Exactly wrong.
[1] The thrust of his claim is that the Militia is a creature of Congress. Bullshit! You know that's not true.
Congress is given the power to "provide for calling forth the militia," §8, cl. 15; and the power not to create, but to "organiz[e]" it—and not to organize "a" militia, which is what one would expect if the Militia were to be a federal creation, but to organize "the" Militia, connoting a body already in existence, ibid., cl. 16. This is fully consistent with the ordinary definition of the Militia as all able-bodied men. —Supreme Court of the United States (District of Columbia v. Heller), Page 23
[2] Whether the Second Amendment entailed a collective or an individual right, it would be about defending/securing against tyranny. But, of course, you're a lying ass dog. It's an individual right, and always has been just like the Court unanimously observed in
Heller. The 5-to-4 split in the decision was over the issue of regulation, not over the nature of the right. Obviously, if the right were not individually enforceable, the collective right of the Militia would be meaningless and unenforceable against the federal government given that the militias are subject to congressional control as "employed in the Service of the United States" for the purpose of national defense.
The Court held in
Heller:
1. The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.
(a) The Amendment's prefatory clause announces a purpose, but does not limit or expand the scope of the second part, the operative clause. The operative clause's text and history demonstrate that it connotes an individual right to keep and bear arms.
(b) The prefatory clause comports with the Court's interpretation of the operative clause. The "militia" comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. The Antifederalists feared that the Federal Government would disarm the people in order to disable this citizens' militia, enabling a politicized standing army or a select militia to rule. The response was to deny Congress power to abridge the ancient right of individuals to keep and bear arms, so that the ideal of a citizens' militia would be preserved.
(c) The Court's interpretation is confirmed by analogous arms-bearing rights in state constitutions that preceded and immediately followed the Second Amendment.
(d) The Second Amendment's drafting history, while of dubious interpretive worth, reveals three state Second Amendment proposals that unequivocally referred to an individual right to bear arms.
(e) Interpretation of the Second Amendment by scholars, courts and legislators, from immediately after its ratification through the late 19th century also supports the Court's conclusion.
(f) None of the Court's precedents forecloses the Court's interpretation. Neither United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, nor Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, refutes the individual-rights interpretation. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, does not limit the right to keep and bear arms to militia purposes, but rather limits the type of weapon to which the right applies to those used by the militia, i.e., those in common use for lawful purposes.
Be sure to pay especially close attention to the last paragraph in bold. Ain't that a daisy? Let's replay part of that again:
None of the Court's precedents forecloses the Court's [individual-rights] interpretation.
The Court has never held it to be a mere collective right per the Militia.
Also see: Supreme Court Gun-Ban Ruling Buries "Collective Rights" Theory - Competitive Enterprise Institute