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All you are doing is proving how ineffective massive centralized control of airport security is.
Each airport and its client airlines should be responsible for security in a decentralized manner.
All you're doing is not answering either of my two questions. Are you suggesting that the people checking for security at airports be from private companies as well?
That's three questions for you to answer now. To recap:
1.) What distinguishing features did the 9/11 hijackers have that would of had you pull them out of line other than the fact they looked Muslim?
2.) How will we have the Israeli system work for us?
3.) Are you suggesting that the people checking for security at airports be from private companies as well?
Again, while the Israel system may work for them as they are a much smaller country with a lot less airports, the same system may not work in such a larger country with a lot more airports like the U.S. Or at the very least be not as efficient.
true the numbers are huge, but so is our TSA org. Do you know how many member's the TSA employs?
I made this point in another thread, we train half their number in the Israeli paradigm then shift away from so many searches by chance per se and use this method in its place for that half.
There is no reason why we cannot employ more methods OR at the very least give it a try. The odds would not be any much less as to a pop screening which is what we do since we don't seacrh everyone now anyway, we allow a computer to choose for us, which in my opinion is totally ridiculous...a computer generated list? Based on some logarithm? Every 5th, 10th, whatever, you must know that leaves a lot to be desired.
Transportation Security Administration - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
56,221 people. How many of those people can be trained to be highly professional and efficient security screeners like they have in Israel? Then you have to account for the cost of doing that, and time for using Israel's methods.
Don't get me wrong, I don't like the current TSA methods anymore than you do. However, at the same time, you can see why I would not want to use methods that would clearly have trouble working for us.
Israel also questions every passenger, or least that's what I've read. Again, that works for smaller airports, however wouldn't it be more difficult for the U.S with not only a larger volume of passengers but also airports?
I think its doable, in the end Mod you know that the edge we get from all of this pop searching etc. is the intimidation deterrent factor, the fear we generate that a T has that they will be picked out , they know its random , but even then there is always the chance. I think that's why we have created enough hurdles already to an including the "grope and scope" and why they may not ever use this type of mechanism to attempt a T act again. Its to iffy.
And the more numerous types of methodology we use the more intimidated they will be.
And let me say I don't have heartache fundamentally with the screen/scanner use. But it needs work, ever see Total Recall? ? Like that, thats what we need.
All you are doing is proving how ineffective massive centralized control of airport security is.
Each airport and its client airlines should be responsible for security in a decentralized manner.
All you're doing is not answering either of my two questions. Are you suggesting that the people checking for security at airports be from private companies as well?
That's three questions for you to answer now. To recap:
1.) What distinguishing features did the 9/11 hijackers have that would of had you pull them out of line other than the fact they looked Muslim?
2.) How will we have the Israeli system work for us?
3.) Are you suggesting that the people checking for security at airports be from private companies as well?
Again, while the Israel system may work for them as they are a much smaller country with a lot less airports, the same system may not work in such a larger country with a lot more airports like the U.S. Or at the very least be not as efficient.
My first question has been ignored for the past hour. And my other questions have simply been brushed aside with the "Well blame the centralization!"
true the numbers are huge, but so is our TSA org. Do you know how many member's the TSA employs?
I made this point in another thread, we train half their number in the Israeli paradigm then shift away from so many searches by chance per se and use this method in its place for that half.
There is no reason why we cannot employ more methods OR at the very least give it a try. The odds would not be any much less as to a pop screening which is what we do since we don't seacrh everyone now anyway, we allow a computer to choose for us, which in my opinion is totally ridiculous...a computer generated list? Based on some logarithm? Every 5th, 10th, whatever, you must know that leaves a lot to be desired.
Transportation Security Administration - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
56,221 people. How many of those people can be trained to be highly professional and efficient security screeners like they have in Israel? Then you have to account for the cost of doing that, and time for using Israel's methods.
Don't get me wrong, I don't like the current TSA methods anymore than you do. However, at the same time, you can see why I would not want to use methods that would clearly have trouble working for us.
Israel also questions every passenger, or least that's what I've read. Again, that works for smaller airports, however wouldn't it be more difficult for the U.S with not only a larger volume of passengers but also airports?
I think its doable, in the end Mod you know that the edge we get from all of this pop searching etc. is the intimidation deterrent factor, the fear we generate that a T has that they will be picked out , they know its random , but even then there is always the chance. I think that's why we have created enough hurdles already to an including the "grope and scope" and why they may not ever use this type of mechanism to attempt a T act again. Its to iffy.
And the more numerous types of methodology we use the more intimidated they will be.
And let me say I don't have heartache fundamentally with the screen/scanner use. But it needs work, ever see Total Recall? ? Like that, thats what we need.
My first question has been ignored for the past hour. And my other questions have simply been brushed aside with the "Well blame the centralization!"
1.) What distinguishing features did the 9/11 hijackers have that would of had you pull them out of line other than the fact they looked Muslim?
Here's what:
- They were taking FLYING lessons.
- They had patterns of behavior prior to getting on a plane that should have put them on a watch list.
thats sorta of an unfair question, I have no idea, how could I?How could you?
No, but it is more of an issue with him since he voted against funding explosives detection systems for airports...which would have avoided to a large extent these pat downs and xrays.you've never flown out of DC, then. there's always some asshole congressdildo/senator doing the do you know who i am dance.
failExactly my point. Special treatment.
so it's only an issue when it's boehner?
Okay. However, they still have to be screened. Boehner did not.Please provide a link to back this up.I wonder how often any of you fly.
I travel quite a bit for business. In international airports, the people who pay for first class and premium tickets are often provided with special security lines to get through the crowd more quickly. I've seen special passes at some that allow the holder to go through an area where they bypass the searches altogether.
Boehner is flying first class. If I paid for a first class ticket, I would expect something for the incremental $Ks cost besides free beverages.
In our country, America, the only special lines first class passengers get are at the ticket counter. Everyone gets in the same line to go through security.
Except the wheelchair bound, of course.
Wrong.
There have always been special queues for first-class check-in and boarding. Those are part of a private transaction between an airline and a customer. But two-tiered security checks are a different story. Airport security, after all, is not a business transaction. It is justified as national defense, mandated by federal law, overseen by the Transportation Security Administration and carried out by either the T.S.A. or a private security service under its ultimate authority. It exists in its present form because of the national emergency of Sept. 11, 2001. It is financed by a Sept. 11 security fee that all fliers pay.
The T.S.A., whenever it is called on the carpet (which is often) about the two-tiered system it countenances, responds with the same piece of casuistry. The rich are scanned the same way as everyone else, the T.S.A. insists, but the formation of the queues themselves is not our department. That real estate in front of the checkpoint is owned by the airlines, one spokeswoman told USA Today in 2006. (The law is not crystal clear. It gives supervisory responsibility for the entire airport to a T.S.A. federal security director.)
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/11/magazine/11wwln-lede-t.html?_r=1
I typically fly business class. During my last trip to Paris, I went through expedited security lines for premium members at both SFO and DeGaulle.
My biggest problem with taking the Israeli method is the uncertainly of how good it would work for a number of reasons that I have already mentioned. First and foremost being you're taking a system used in 48 airports with a vast amount of less passengers and going to use it in over 15,000 airports.
) my point was the comparative look, I am sure the number in in use comparatively is pretty large too. So comparatively we have more bodies. And as I inferred not every single one of them needs to be an "expert". I think the biggest problem for the TSA is the same problem that the CIA has. They don't have nearly enough people who they need to carry out their objectives in a proficient manner. Due to that, they have to take what they can get in many cases, which doesn't go well when it comes to our national security.
They don't have nearly enough people who they need to carry out their objectives in a proficient manner.
No you're not. You refuse to see what is plain and clear. The evidence was there; the system didn't allow the dots to be connected.
Complete 911 Timeline: Flight Training Undergone by Alleged 9/11 Hijackers
No. But that hardly matters. I'm not either and yet I am treated like one.Do you think Boehner is a terrorist threat who will hijack the airplane?
No you're not. You refuse to see what is plain and clear. The evidence was there; the system didn't allow the dots to be connected.
Complete 911 Timeline: Flight Training Undergone by Alleged 9/11 Hijackers
You seem to be ignoring the fundamental part of my question. What behavior profiling on 9/11 could of been used to pull the hijackers out of line outside the fact they were Muslim? The failure of the system has nothing to do with what I'm asking. I'm looking at what the people at the airport could of done. We're not talking about the obvious failure of the system on multiple levels. Otherwise I could also mention that several of the hijackers were in this country on expired student visas.
