preemptingyou03
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http://www.worldthreats.com/middle_east/IraqKoreaNam.htmVietraq
Dispelling Preconceived Notions
By Nicholas M. Guariglia
March 20, 2006
Oftentimes pundits and analysts view historical comparisons as binary analogies. Either the reference to previous events is unquestionable and absolute, or absurd and out of touch. Such is the case with our present conflict in Iraq, where many opponents of the decision to intervene claim we are either in, or are heading towards, a Vietnam-like scenario, while supporters of the effort tend to offer differences as evidence that ours is far easier the war.
Vietnam was admittedly before my time, and my purpose is not to rehash old debates and regurgitate the old justifications for either why containing Marxism in Southeast Asia was worthwhile, or why the whole endeavor was unwarranted. The purpose is, however, to review the comparisons between the Vietnam and Iraqi conflicts, while dispelling some of the preconceived notions regarding them both.
First and foremost, both wars were initially popular by an either supportive or apathetic American public. Conscription, unclear goals, and far greater violence eventually lead to a decline in support for Vietnam, whereas a continued insurrection three years after the fall of Husseins statue understandably worries our soccer moms. But we must remember that, initially, the majority of Americans supported toppling the fascists in Baghdad. One can conclude that, minus the present violence, support for the Iraqi war in retrospect viewing it in the past tense would change some minds. We have yet to reach that moment, though, because the bombs have not completely subsided.
Both wars also had one tactical commonality: U.S. forces faced mainly asymmetrical enemies on the battlefield. Be it a Vietnamese child strapped with a bomb or a booby-trapped body in the streets of Ramadi, the American tale to tell in both wars was largely one of counterinsurgency. In both instances, there was fierce debate as to how we got into each war Gulf of Tonkin, chemical weapons, etc. while supporters of the respective campaigns urged opponents to look beyond that and see the bigger picture in containing communist expansionism and promoting Middle Eastern liberalization.
But the resemblances seem to end there. In both strategic and tactical terms, I have yet to see a critic who advocates the Vietnam-Iraq comparison offer any other deep-rooted likeness that can be agreed upon by everyone. For some, the similarities listed above are enough to decline support for both. But what exactly are the differences? And how can we distinguish the two, using mistakes in the former to our benefit in the latter?
Consider the strategic, tactical, geopolitical, and moral contrasts: Vietnam was a war of conscription with a national draft, in which 3.4-percent of the U.S. military deserted to places like Canada. Although the Associated Press opted to title their misleading headline something to the effect of, 8,000 Desertions Since Iraq War, readers of the article would find out several paragraphs down that that is the lowest level of desertion in years. Retention rates are high, and the Americans in Iraq are either enlisted privates or college-graduate commissioned officers representing the single most professional institution in the world. To those roughly 129,998 of 130,000 soldiers who make it alive each day, they are experiencing, firsthand, real-time conflict, refining their instincts and reinforcing what theyve learned. There is no better battle-hardened entity on the planet.
Whereas in Vietnam the U.S. was protecting an undemocratic South Vietnam hoping an anticommunist authoritarian government could gradually democratize à la South Korea the geopolitical effort in Iraq is quite different. Rather than protect or reinstall friendly autocrats, as we had done in Vietnam and in 1991 with the Kuwaiti monarchy, the U.S. effort in Iraq can legitimately be considered an idealistic attempt to foster democratic self-rule. Illiberal and imperfect, for sure but then again, consider the ramifications had we dropped the interim title from Mr. Allawi, or told the Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani to remain quiet as he called for elections, or sent Paul Bremer back in late 2005 to write the Iraqi constitution.
Which leads us to perhaps the most glaring difference, and that is the characteristics of each war theater. Americans (other than an out-of-power Reagan) never sought or spoke of toppling the North Vietnamese regime. With goals that could be paralleled to that of our war in Korea, we never once had the military equivalent of crossing the DMZ, en masse. We were battling the conventional North Vietnamese armed forces in southern territory that they occupied. In the South, the nation we were supposedly defending gave us Marxist and nationalist guerrillas to conspire with the North, forcing Americans to ask, Whom are we protecting anyway? The equation is almost wholly different today: it is the old Iraqi government we overthrew, the new one we protect, the old Iraqi military we destroyed, the new one we train, and Iraqi territory we already occupy. Hussein not the romantic figure Ho Chi Minh was deemed to be was toppled, his sons killed, his men arrested, himself humiliated and now on trial.
And is difficulty no longer a valid barometer? Force-levels in Southeast Asia were at times at a half-million; the war in Babylon showcases one-fifth that of a presence (with gradual reductions within sight). Where we roughly lose two soldiers per day in Iraq, totaling a little over 2,300 thus far, the effort in Vietnam saw approximately 58,200 U.S. fatalities. And we must remember the North Vietnamese had sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos, with nuclear sponsors in Moscow and Beijing. To date in Iraq, the Syrian border has been largely pacified through operations in the Al Anbar province, jihadist-run cities have been taken back, and no such adversarial nuclear superpower (like the Soviets) exists.
We must remember that, for all its difficulties, Vietnam was still a winnable conflict up until the end. With antiwar sentiment at home, an unwilling Congress, and a poor peace accord, a reinvading North Vietnam and the subsequent collapse of Saigon proved to be too much for a recommitment of American aid. What followed, needless to say, was horrific both inside our military and abroad with Soviet expansionism in places like the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia.
For all the talk of a Rumsfeldian obsession with quick and light tactics and low force-levels, the civilians in the Pentagon have and are listening to the commanders on the ground in Iraq, both in regards to force-levels and tactics. This was not the case with the Johnson administration, where almost every aspect of the war was micromanaged from the Oval Office. So taking into account the distinctiveness of each war, with the stark differences and analogous similarities the body-bag syndrome, being the most prominent how could the comparison between the two wars work?
For a moment envision the following hypothetical scenario: U.S. troops, mostly drafted, are fighting the Iraqi military, on the orders of the Iraqi government, in Iraqi-occupied Kuwait, attempting to protect an autocratic Kuwaiti government. The fighting has lasted a decade with tens of thousands of U.S. fatalities, around three million Kuwaiti and Iraqi deaths, and an imaginary nuclear Arabist superpower curtailing our options while they subsidize, arm, and aid the Iraqis. Rather than have graciousness on the part of the Kuwaiti population, there is an underground Hussein-sympathetic, anti-U.S., VC-like guerrilla movement of Kuwaiti insurgents that perceives the Americans not as protectors of an invading Iraqi army, but as exploiters and defenders of their own unelected oil-pumping monarchy.
Until we withdraw from Iraq, move into Kuwait, institute a national draft, disband the new Iraqi military, overthrow the new Iraqi government, reinstall good-ole Saddam, allow him to reconstitute his old vanguard paramilitaries and imperialistic army, invite him to invade Kuwait, give a make-believe Arab empire nuclear weapons, lose an additional 56,000 souls, and kill an additional 2.97 million civilians, the rhetoric about Vietraq simply doesnt hold any water.
