The provocative Yale Law Review conclusions are in no way supported by the Constitution.
So now you are a loosy goosy Progressive big government liberal.
Stay here with me. You will learn a lot you need to know because you are generally clueless.
Articles I, II, and III respectively define the tenures, including the conditions that can terminate tenure, for the principal legislative, executive, and judicial officials. For example, Article I provides that a Senator’s tenure terminates upon the expiration of a six-year term, by
“Resignation, or otherwise,” or (in the case of a Senator appointed to fill a vacancy) upon
“the next Meeting of the [state] Legislature.” Similarly, Article III conditions a judge’s tenure on continued
“good Behaviour”; the clear implication is that misbehavior can terminate a judge’s stay in office.
In addition to other tenure-terminating contingencies, Article II, Section 4 provides for impeachment as an alternative means of removal:
“The President, Vice President and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.” This additional means of removal does not negate or displace other tenure-terminating provisions. Everyone concedes this point with respect to executive officials; no one thinks that because a Secretary of State can be impeached, he or she can be removed only through impeachment. There is no reason for a different conclusion with respect to judges. In fact, the impeachment provisions do not single out or even expressly mention judges: like Secretaries of State, judges are simply included in the general category of “civil officers of the United States.”
Nor does Article III’s good behavior provision suggest that it merely cross-references Article II’s impeachment provision. To the contrary, the “good Behaviour” requirement is manifestly not identical to the standard for impeachment: “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.” The separate standards corroborate what the natural reading of the separated impeachment and “good Behaviour” provisions already suggests, namely, that these provisions refer to independent tenure-terminating contingencies.