of some of the "discussion", here, several things come to mind.

First, this is NOT Vietnam; it's another insurgency, and that's about where the similarity ends. Some key points that come to mind: (1) such ROE problems as we had in Vietnam were more of a strategic than tactical nature.For instance, there were key targets off limits to airstrikes, and we could not pursue NVA and VC across the border and finish them, after mauling them; they had a built-in sanctuary in which to refit and regroup. ROE in day-to-day operations normally did NOT pose a problem, in my experience. (2) Our primary problem was poor planning and lack of direction on the part of the NCA. As of 1964 the counterinsurgency mission had been largely tasked to SF; consequently, when the build-up occurred we had little to no effective conventional force counterinsurgency doctrine; as a result, that doctrine largely had to be made up on the fly. In retrospect, it's amazing it worked as well as it did, though I do think the learning curve cost us a lot of casualties. (3) There was a tendency for the NCA and MACV staff to underestimate the capability of the enemy (both the VC and the NVA). Those in the bush knew better. One big problem with fighting "amateurs", as opposed to a conventional professional army, is that the former are a good deal less predictable. I'll defer to those of you who have fought this particular group of bad guys, but my guess is that's still much the same. I would expect this enemy to adapt, and to use his "home field advantage" to maximum effect; any insurgent force with any staying power at all is going to do that.

Lessons learned: we now have a better grasp of how to effectively use both conventional and unconventional forces in the counterinsurgency role. There is a better understanding that an insurgent force is NOT static; it can and will evolve and adapt its strategy and tactics. We are now more aggressive in attempting to cut the enemy off from his "safe areas"-apparently, that is exactly what was being done in this instance.

In any event, we didn't "lose" in Vietnam because of "restrictive ROE". In fact , militarily, we won, in spite of incoherent strategic planning and inconsistent direction. Fundamentally, we lost the fruits of that military victory, because we lost a political and public relations war on the home front; given the climate that developed there, what we did in the field ultimately did not much matter. I do hope we do not let that happen again.

Again, I'll defer to those who have been on the ground there, but it appears to me most of what we are doing In Afghanistan is basically sound. Unfortunately, we can;t take out all the bad guys with drones and precision air strikes. It's still often necessary to go in and root them out, just like it was in 'Nam; only this time with a different enemy, in very different terrain and a very different cultural environment, which would seem to pose its own unique set of problems.

 

[Wicked Jester]

I don't agree. They still value symbolism.

In any event, it may very well be true, as you suggest, that it IS very unlikely.

That would make me feel a little better. Not a lot. But at least a bit.

Pffft. A Chinook is a big fat target. If you are a Taliban fighter with an RPG and you have a reasonable chance of hitting one, you are going to take that shot whether you know it's full of SEALs or completely empty. It doesn't equate to a grand conspiracy. Shit happens in combat.

I doubt this was a set up. I suspect it was just bad luck.

That last would be my guess at this point, Geaux. As for the rest of some of the "discussion", here, several things come to mind.

First, this is NOT Vietnam; it's another insurgency, and that's about where the similarity ends. Some key points that come to mind: (1) such ROE problems as we had in Vietnam were more of a strategic than tactical nature.For instance, there were key targets off limits to airstrikes, and we could not pursue NVA and VC across the border and finish them, after mauling them; they had a built-in sanctuary in which to refit and regroup. ROE in day-to-day operations normally did NOT pose a problem, in my experience. (2) Our primary problem was poor planning and lack of direction on the part of the NCA. As of 1964 the counterinsurgency mission had been largely tasked to SF; consequently, when the build-up occurred we had little to no effective conventional force counterinsurgency doctrine; as a result, that doctrine largely had to be made up on the fly. In retrospect, it's amazing it worked as well as it did, though I do think the learning curve cost us a lot of casualties. (3) There was a tendency for the NCA and MACV staff to underestimate the capability of the enemy (both the VC and the NVA). Those in the bush knew better. One big problem with fighting "amateurs", as opposed to a conventional professional army, is that the former are a good deal less predictable. I'll defer to those of you who have fought this particular group of bad guys, but my guess is that's still much the same. I would expect this enemy to adapt, and to use his "home field advantage" to maximum effect; any insurgent force with any staying power at all is going to do that.

Lessons learned: we now have a better grasp of how to effectively use both conventional and unconventional forces in the counterinsurgency role. There is a better understanding that an insurgent force is NOT static; it can and will evolve and adapt its strategy and tactics. We are now more aggressive in attempting to cut the enemy off from his "safe areas"-apparently, that is exactly what was being done in this instance.

In any event, we didn't "lose" in Vietnam because of "restrictive ROE". In fact , militarily, we won, in spite of incoherent strategic planning and inconsistent direction. Fundamentally, we lost the fruits of that military victory, because we lost a political and public relations war on the home front; given the climate that developed there, what we did in the field ultimately did not much matter. I do hope we do not let that happen again.

Again, I'll defer to those who have been on the ground there, but it appears to me most of what we are doing In Afghanistan is basically sound. Unfortunately, we can;t take out all the bad guys with drones and precision air strikes. It's still often necessary to go in and root them out, just like it was in 'Nam; only this time with a different enemy, in very different terrain and a very different cultural environment, which would seem to pose its own unique set of problems.

Most of what we are doing over there is sound, fly.........It's a hell of a dichotemy as far as the different tribes and what not. The whole make up of the population I can only describe as bizarre. It truly is like the wild west. Cowboys versus indians so to speak......We being the Cowboys, they being all the indians. Some tribes get along, Some tribes don't. Some tribes are friendly, others will cut your throat. Feuds between different tribes have been going on for many generations. One tribe will rat out another tribe one day in order to appear friendly, the next day they're ratting your position out, or downright firing on you.....One thing about that place also. If you could go back in time in many areas, say 3-4-500 years, you would not notice one bit of difference other than more modern footwear, weaponry, etc........It's like many areas are completely stuck in time, and the people there are steadfastly wanting to keep it that way. They want nothing to do with change whatsoever. It's a damn trippy place.

I'll tell ya' though, there is one element over there who isn't getting a lot of press and glory for what they are doing, and I KNOW they don't care, and that's the BERET'S. Those dudes are doing amazing work. They are in various regions making the contact with those tribes. Speaking the language. Blending in. Building relationships. Gaining the respect of the tribal elders. Bringing tribes together who may not necessarily get along. Gathering the intel that really matters, while still pulling combat missions in between.

After all is said and done, we should hear some amazing stories of exactly what these guys have done and are continuing to do. They damn sure should get the props they deserve.

BTW, as far as Vietnam, you guys won your end of the war. The tough end of the war. And should ALWAYS be proud for doing so........It's the rat bastard politicians and beurocrats who lost their end of the war. The cakes and cookies part of the war, and should ALWAYS feel like shit for doing so........IMHO.

 

[High_Gravity]

Why such a big deal over this chopper getting shot down and the troops all killed?
Not minimizing their deaths in any way, just curious about all the hoopla over this incident.

Many have died in Afganistan and will continue to die as long as we stay there.

Its because of the number of people and they were Special Forces, SEALS etc we never lost 30 people in 1 strike during the whole 10 years of this war. If this happened all the time, people wouldn't be as shocked and saddened.

 

[Brian175]

I don't know if the Ranger decal is real. My guess is that it is phony. You sissies make my point though. You don't really want to kill the bad guys. You want to pretend the whole thing is a hollywood movie.

Sissies? Not wanting to kill civilians is sissy? Look here, motherfucker, I've had two bunk mates die overseas, one shot in the face, the other in a helicopter crash. PFC Min Sun and PFC Kristopher Thomas, look them up. Two of my current roommates in my house have literally had men die in their arms while awaiting casevac, their names SGT Lugo and SSG Pape. A former TL, who taught me everything about Rangering as a young Private, SSG Dahlke was shot in the neck and died almost instantly. I can ring off every name of every 1/75 Ranger that has died in the GWOT and the list is pretty long. A few of them were drinking buddies. I think you need to be real careful with who you go around calling a sissy.