You posted questionable testimony. An orchestrated Court of Inquiry is not a formal investigation in which witnesses are summoned and cross-examined. That is how facts are determined.
Have the survivors of or witnesses to any of the foregoing incidents argued that they were anything other than accidents? Do you believe there is any more qualified to describe what happened than those who were there? Friendly fire incidents typically occur consequent to and within the framework of a momentary error, such as a missile launch. The Liberty was under attack for two solid hours and it involved aircraft and PT boats that frequently came close enough to be clearly identified by the Liberty's crew.
Thanks for putting your foot in your mouth. You said the facts are determined by a formal investigation in which witnesses are summoned and cross examined. "That's how facts are determined," you said.
The testimony says that the flag was hard to see because of calm waters, and it was shot away early in the fight.
It also says that there were a lot of communication erroris and the ships wasn't were it was supposed to be.
Also the first rescuers of the ship were the Israelis.
From US Naval Court of Inquiry
It's not the whole think since it's pretty long.
USS LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY
I now request Captain Raish to read these messages.
Captain Raish: Exhibit 1 is a Joint Chiefs of Staff Secret
message 011545Z JUN 67 from JCS to USCINCEUR, info CNO,
CINCLANTFLT, CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, CTF 64, USS LIBERTY,
DIRNSA, NSAEUR, DIRNAVSECGRU, ADIRNAVSECGRU,
DIRNAVSECGRULANT, DIRNAVSECGRUEUR, subject USS LIBERTY SKED,
reference DIRNSA G/104/311906Z (NOTAL-BOM). 1. When RFS
request sail LIBERTY in accordance with the following
schedule: A. 2 June depart Rota. B. 2-8 June ENROUTE VIA
GIBRALTAR STRAIT CPA AS PERMITS. THEN VIA NORTHERN AFRICA
COASTAL ROUTE TO POSIT 32-00N 33-00E. CAP MOROCCO MALTA 8
NM CLAIMED DIST 3 NM. CPA SPAIN TUNISIA SARDINIA SICILY
CRETE 7 NM CLAIMS EFBDIT(?) 6 NM. CPA ALGERIA LIBYA UAR 13
NM CLAIMED DIST 12 NM. C. 9-30 JUNE CONDUCT OPS SOUTH OF
32-00N AND BETWEEN 33-00E AND 34-00E.
[3]
WHILE CONDUCTING OPS CPA UAR 12.5 NM CPA ISREAL 6.5 NM. 2.
REQUEST JCS (JRC) CNO CINCLANT (JRC) CINCLANTFLT BE INCLUDED
AS INFO ADDEES ON ALL MOVREPS, DAILY SITREP AND INCIDENT
REPORTS. 3. ENROUTE TECH TASKING LAW RE?. 4. PROCEDURES
FOR DEVELOPING JULY SKED FOLLOW. Exhibit 2 is a Joint
Chief's of Staff message, Confidential 072230Z JUN 67, from
JCS to USCINCEUR, info CNO, CINCLANT, CINCLANTFLT,
CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, CTF 67, USS LIBERTY, HQNASAEUR,
NASAEUR OFF GERMANY, DIRNSA, DIRNAVSECGRU, ADIRNAVSECGRU,
DIRNAVSECGRULANT, DIRNAVSECGRUEUR, subject USS LIBERTY,
reference JCS 6724/011545Z JUN 67. 1. IN VIEW PRESENT
SITUATION EAST MED, OPERATING AREA SPECIFIED REF FOR
GUIDANCE ONLY AND MAY BE VARIED AS LOCAL CONDITIONS
DICTATE. 2. CHANGE CPA UAR TO 20 NM, ISRAEL 15 NM. Exhibit
3 is a Joint Chiefs of Staff Top Secret message 080110Z JUN
67, from JCS to USCINCEUR, info CNO, CINCLANT, CINCLANTFLT,
CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, CTF 64, USS LIBERTY, HQNSAVEUR,
NSAEUR OFF GERMANY, DIRNSA, DIRNAVSECGRU, ADIRNAVSECGRU,
DIRNAVSECGRULANT, DIRNAVSECGRUEUR, subject USS LIBERTY,
references A. JCS 7337/072230Z JUN 67, B. COMSIXTHFLT
071503Z JUN 67 (NOTAL), 1. CANCEL REF A. 2. REQ LIBERTY
COMPLY NEW OP AREAS DEFINED LAST SENTENCE PARA 2 REP B,
UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE, I.E., NOT CLOSER THAN 100 NM TO
ISRAEL, SYRIA, EGYPT AND 25 NM to CYPRUS. Exhibit 4 is a
COMSIXTHFLT Secret message 080917Z JUN 67, from COMSIXTHFLT
to USS LIBERTY, subject USS LIBERTY OPERATIONS, references
A. JCS 011545Z JUN 67, B. JCS 080110Z JUN 67, C. COMSIXTHFLT
062349Z JUN 67. 1. PARA 1 REF C is MODIFIED BY REF B.
PROCEED IMMED TO OPERATE WITHIN A 25 MILE RADIUS OF POSIT
33-40N/32-30E UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. DO NOT APPROACH COAST
OF UAR, ISRAEL, SYRIA OR LEBANON CLOSER THAN ONE HUNDRED
MILES AND CYPRUS CLOSER THAN TWENTY FIVE MILES. 2. NO TASK,
ORGANIZATION ASSIGNED TO LIBERTY, 3. ACKNOWLEDGE. Exhibit 5
is a COMSIXTHFLT Secret message 101205Z JUN 67, from
COMSIXTHFLT to CINCUSNAVEUR, references A, CINCUSNAVEUR
101036Z JUN 67, B. JCS 080110Z JUN 67. 1. REF A TAKEN FOR
ACTION, 2. ACCORDING TO CO, USS LIBERTY, REF B AND ALL
ASSOCIATED MESSAGES TO PASS CONTENT OF REF F WERE NOT
RECEIVED ON BOARD LIBERTY PRIOR TO ATTACK.
[4]
Q. From the information in the exhibits, was USS LIBERTY at
the time of the attack, at the position that she was ordered
to proceed to?
A. Yes, however, she did not receive two key messages which
in effect canceled the orders under which she was operating.
Q. Which are the two key messages you are referring to.
A. JCS 080110Z and COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z.
Q. Will you please explain to the Court, in a narrative
manner, the substance of these messages and the
applicability of the messages to USS LIBERTY ?
A. LIBERTY was operating pursuant to a JCS message,
011545Z, June 67, which directed her to proceed to position
32o North, 33 East. These orders were later modified by JCS
072230Z, which specified that the operating area specified
in JCS 011545Z was for guidance only and may be varied as
local conditions dictate. This message also indicated
"change the CPA to UAR to 20 NM and Israel 15 NM. The next
message, JCS 080110Z, a Top Secret message directed
USCINCEUR to change the operating area of LIBERTY such that
she remained at least 100 miles off the coast of Syria,
Israel, and UAR, and at least 25 miles off the coast of
Cyprus. This message was also info to several addees
including CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, and USS LIBERTY.
Action on this message was directed to CONSIXTHFLT.
Q. Is there any information available that LIBERTY received
the JCS message 080110Z?
A. The LIBERTY did not receive that message.
Q. On what basis do you form that opinion?
A. I form that opinion on the information received from
COMSIXTHFLT, who had queried the Captain of the LIBERTY,
COMMSIXTHFLT 101205Z.
Q. In other words, it is clear and certain that USS LIBERTY
did not receive the message directing it to stay outside of
100 miles of the coast?
A. Yes. Additionally, COMSIXFLT, by his 080917Z repeated
the substance
[5]
of the JCS 080110Z when he directed the LIBERTY to comply
with the later message.
Q. What response to indicated from the LIBERTY?
A. The LIBERTY did not receive that message either.
Q. As a communications specialist, will you please advise
the Court of your opinion predicated on the exhibits in
evidence, why these two messages were not received by
LIBERTY?
A. Yes. The analysis reveals that the JCS message,
080110Z, was erroneously routed by the communications center
serving the JCS to NAVCOMSTAPHIL for delivery to USS
LIBERTY. At 080449 NAVCOMSTAPHIL took the correct action
and re-routed JCS 080110Z to NAVCOMSTA MOROCCO for delivery
to LIBERTY. Up to the current time this message has not
arrived at NAVCOMSTA MOROCCO, and we are still attempting to
trace the reason for non-delivery to NAVCOMSTA MOROCCO.
COMSIXTHFLT's 080917Z which directed LIBERTY to comply with
JCS 080110Z and essentially repeated its text as well, was
sent from the LITTLE ROCK at 081058. The elapsed time in
getting this message off the ship was about one hour and 45
minutes. NAVCOMSTA MOROCCO routed COMSIXTHFLT's message to
Asmara via San Pablo Spain Defense Communication System -
USAF major relay. At 081200, COMSIXTHFLT's message was
received by the U. S. Army Communications Center at Asmara
for further relay to NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA for placing on the
broadcast to USS LIBERTY. At 081215Z the U. S. Army
Communications Canter Asmara relayed the COMSIXTHTFLT
message erroneously to NAVCOMMSTA GREECE for relay to
LIBERTY. At 081506, and there is some question about the
preciseness of this time, NAVCOMMSTA GREECE returned the
COMSIXTHFLT message back to the U. S. Army Communications
Center Asmara. At 081510 U. S. Army Communications Center
Asmara then relayed the COMSIXTHFLT message correctly to
NAVCOMMSTA Asmara and it was placed on the broadcast at
081525. Clearly, LIBERTY had not received this message as
she was hit at least three hours before.
Q. In recapitulation, the official records from
CINCUSNAVEUR, which you have read into these proceedings,
indicate that at the time USS LIBERTY
[6] was under attack, she had not
received either of these two messages, COMSIXTHFLT 080817Z
and JCS 080110Z?
A. Yes, that is correct. Do any members of the Court have
questions of the witness?
Captain LAUFF: Q. Can you give an opinion, based on your
experience, as to why these failures to deliver occur in our
system?
A. Yes, in my opinion these errors in routing turned out to
be human errors on the part of the persons doing the routing
in the Communications Center serving the JCS and in the Army
Communications Center at Asmara. I would like to further
point out that at the time these mis-routes occurred we were
several days in a critical situation in the Mid East with a
tremendous volume of high precedence traffic being handled
and that the undoubtedly young kids who were doing this work
were up against traffic volume and probably lack of
experience. Communication systems like weapons systems
these days are sophisticated but still perform an well as
the people who operate them.
Q. Under the conditions such as you have just described,
what do you estimate a normal delay time of the precedence
of the JCS message 080110Z or the COMSIXTHFLT message
080917Z - what would be the delay time to the ship on
average?
A. It would be unrealistic to give you an average because
there are so many contingencies. The DCA has established
standards which we use for guidance, however, meeting these
standards is difficult to achieve particularly under the
circumstances that we have been involved over the past week.
Q. Had the errors connected with the routing of the
messages in question not occurred, would the messages have
been received by LIBERTY in a timely fashion?
A. The answer to that to yes.
[7]
Rear Admiral KIDD: Do you gentlemen have any more questions?
No Sir.
Captain, I have two or three questions I would like to ask.
Q. Are all of the terminals in the system related to
delivery of the messages in question, to the best of your
knowledge. now on-line crypto- equipped?
A. Affirmative.
Q. Has the introduction of the on-line system, in your
experience, introduced a situation where we are perhaps
becoming increasingly confident and dependent upon
automation in general terms, beyond that which existed
before the on-line systems were made a part of the
communications network?
A. Yes sir. We are both confident and dependent, and in my
opinion this is all to the good due to the increased
capability of the system and increased speed of handling
messages.
Q. Has the incidence rate of identifiable problems typified
by these two messages increased, decreased, or remained
about the same since the introduction of on-line crypto?
A. I have no way of comparing that sir, this in like saying
were there more automobile accidents in the 1947 model
automobiles compared to the 1967 automobiles.
Q. I think captain, you have really answered the question
indirectly in the affirmative, that there to an increased
incidence rate because with the increased capability, has
not the volume increased also?
A. It wasn't my intention to give you that impression, sir.
Yes, there has been a quantum increase in volume, ergo, the
chances for errors would be greater, I grant you that. But
on a percentage basis, I doubt it. On the old system, you
were dependent on human beings all along the line. Under the
new system, of course, you are still dependent on human
beings, but in fewer places.
Q. Are the human beings on whom we are depending now of the
same or different qualification and experience levels?
[8]
A. Depending on the point you make the comparison, but
prior to on-line systems we use to have officer coding
boards usually made up of junior officers. Now coding
boards are generally a thing of the past and enlisted men
operating on-line equipment do this work. I would say,
quality of personnel in some respects is down, particularly
in the communications field, because reenlistment for hard
driving communicators is not the best. In my opinion, the
Navy is accomplishing with youngsters, that is with strikers
and third class petty officers, that which commercial
communication companies wouldn't attempt to do unless they
had personnel with considerably more experience. Efficiency
of personnel is a relative thing as I see it, associated
with experience. We are operating a sophisticated
communications system with a substantial percentage of first
term personnel. On the officer side, we are doing the job
with essentially a hard corps of LDO's and the rest are
young reserve officers, the great majority of whom are short
timers.
Q. When a message of the precedence of the two in question
is received in a communications terminal, what if any alarms
or other signals are used to alert the individuals at the
receiving point that a particularly important message has
arrived?
A. The communicators are governed by precedences. They do
not have the time nor are they expected to analyze texts of
messages in addition to determining importance. Flash
messages are associated by either alarm bells or a warning
light of some kind. As I recall, neither of these were
flashed. Operational immediate messages and the practice in
communications centers to shout out "op immediate coming
through" or something similar so that personnel concerned
have their attention drawn to the fact that an op immediate
is being processed.
Q. Now, when you have hundreds of op immediate messages
arriving in the same center, then I would imagine that this
system collapses of its own weight?
A. I wouldn't say it collapses, but human beings might tend
to lose respect for the precedence because of its obviously
excessive use.
[9]
However, wherever I have been, they say "op immediate coming
through". Sometimes several times a minute - they still say
it - they try.
Q. The point I am seeking, Captain, relates to the order in
which these messages could expect attention by the
individual who would first address himself to it after it
left the mechanical and electrical machines in order to
first identify, in this case, an error in routing indicator.
A. The basic rule of communicators is "first in, first out
by precedence". Thus, if there were twenty op immediates in
process and the 21st came in, it would wait its turn and
then move along.
Q. Does my recollection serve me correctly, Captain, that
during the period of time under consideration, the days
preceding, and immediately following, the LIBERTY's attack,
the circuits were relatively well choked; or perhaps that is
an over-statement with FBIS intercepts and similar traffic
transmitted at a very high precedence?
A. We were very busy with traffic of that nature,
particularly with FBIS intercepts. All of which were at
least op immediate. However, these conditions had little,
if anything to do in directly causing the mis-routes.
Q. My point, Captain, is that a mis-routed message arriving
- it seems to me would have to wait its turn to find the
mis-route and identify it, is that correct?
A. You are correct, sir, it would wait its turn under the
first in first out by precedence rule.
Q. My next question, Captain, relates to possible
safeguards in the communications system wherein a message
originated with a particular precedence and which
experienced inordinate delay, what safeguards, if any are
available for intermediate stations to raise the precedence
where delays have been experienced up to the time of receipt
where the delay is identified?
A. Here is where experience counts. An experienced
communicator will notice this and do something about it.
This is something you can't legislate, sir. A mechanical
safeguard is not feasible, but an experienced person can do
something about it.
[10]
Q. Have you, in your career, had occasion to personally
observe instances where precedences have been raised under
such circumstances?
A. The assignment of a precedence to the responsibility of
the originator, thus the communicators would not raise the
precedence per se, however, depending on their experience,
they could handle it in a manner as though it had a higher
precedence; and this I have seen done often. For example,
sir, in many cases there are either direct circuits or the
NAVCOMOPNET available and messages can be sent over such
circuits and taken out of competition with all other general
traffic.
Q. Did Asmara, or does Asmara have such a NAVCOMOPNET?
A. Affirmative.
Q. I would gather then that the two critical messages in
question did not enjoy this type of service, is that
correct?
A. Certainly, the one message from COMSIXTHFLT was not
routed over that circuit, it went over DCS circuits.
Q. Would the situation that we have just been discussing,
Captain, come under the heading which you mentioned earlier,
of lack of experience being a key to identifying a message
that had been delayed, in this particular incident?
A. Possibly, sir, in the case of the COMSIXTHFLT message.
This message was mis-routed by the Army's comm center in
Asmara and sent to NAVCOMMSTA GREECE. The soldier who did
the mis-route may have been inexperienced, or what have you,
but then NAVCOMMSTA GREECE apparently was a little slow in
getting this message back to Asmara and here experience
might have been a factor. On the other hand, we know
NAVCOMSTA GREECE had been handling a lot of FBIS type
messages and the delay could have been under the first in
first out rule. Also, the NAVCOMSTA GREECE personnel could
have returned this message direct to NAVCOMSTA ASMARA had
the experience factor been present. Mind you, this business
is surmised because I do not know the rate and enlistment
time of the traffic handlers involved.
Let the record show at this point that Captain Raish has
been asked to develop a set of questions for submission to
communication officers,
[11]
Relay stations, and centers involved to ascertain the reason
for the delays experienced by the two messages under
discussion.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The Court adjourned at 0250 hours, 11 June 1967, to be
reconvened at the call of the President.
The President, Counsel to the Court and Reporter proceeded
to Souda Bay, Crete and boarded USS LIBERTY at sea enroute
to Malta. The Court met aboard LIBERTY at 0630 hours, 12
June 1967, but adjourned until arrival of LIBERTY at Malta
to meet with full court.
-SECOND DAY-
At Malta, the hour 0755, the date 13 June 1967. This court
of inquiry is now in session again. All persons connected
with the Court who were present when the Court adjourned in
London, England on 11 June 1967 are again present in Court
except that the Assistant Counsel for the Court who is now
present will be sworn.
The Assistant Counsel for the court, Lieutenant Commander
Allen Feingersch, U. S. Navy, was sworn.
Ensign David G. Lucas, U. S. Naval Reserve, took the
stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights
under article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and
examined as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
Questions by counsel for the Court:
Q. Please state your name, rank, organization, and present
duties station.
A. Ensign David G. Lucas, First Lieutenant and Gunnery
Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5).
Let the record show that this witness is being called out of
order in order that he may be medically evacuated to a
hospital ashore for [deleted] and that he is experiencing
considerable physical discomfort at this time.
Q. Mr. Lucas, as you are well aware, this Court of
Inquiry has been convened to inquire into the circumstances
attendant with the armed
[12]
attack on the U. S. Naval vessel, USS Liberty, which
occurred on 8 June 1967. Will you please describe to the
court the circumstances of that incident that you recall?
A.. Yes Sir. We had a general quarters drill which secured
shortly prior to 1400. After securing from the drill I came
to the wardroom and was in the presence of Lieutenant Golden
and Ensign Scott. Ensign Scott left the wardroom and we
heard the word passed over the 1MC to stand clear of the
motor whaleboat while testing engines. Very shortly after
that word was passed we heard what sounded like a very loud
thump or crash. Mr. Golden and I half jumped from our
seats, we looked at each other, and both thought that the
motor whaleboat had fallen from its davit onto the deck. We
went to the closest porthole, pulled the curtains, and did
see some dust and black smoke rising. It was at this time
that the general quarters alarm was sounded, and we knew
that we had been attacked. I went into the passageway
outside the wardroom via athwartships passageway to the
starboard side of the main deck and from there used the
ladder to go to the bridge, the 03 level. Upon arriving on
the bridge I got my battle helmet and my life jacket from
the starboard gear locker and was just getting ready to go
to my general quarters station which is on the 04 level, the
flying bridge. We were hit by what I assume to be the
second pass of aircraft. Another man was next to me. I
think he was a signalman. We both hit the deck just outside
the starboard hatch leading to the pilothouse. Three or
four shells hit in our area. After that shelling had
ceased, I went into the pilothouse, didn't figure it was too
safe to go to the 04 level at that time. Another pass was
made and everyone in the pilothouse hit the deck. When I did
enter the pilothouse, the officer of the deck for general
quarters, LT. O'CONNER, had already been injured and had
been carried into CIC, which is just aft of the
pilothouse. The junior officer of the deck at general
quarters, LT ENNIS, was lying in the after portion of the
pilothouse and appears to have [deleted]. I can't recall
what other personnel were on the bridge at that time. It
consisted
[13]
of several phone talkers and a third class quartermaster,
BROWN, was at the helm, which was his general quarters
station. I left the pilothouse, came to the wardroom to
learn the condition of LT. O'CONNER and LT Ennis. Came down
the ladder in the superstructure. When I got to the 02
level, the men were carrying the Executive Officer LCDR
ARMSTRONG, down to the wardroom for medical aid. At the
time I saw him, he appeared to be in shock, was very pale,
and was not saying anything. Mr. ENNIS had gotten partially
down - they were having difficulty carrying him down and he
was in the passageway outside his stateroom, waiting for
attention to his leg. I came into the wardroom and there
were at least half a dozen casualties in there being
treated. Several of the enlisted men had been in the spaces
forward of the superstructure, and the IC shop and the
emergency diesel room. These areas had been shelled very
heavily on one of the first passes. I found out the
emergency diesel did not work and that the gyro was not
functioning either. I left the wardroom area. Somehow we
received word that there was a fire burning on the 01 level,
port side. It was in the vicinity where two 55 gallon drums
of P-250 fuel was stored. Some enlisted men in the
passageways got a hose and were putting out the fire. The
fire had spread aft of the P-250 cans and the four life
rafts were burning on the 01 level. I can't remember the
exact amount of time that I did spend in the superstructure
area. When I was in the passageways, I hear we did receive
some more shelling. I returned to the bridge. To the best
of my knowledge, when I did return to the bridge, the only
people present were the Commanding Officer, one phone
talker, who was lying on the deck in the chart room,
quartermaster BROWN on the helm and myself. Before I went
back to the bridge, we had received word over the phones
that were working, we had very little communication as such,
the 1MC was hit and not functioning. The only communications
we had were via sound-powered phones. We had received the
word "standby for a torpedo attack". It was very shortly
after I returned to the bridge the Commanding Officer
hollered in to pass over all circuits, "standby for another
torpedo attack, starboard side".
get the numbers of both helicopters in the quartermasters
log. They were either "04 or D4" and "08 or D8". There
also appeared to be a "Star of David" on the side of the
helo. The helo was waved away shortly after the calling
card was thrown over, we saw no more of the helos. Now it
was the matter of still trying to get the ship out of the
area. We had no idea whether we would be attacked again or
not. The list had held steady at approximately 10 degrees.
After steering was able to keep us on somewhat of a
northerly course, although we were weaving anywhere from 30
to 40 degrees either side of our chosen magnetic course of
000. I was getting the rudder angles to steer for awhile
called back to after steering and then the Commanding
Officer was giving them after that. The Commanding Officer
had been injured in his right leg on what must have been the
first aircraft pass. He was bleeding profusely. The
Captain had been administered first aid and he had a belt
tourniquet around his leg. He insisted on being everywhere
that he could. He was on both wings, in and out of the
pilothouse, taking pictures. I believe at the time I was
giving orders to after steering the bleeding had started
again on the Captains leg wound. I'm just theorizing that
the shell fragment that was lodged in the leg had been
discharged by his movement. We called the corpsman, and the
Captain was stretched out on the port wing, being
administered first aid. He was still calling orders in to
me to relay on to after steering. Bleeding did stop and the
Commanding Officer once again was, well, this time he was
placed in his chair on the port wing. He gave orders there
for quite awhile. It was also a matter of identification.
We, ourselves, were asking the question, "Who made the
attacks?", "And why?". There was a time when I was in the
pilot house that I heard the Commanding Officer holler to
someone, perhaps signalman DAVID, to get the Ensign, the
colors, off the deck. I went out to the starboard wing, and
there was an Ensign on the deck. I went out a little bit
further and looked up and we were flying our Ensign. I
found that later all of the starboard halyards or hoists
had been shot down and that signalman DAVID had run up
another Ensign.
[18]
Things quieted down somewhat at this time. We still had no
indication if we were still under attack or not. I know
that there were several times later in the afternoon and
early evening that we did take cover at the order of the
Commanding Officer when some aircraft did approach at a
distance. We were still doing the best we could to head due
North. We still had considerable deviation from the base
course. I can't recall what speed we finally did attain.
I think we tried to make turns for 8 knots, and found it too
difficult at that speed to hold the course, and dropped back
to all ahead 1/3. We had main control make turns for five
knots. There were several times when we were almost dead in
the water. Believe that just before or just after the
torpedo attack we had no turns. Another time that I can
recall that lube oil suction was lost. Both boilers were
on the line. We had to wait until that situation was
corrected. Seems as if there were several other occasions
when it was not possible to get power. After the attack
from the patrol boats had stopped, and before we had
steadied up, or successfully steadied up on an approximate
course of 000, I was checking the fathometer, which was the
only piece of equipment on the bridge that I know was
functioning and it was only functioning on the 100 fathom
scale at the time. Our readings started decreasing rapidly.
Commanding Officer ordered me to go to the forecastle, get
some men and to standby to let go an anchor. We proceeded
to the forecastle, had the starboard anchor ready for
letting go, the bridge said "make the port anchor ready".
We were trying to pick up the chain stopper, but the pelican
hook was up almost against the stopper and we could not
raise the stopper. I grabbed a bar of some kind, another
man grabbed a sledge and we were pounding at the stopper to
try to raise it. We received an order from the bridge that
was shouted to us from the Commanding Officer to let go the
port anchor, and we could not let go the port anchor. We
finally pried the stopper up, this was maybe a minute later,
the ship was backing down at that time, all back 1/3. The
readings were increasing, the fathometer readings. We
received an order not to let go the port anchor. After
backing down,
[19]
getting a sufficient depth under the keel, we then come
around to our northerly course again. After we got on our
northerly course, the Commanding Officer came in to his
chair inside the pilothouse and gave all orders to after
steering. Later, this would have been perhaps 1800 or so,
steering was shifted from after steering back to the bridge.
Rear Admiral KIDD: Q. I'd like to interrupt and ask you a
question at this point. Was the Commanding Officer on the
bridge all this time?
A. The Commanding Officer never left the bridge, was there
from the time CQ was sounded. Perhaps he had stayed there
since the drill had secured. He did not leave the bridge
until, I'd say, 0400 the following morning to make a head
call. He made two or three head calls in the course of the
morning, but he did not leave the bridge until the DAVIS was
alongside the following morning at 0700, on the morning
of 10 June. We weren't positive that our magnetic compass
was responding correctly. Every now and then the Commanding
Officer would go out on the wing and would make minor
course adjustments by sighting the North Star. Sometimes
after sunset, a message was delivered to the bridge from
radio central and it stated that the attack had in fact been
made by Israeli forces and that they had extended their
apologies. Prior to this message, we had received word
from the Sixth Fleet that help was on the way. I believe,
initially, they just said, "help". Later on we learned that
two destroyers were coming to rendezvous with us. During
the night, as I said previously, the Commanding Officer left
the bridge only to make a head call and all during the
evening, night, and following morning until the arrival of
the DAVIS, there was an officer with him at all times.
Either LT BENETT, LTJG PAINTER or myself.
Questions by Counsel for the Court: To your knowledge, was
the Commanding Officer requested to leave the bridge by the
doctor in order to obtain medical attention?
A. I didn't hear the order, it's quite possible, but it
would have taken ten people the doctor's size to even begin
to get him off the bridge.
[20]
Q. How would you describe his reaction to his injuries
A. He was in great pain, there were several times when he
was still walking around, but it was obvious he was in great
pain. He had lost a considerable amount of blood. At
several times felt dizzy. He would not leave, but if he
started to get dizzy, he would turn to me, or if Mr. BENNETT
or Mr. PAINTER were there, he would say this to what course
were on, what speed to make. He would give instructions.
Q. Backtracking to a point during the heat of combat, did
you observe the Captain when he was initially wounded.
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And he continued on in this condition without stopping
for assistance by medical?
A. That is correct. It was quite awhile before he did slow
down enough to have the belt tourniquet put on the leg. I
assisted with that. I used my belt, and after that a
corpsman came up just long enough to adjust the tourniquet
and take a look at the Commanding Officer. He did not want
any further medical attention and he did not receive any
more until the bleeding started a second time, when I think
the shell fragment was worked loose.
Q. What period of time had elapsed?
A. Over an hour. I can't say for sure, but it had been at
least an hour. How he managed to stay up on the bridge and
keep on his feet, to keep the cool head the way that be did,
is beyond me. He was giving orders to us in the pilothouse,
he was taking photographs of the aircraft, the patrol craft,
attempting to identify them with his binoculars, giving
orders to the gun mounts when they were still manned, was
directing the fire fighting parties, seemed like he was
everywhere at one time. Also giving commands to get the
ship out of the area, away from land as fast as we could.
Questions by Captain ATKINSON: Q. Mr. LUCAS, approximately
when did you receive word that the Israelis
[21]
had attacked - about how long after the attack?
A. It was right around sunset.
Q. Until that time, you all felt you might be subject to
re-attack?
A. That is correct.
Questions by Counsel for the Court: Q. At this point I
would like to interrupt your narrative testimony in order to
present this exhibit to the record. I have in my custody as
Counsel for the Court, the quartermasters notebook, USS
LIBERTY. I show you page 102 dated 8 June and ask you if
this is the page you referred to when you testified to
making entries in it?
A. That is the page, starting with the entry at the time
1446, and I continued making entries until 1655.
Q. Let the record also show that page 102 is considerably
splattered with what appears to be blood.
A. It is.
I request the reporter to mark this exhibit number 6. At
this time, the Counsel for the Court offers the
quartermasters logbook into evidence, A true copy thereof
will be substituted in its place.
Q. Will you please read this first entry?
A. "1446, one gunboat tentatively identified as number
206-17." And this was seen by both the Commanding Officer
and myself from the. starboard wing. I mentioned earlier,
the patrol craft was going exactly the opposite direction
that we were. This number was read when it was abeam to
starboard at approximately 500 yards.
Counsel for the Court: It is requested that the Court note
page 138 of Janes Fighting Ships for 1966, which has Israeli
vessels described on that page 138. I will now ask the
witness to identify the patrol craft on page 138, and ask if
it is similar to the one he saw?
A. The patrol craft here, THOMAS, appears to be the exact
same one that I identified. If I had had a camera and taken
a picture of it, I would have gotten the same angle, same
presentation, as is present here in this photograph. There
is one slight difference, there is no dash between the first
three and the last two digits, and what I thought to be 17,
[22]
I found out later from Mr. BENNETT, when I examined this
book, that it was an Israeli symbol that looks like a 17,
but is connected by a horizontal line at the bottom. It's
quite possible that, well I know that, it was difficult to
read the number, not because of the distance, but because of
the bow wake coming over and obscuring the numbers.
Counsel for the Court: I will now ask the court members if
they have any questions on the exhibits that have been
introduced.
Captain ATKINSON: Q. You say communications were bad. What
communications were you referring to?
A. I don't know much about the communications or research
setup at all.
Q. This is not the bridge communications?
A. That is correct. I believe that was outgoing
communications from the transmitter room.
Q. Were there voice communications passed to the bridge?
A. Not from radio central. We had communications with main
control, damage control central and after steering.
Q. In radio communications do you know where the hicom not
is?
A. We knew nothing of what was going on. All messages,
outgoing and incoming were hand carried up to the bridge
from the radio central personnel. We had been receiving,
monitoring Sixth Fleet communications several days prior to
the attack, but during the attack the only way we could get
hold of somebody was after transmitter room and everything
that was sent out or received came up to the bridge via
handed message.
Q. Do you know specifically what circuits were being
monitored when you said you were monitoring Sixth Fleet
communications before the attack?
[23]
A. I don't know the call signs of the ships involved or
still on the status board in the pilothouse, I can't
recall.
Q. You mentioned that there were fathometer readings
decreasing. Where were you getting this information from?
A. The only fathometer that was working was in CIC, just
aft of the pilothouse, and at that time it was only working
on the 100 fathom scale.
Q. Do you recall the depth?
A. I believe they rapidly approached the middle teens. You
see, we had no radar. This was knocked out, evidently, on
the first air pass. We had to DR from our last fix to give
an approximate 1400B position. We included that position in
the message requiring assistance.
Q. Were you in sight of land at about the time of the pass?
A. Yes we were. After dinner, as is customary on here, we
often go to the 01 level forward on deck chairs to soak up
some sun.
Q. Excuse me, you mean noonday?
A. Noon. There were six officers on the 01 level forward
until turn to at 1300. There was smoke visible from land
off the port side and also during the general quarters
drill. When I was on the 04 level more smoke was visible
and the land itself was barley visible. This was through
the telescope or high powered binoculars on the 04 level.
Q. In the first portion of your testimony, you mention
shelling, what did you intend to convey by the word
"shelling"?
A. The first hit, the first noise that LT GOLDEN and I
heard when we were in the wardroom was obviously a heavy
hit. I assumed this was aircraft and it sounded to us as if
It hit on the starboard side. Like I said, we thought it
was the motor whaleboat falling from its davit onto the
deck. I mentioned shelling again just as soon as I had put
on my battle helmet and life jacket on the bridge. This
again, I would say was aircraft cause there was a whistling
sound several seconds before the actual burst and noise
itself came. After I had gone inside the pilot- house and
was on the deck, there was another series of whistling
sounds preceding the hits. Here again, I assume it was
aircraft. When I had
[24]
come down to the wardroom, was lending a hand to getting the
hose to fight the fire on the port side, there were more
easily discernible whistling sounds, even in the
passageways, that were aircraft hits. The two men who were
handling the hose were keeping an eye out for aircraft.
They would put out the fire until another plane came over
and then they ducked back inside.
Q. Did the motor torpedo boats fire on you with ordnance
other than torpedoes?
A. Yes, they did. This we could easily hear. I can recall
it coming from the starboard side on several occasions. At
the time quartermaster BROWN was on the helm, the fragment
that caught him came from the starboard side and I can't be
sure if it was from the gun boats or from our own shells
baking off. I'm pretty sure it was from the gun boats. And
there were several other occasions of obvious shelling from
the torpedo or motor boats themselves.
Q. Do you have any idea how many aircraft were involved?
A. I did not actually see any of the aircraft. There were
definitely three motor boats.
Q. Are you the Gunnery Officer?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. Do the surface lookouts come under your glance at
general quarters?
A. There, at general quarters the lookouts are on the 04
level. The actual lookout training was done by the
Navigator or another member of the Operations Department.
They had received refresher training, this was sometime
since we left Rota on the 2nd of June, and had been
refreshed on reporting all surface contacts to include
relative bearing, approximate range, and target angle. Had
also been given refreshers on reporting aircraft properly,
on elevation, what angle, other factors pertaining to
properly reporting all surface and air contacts to the
officer of the deck. This had been stressed heavily in the
first week in June, before we did reach our operating area.
Q. Was their method of reporting via sound-powered
telephone?
[25]
A. When we were normally steaming at our modified condition
three, the lookouts were on the port and starboard wings, so
it was just a matter of shouting into the officer of the
deck directly. We had stationed, or had one man in each of
the two forward gun mounts. We had ammunition at the guns,
but not actually in the breech. These two men had sound-
powered phones on. We could call them from the bridge
anytime, but for them to call us on the circuit, they would
blow a whistle and we would pick up the phone on the bridge.
I can't recall what circuit it was, but at a toot of a
whistle they could have someone on the bridge alerted to
pick up the phone and talk with them.
Q. During the time that you were on the bridge, did you
receive any lookout reports via sound-powered telephones?
A. During the attack?
Q. During the attack.
A. When I got up to the bridge, as I said I did not get to
the 04 level which was my general quarters station. During
general quarters, the two air lookouts were on the 04 level,
but they had not made it up there either. I cannot recall
seeing a surface lookout on either side of the bridge when I
got there. The shelling from the aircraft had either
injured them, or they had taken cover inside the pilothouse.
Q. During, and after the attack, did you have sound-powered
communications with your gun mounts?
A. To the best of my knowledge, we never had contact with
the gun mounts. Let me explain the connection there. My
general quarters station is on the 04 level at gunnery
control. To get an order to the gun mount, it was easier
for the bridge to call a phone talker stationed on the 04
level. He in turn would convey the message to a second
phone talker who had communications will all of the mounts.
No direct communications from the mounts themselves to the
pilothouse, and since no one was able to be on the 04 level,
there was no direct communications. At one time, while the
torpedo boats were firing at us, my man in charge of mount
53, seaman QUINTERO, hollered to me, "should I fire back?",
and I gave him an
[26]
affirmative on that. This was before he and the other men
in mount 53 had been chased away by the fire and flames from
the motor whaleboat. On the forward mounts, I said we had no
communications up there. My third class gunner's mate,
THOMPSON, according to several witnesses, and to the members
of repair two, which is located directly beneath mount 51,
said that petty officer THOMPSON went to mount 51 when GQ
sounded. He was below decks. His station is with me on the
04 level. Guess he figured he didn't have time to get up
there. He went to the closest gun and from the account
given by the people in repair two, it sounded as if he got
off half a box of ammo at the aircraft. They somehow missed
him on the first strafing attack. Several witnesses said
that he had the aircraft under fire while it was circling
for the second pass and it was during the second pass that
he was cut in half by a rocket, but he had the aircraft
under fire and got off at least half a box of 50 caliber
ammo.
Q. Do you recall how long the Ensign was down?
A. I cannot recall for sure. From the first air attack,
the radar was made inoperative, the antenna on the mainmast
was damaged, obviously on the first air pass and the Ensign
would be flying just below it and just aft of it.
Evidently, the shelling that got the radarscope, well it
could have very possibly severed the halyard lines at that
time. I do not recall when the Commanding Officer saw the
Ensign on the deck and told someone to pick it up, but I do
recall going out on the starboard wing, looking up and
seeing that there was an Ensign flying.
Q. Do you remember the time frame when you looked and saw
the Ensign flying, was it during the surface or the air
attack?
A. I can't set an exact time on it. I do believe that I
recall that at this time the patrol craft was off our
starboard side at an approximate bearing of 120. It seems
to me that this might have been around the time when I
investigated the firing coming from mount 53 and found it
was bullets cooking off as opposed to men being there
actually firing.
[27]
Q. Did you look and see the Ensign flying before the
torpedo hit, or was it after?
A. I cannot honestly recall whether it was before or after.
Q. When did you receive your injuries?
A. As soon as I had gotten to the bridge and put on the
battle helmet, I mentioned what I assumed were rockets from
the aircraft hit in the immediate vicinity. I hit the deck
and picked up several pieces of [deleted] One of them was
bleeding enough that I took out my handkerchief and wrapped
it around [deleted]. The piece of fragment that hit me in
the [deleted] occurred much later, after I had been to the
wardroom, returned to the bridge, and after the
quartermaster had been killed on the helm. The commanding
Officer came from the port wing into the pilothouse, and he
said "standby for another attack". I don't recall if it
was surface, air, or torpedo. He said "take cover". I
heard some firing, some ricocheting off the starboard side.
I assumed it was from the patrol craft. I was in the rear
portion of the pilothouse and tried to crawl behind the
water fountain as best I could, and I got most of me back
when I felt something hit me just to the right of
[deleted] it started bleeding rapidly. I tore off the
[deleted] over the wound and just continued on from there.
Q. When did you receive treatment for your wounds?
A. I didn't know that I had any metal in me as such,
[deleted] I
had no pain. I would guess the first time that I was
looked at was on the 10th of June. I went back to
sickbay. The night before I had a little bit of
swelling, so went back to have the doctor have a look at
it. This was just the injury. He took an xray and did
find that there was a chunk of metal in there. I believe
he said it was [deleted]
Q. Do you recall that the patrol boats strafed the ship
after the torpedo attack, and if so, how many times?
A. Sir, I cannot honestly answer that.
[28]
Q. Let me put the question a little bit differently -
earlier in your statement you observed that the patrol boats
were attempting to communicate with flashing light?
A. This was definitely after the torpedo attack.
Q. The flashing lights from the boats were after the
torpedo attack?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. I also understood from you that the ship was unable to
respond to the flashing lights from the boats?
A. To the first signaling, that is affirmative, because the
smoke that was between the patrol craft and us.
Q. And I believe, also, the starboard wing 24-inch
searchlight had been shot away earlier in the action. Is
that not correct?
A. The only signaling light we had available was a small
portable light, the face of which was approximately six
inches in diameter.
Q. I believe that is called an Altis Lamp and the intensity
of that light, from personal knowledge, would probably be
completely inadequate to penetrate the smoke?
A. Yes sir. All power to all of the other lights was off.
Even if it had been on, there was only one operative light
on either the 03 or 04 level. The only one that had not
been hit.
Q. To the best of your recollection, after the motor
torpedo boats signaled, were there any further attacks from
them?
A. No, there were not. After this first signaling, I
don't believe so. After they signaled "do you need help?",
and we answered in the negative, I am positive there were no
more attacks after that time.
Q. With regard to the signal from the torpedo boats, when
did you first observe the signaling, with respect to the
torpedo attack?
A. The first signaling that I observed was the unsuccessful
attempts to determine what they were signaling us, and of
course, we did not have a chance to answer back to them.
This was after the torpedo attacks. The only other signaling
that I recall seeing is when we did successfully receive
their message and sent a negative answer to it
[29]
Q. Mr. LUCAS, did you bring with you any examples of
ordnance or shrapnel recovered aboard USS LIBERTY subsequent
to the attack?
A. With the exception of one fragment that was located this
morning, the remainder of these fragments and shells were
brought up to the pilothouse in the course of the evening
and the following morning after the attack. These were
turned in by various personnel throughout the ship. Several
of these have been turned in since the night of the 8th and
the morning of the 9th.
Counsel for the Court: At this time it to requested that
these examples be marked exhibit 7, that they be introduced
into evidence and copies of photographs be made for record
purposes.
President: Let the record also show that these fragments are
but a cross- sectional sample of the type of bullets and
shrapnel which "holed" the ship.
President:. Q. A question if you please - would you be kind
enough to expand on the performance of duty of a young man
mentioned earlier in your testimony, named LARKINS?
A. Seaman LARKINS helps man mount 54, 03 level, port side,
as his general quarters station. He was on that mount, and
stayed on that mount, until the fire coming from the 01
level chased him away. He did recall seeing a plane
approaching from the port side and lobbing a cylinder that
was attached under the wing. A cylinder five to six feet
long, approximately ten inches in diameter. This cylinder
approached the 01 level port side in an end over end
fashion. After it hit, and the fire started, he climbed
over the skylight to mount 53 and helped the gun crew there
until the fire from the motor whaleboat drove all people
away from that mount. I later personally saw him helping to
extinguish the fire on the port side and still later, he, by
himself, manned mount 51 and fired one shot before he
received a cease fire from the Commanding Officer.
President: No further questions - before you leave to go to
the hospital, the Court would like to express itself with a
feeling of great pride to
[30]
be associated with the service's uniform you wear, young
man, and we thank you very much for your cooperation and
fine testimony.
Mr. LUCAS: Thank you, Admiral.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The Court recessed at 1045 hours, 14 June 1967 from taking
further testimony in order to examine exhibits received by
the Board.
The Court opened at 1300 hours, 14 June 1967. All persons
connected with the inquiry who were present when the court
recessed are again present in court.
Commander William L. McGonagle, U. S. Navy, took the stand
as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under
Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and examined as
follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
Questions by counsel for the court: Q. Please state your
name, rank, organization and present duty station.
A. Commander William L. McGonagle, U. S. Navy, Commanding
Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5).
Let the record show that although the witness is
experiencing considerable pain from shrapnel wounds in his
leg, that he willingly appeared at this hearing.
Q. Captain McGonagle, as you are well aware, this Court of
Inquiry has been convened to inquire into the circumstances
attendant with the armed attack on the U.S. Naval vessel
which you command, USS LIBERTY, which occurred on 8 June
1967. Will you please describe to the Court the
circumstances of that incident as you recall it?
A. At the time of the incident, LIBERTY was performing her
mission in accordance with JCS message dtg 011545Z June
1967. At the time of the incident, the ship was operating
under the operational control of Commander, U. S. Sixth
Fleet. The ship had arrived in its assigned operating area
on the morning of 8 June 1967 after having departed from
Rota, Spain on 2 June 1967. The ship was steaming in
international
[31]
waters and was so at all times. A condition of readiness
three modified was set. The condition three modified watch
consisted of normal steaming watch with the exception that
one man was stationed in the forward two 50 caliber machine
guns 51 and 52. Lookouts on the bridge were designated to
man machine guns 53 and 54 in the event of surprise air or
surface attack. Each machine gun had a box of ammunition
attached to the machine gun with a round up to but not in
the chamber of each mount. During the 0800 to 1200 watch on
the morning of 8 June at about 1030, a flight of two
unidentified jet aircraft orbited the ship at about 10,000
feet three times at a distance of approximately two miles.
It was not possible to identify any insignia on the aircraft
and their identity remains unknown. A locating two report
was submitted on this sighting. It is not known at this time
whether the sighting report was transmitted from the ship or
not. Records are not accessible at the time. It was also
possible to see on the 8 to 12 watch in the morning the
coastline of the Sinai peninsula. Aircraft activity of an
apparent propeller patrol type flying at very low altitude
and parallel to and over the coast in the vicinity of El
Arish was noted. It is estimated that the altitude of this
plane was approximately 500 feet. At no time did this plane
approach the ship in any fashion. His distance remained
approximately 12 to 15 miles. It was possible to visually
sight the minaret which is quite conspicuous at El Arish.
This was used as a navigational aide in determining the
ship's position during the morning and afternoon of 8 June.
It became visible at about 0930 and the ship's position was
verified, and was within our established operating area.
Radar ranges were taken on the nearest land on the same
bearing as the minaret. The minaret was also identifiable
by radar. There were no other conspicuous or outstanding
navigational features in the area. At about 1056 in the
morning of 8 June, an aircraft similar to an American flying
boxcar crossed astern of the ship at a distance of about
three to five miles. The plane circled the ship around the
starboard side, proceeded forward of the ship and headed
back toward the Sinai peninsula. [40]
crew able to assist. Following the torpedo hit, those
personnel from the research area who were able to so, left
their stations. One of the torpedo boats was identified by
a hull number of 204-17. Pictures were taken of the torpedo
boats prior to and subsequent to the attack. About 1515,
two helicopters approached the ship and circled around and
around the ship at a distance of about 100 yards. The
ensignia the Star of David was clearly visible. Hull number
on one of the helicopters was 04 or D4. The other had a
hull number of 08 or D8. It was not known whether these
helicopters intended to strafe the ship or not. However,
they did not approach the ship in a hostile manner, but kept
pointed parallel to the ship as they continued around and
never made a direct approach as such. They were not taken
under fire by Liberty, nor did they fire at us. The torpedo
boats left the general area of the ship at about 1515.
About 1537, after they had departed the ship and gone to a
range of about five miles, they again headed toward the ship
at high speed. Their intentions were unknown. At about this
same time two unidentified jet aircraft were also noted
approaching the ship from our starboard side, in similar
fashion to that which preceded the initial attack. All
hands were again alerted to the possibility of repeated
attacks. No attacks occurred however, and the jets
disappeared from the scene. To further assist in
identification of the ship, at 1611 I ordered the ship's
international call sign hoisted. Both boilers had been put
back on the line at approximately 1520, but at 1523 lube oil
suction was lost to the main engines and the ship again
became dead in the water. The heading of the ship at this
time is not known. About 1555, communications were
restored, and at 1600 a message was sent providing
additional information concerning the attack by unidentified
aircraft and the fact that the torpedo boats had been
identified as Israeli. Preliminary estimate of the number
of dead and casualties, as well as the condition of the
ship, was also provided. At the time this message was being
dictated to Lieutenant Bennett on the port wing of the
bridge, I was laying on the deck with a
[41]
tourniquet being applied to my right leg at the thigh. A
few moments prior to this I felt myself blacking out from
loss of blood, and called for assistance of CT1 Carpenter to
apply a tourniquet. I had assumed the con immediately upon
the air attack and retained the con until rendezvous was
affected with the destroyers about 0630 on the morning of 9
June 1967, leaving the bridge only about 3 times during the
night hours to make brief head calls on the 02 level. No
bodies were noted in the area of ship following the
explosion. Several life rafts, however, were released and
placed into the water by various crew members whom I was
unable to communicate with prior to their placing the boats
in the water. They exercised their initiative on the scene,
and no fault can be found with their estimate, not having
the information that I had. When the messenger was sent to
tell them to leave the lifeboats alone, that the ship was in
no danger of sinking at that time, but that the lifeboats
might be needed at a later time, no additional lifeboats
were placed in the water. Misinterpretation of the
situation by personnel in combat following the order to
prepare for torpedo attack to starboard also resulted in the
ship's radar being purposely destroyed. Again, I find no
fault with this action under the circumstances. At about
1637, the torpedo boats commenced retiring from the area
without further signal or action. At this time, the ship
was attempting to make good a course of 340 magnetic, at
speed 8 knots. Emergency manual steering was being
conducted from after steering. The amount or rudder was
given to after steering over emergency rigged sound powered
telephones. They would apply the rudder. When the ship had
come to the approximate magnetic heading, the rudder would
be shifted to attempt to maintain that heading. It was
possible to maintain within plus or minus 30 degrees of the
ship's heading most of the time. The exact position of the
ship was not known at this time. At 1653 an attempt was
made to steer and make good a course of 000 magnetic. It
was not known what effect the nearby explosions might have
had on the pilot house magnetic compass. The gyro compass
was
[42]
out. It was not known what the azimuth of the setting sun
was, but this was used as a rough guide and it appeared that
the magnetic compass had not been unduly affected. The
ship's fathometer in combat was working following the
attacks. At about 16??, the fathometer sounding reported
approximately 26 fathoms under the keel. I realized at this
point that the ship might be south of its track and could be
approaching the shoal areas outside of our operating area.
Since I was not positive of the ship's position, I ordered
Mr. Lucas to round up as many personal as he could, and
proceed to the forecastle and standby to anchor. My
intentions was to anchor until it became night so that I
could visually sight the North Star to see whether the
magnetic compass had been unduly affected or not. Once I
was able to sight the North Star, then I would know in which
direction the ship was actually proceeding. Mr. Lucas and
personnel did go to this forecastle, and at one point I did
order the port anchor to let go. But before the port anchor
could be let go, I reversed my decision and backed all
engines two-thirds to see it I could back clear of the
apparent shoal area. I commenced backing the ship at about
1704 and continued backing until 1722, at which time the
fathometer reading was approximately 48 fathoms under the
keel. With the ship going ahead two-thirds and right full
rudder we quickly came to a magnetic heading of about 350
magnetic and continued on to a heading of 025 magnetic about
1729. The ship was at this time making a speed of about 8
knots. At 1730, the ship lost lube oil to the main engines,
and all engines were stopped. At, 1731, the ship was on a
heading of 022 magnetic with 50 fathoms of water under the
keel. Lube oil pressure was regained to the main engines
within a very short period of time, and the ship continued
right to a magnetic heading of 040 at 1737, at which time 72
fathoms was indicated under the keel. At 1743, the ship's
heading was 068 magnetic and 82 fathoms of water under the
keel. At this time I considered the ship to have stood
clear of the immediate danger of grounding and at 1748
increased speed to ten knots on a magnetic heading of 050.
The ship remained at general
[43]
quarters, and reports from damage control central were to
the effect that all water tight boundary bulkheads were
holding satisfactory. Dr. KEEFER, and the two corpsman,
were doing outstanding work in assisting injured crew
members. They advised me from time to time of the number of
casualties, the extent of injuries, and efforts being made.
At 1750, a message was received from COMSIXTHFLT to the
effect that escorts were on the way and that the ship was to
proceed on a course of 340 magnetic at maximum speed until
100 miles from present position, then turn 270 magnetic.
The ship attempted to carry out this directive. At 1757,
COMSIXTHFLT advised that escorts were proceeding to
rendezvous with us at maximum speed of destroyers. At 1841,
an Israeli helicopter approached the ship and hovered at
bridge level approximately 30 feet from the ship. They made
various attempts to indicate by visual means that they
wished to land a man on board. At one point, I considered
granting the request, but considering the obstructions in
the area of the forecastle, signaled a waveoff to them.
Lettering on the tail of the helicopter was SA32K. On the
fuselage were the numerals 06 or D6. At 1857, the
helicopter dropped a message on the forecastle. The message
was written on the back a calling card, identified as
Commander Ernest Carl Castle, Naval Attach� for Air Embassy,
USA. The message on the back read as follows: "Have you
casualties". We attempted to advise them by flashing light
with an Aldis lamp that, "affirmative", we did have
casualties. It was evident that they were unable to
understand what we were saying. After some ten to fifteen
minutes of unsuccessful efforts to communicate between the
helicopter and the ship, the helicopter departed from the
area, at a time unknown, but as dusk was approaching the
ship. Three musters were taken during the night to identify
the dead, the seriously injured, and to determine those who
were missing. It was believed that those initially reported
as missing are entrapped in compartments in the forward part
of the ship as a result of the torpedo explosion and
resultant flooding. As of 1900,
[44]
11 June, two of the persons previously reported missing,
have been recovered. One by removing him directly from the
space on board ship. The other was recovered by the PAPAGO,
a Fleet tug steaming approximately six miles astern of the
ship on the morning of 11 June. It is not known at this
time whether any of the other individuals reported missing
have drifted free of the space through the torpedo hole and
vanished from the area. It will not be possible to
determine until the ship has been drydocked and the
compartment dewatered and remains recovered. Preparation of
casualty messages were completed as expeditiously as
possible upon the completion of the musters, and necessary
message notifications sent. The ship rendezvoused with the
two destroyers on the morning of 9 June. Commander Destroyer
Squadron Twelve reported on board to inspect damage and
confer with the Commanding Officer. Personnel from the USS
DAVIS immediately boarded the ship to render assistance with
damage control and treatment of injured personnel. I have
no complaint to lodge against any officer, or man on board
USS LIBERTY for any acts of commission or omission during
the attack and post attack phase. I have nothing but the
greatest admiration for their courage, their devotion to
duty, and their efforts to save the ship. As the result of
my personal knowledge of the manner in which the following
personnel performed their duties during the attack and post
attack phases, I intend to commend Ensign LUCAS; Signalman
DAVIS; Quartermaster Third BROWN; Lieutenant George GOLDEN,
Engineering Officer; and Ensign SCOTT, Damage Control
Assistant. I have requested the officers and the petty
officers of the ship to advise me of any other individuals,
who, to their personal knowledge, performed in such a manner
as to warrant special recognition. I also intend to address
a letter of appreciation to Lieutenant Commander Bill
PETTYJOHN, Chief Staff Officer, COMDESRON TWELVE, for the
outstanding manner in which he has assumed the
responsibilities of assisting the Commanding Officer in
sailing the ship from point of rendezvous to destination of
Malta. A message of condolence from the ship has been sent
to BUPERS with the request that it
[45]
be delivered to the next of kin at the funeral or memorial
services conducted for the deceased and those missing in
action. A personal letter from the Commanding Officer to
the next at kin will be prepared and sent at the earliest
possible time. Dr. KEEFER, and the two pharmacist mates
will also be awarded letters of commendation from the
Commanding Officer. It is not known at this time the extent
of probable compromise of classified material. Destruction
of superseded RPS- distributed material was conducted
immediately prior to the attack. Lieutenant PIERCE,
Communication Officer and RPS-Custodian discussed the matter
with the Commanding Officer on the morning of 8 June, and it
was decided at that time that we would make the June burn
before the scheduled 15 June date, in view of the location
at the ship, and we intended to burn superseded key cards on
a daily bases as they were superseded. A report to this
effect was released by the Commanding Officer. It is not
known, however, whether this message was transmitted or not.
The court recessed at 1620 hours, 14 June 1967
The court opened at 1645 hours, 14 June 1967. All persons
connected with the inquiry who were present when the court
recessed are again present in court. Commander William
McGonagle, U.S Navy, resumed his position on the stand as a
witness.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
Questions by counsel for the court:
Q. Captain, will you please continue with your description
of the incident.
A. I would like to relate some additional information which
may be of some help to the court. USS LIBERTY departed
Norfolk, Virginia 2 May 1967 in accordance with COMSERVRON
EIGHT message dtg 281502Z April 1967. This was to be the
fifth deployment of the LIBERTY to foreign station since its
conversion and commissioning as a technical research ship in
Seattle,
[46]
Washington 30 December 1964. The deployment initially
commenced under the operational control of COMSERVRON EIGHT.
The first port of call was Abidjan, Ivory Coast with a
scheduled arrival of 22 May 1967. LIBERTY arrived at
Abidjan, Ivory Coast on the scheduled date. LIBERTY was
scheduled to spend four days in Abidjan, Ivory Coast to
depart on 26 May 1967. The operation order was similar to
that under which the LIBERTY had deployed on four previous
occasions. On the morning of 24 May, approximately 0345Z, a
message was received from COMSERVRON EIGHT with a dtg of
240020Z, May 67 in effect directing that LIBERTY get
underway immediately and proceed to Rota, Spain for further
operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Immediately upon
receipt of this message, LIBERTY commenced preparations for
getting underway. It was not possible to get underway,
however, until about 0730 on the morning of 24 May 1967.
The delay was due to awaiting for pilot, tug, and proper
tide conditions for transit of the Vridi Canal. USS LIBERTY
cleared the Vridi Canal approximately 0745, 24 May 1967, and
set course via coastal route direct to Rota, Spain at best
speed. An average of about 15 knots was maintained during
the transit. During the transit from Abidjan, Ivory Coast
to Rota, Spain, operational control of LIBERTY was changed
from COMSERVRON EIGHT to USCINCEUR. The reference for this
operational control change is COMSERVRON EIGHT 300202Z May
1967. This reference is not immediately available to me.
Operational control of LIBERTY was again shifted from
USCINCEUR to CINCUSNAVEUR in accordance with USCINCEUR
300932Z May 1967. This change of operational control
occurred as LIBERTY arrived at the sea buoy off the port of
Rota, Spain at about 0930 local time, 1 June 1967. After
completion of fueling, load- ing provisions, and
accomplishing repairs to the special communications relay
system (TRSSCOMM) the ship was RFS at about 1330, 2 June,
and at that time got underway in accordance with
CINCUSNAVEUR move order 7-67, dtg of this move order was
CINCUSNAVEUR dtg 311750Z May 67 modified by CINCUSNAVEUR dtg
011305Z June 1967. JCS message dtg 011545Z June 1967 is
considered pertinent in LIBERTY'S schedule from the period
02 June until the time of the incident. This message gives
departure date from Rota, route to
[47]
follow, point to proceed to, and the operating area of
Liberty during the period of 9 to 30 June 1967. Paragraph
1C of this message is par- ticularly pertinent. At 070001Z
June 1967, operational control of Liberty again changed from
CINCUSNAVEUR to COMSIXTHFLT in accordance with CINCUSNAVEUR
dtg 061357Z June 1967. This change of operational control
was made by message in which Liberty indicated to
COMSIXTHFLT that Liberty was reporting to COMSIXTHFLT in
accordance with the CINCUSNAVEUR message 061357Z. This
message also included Liberty endurance and provisions, dry,
frozen, and chill. It indicated that the ship had on board
approx- imately 85% fuel and utilized approximately 1% fuel
per day while on station. The message also indicated that
Liberty self-defense capability was limited to four 50
caliber machine guns. The dtg of this message is 062036Z
June 67. USS Liberty was operating under the operational
control of COMSIXTHFLT at the time of the incident. No
additional messages were in hand onboard Liberty concerning
area of operation or other guidance for the performance of
our mission than previously mentioned in the JCS message of
011545Z June 1967. COMSIXTHFLT message dtg 080917Z June
1967, which directed Liberty to proceed and operate within a
25 mile radius of 33.40 North, 32.30 East until further
notice was not received until delivered by hand on 10 June
1967. Had this message been received anytime prior to the
attack, Liberty would have attempted to open the range on
the coast of the countries indicated in the message to at
least be 100 miles specified. The existence of this message
was not known by the Commanding Officer of the Liberty at
the time of the incident and no action was taken to comply
with it. During the four previous deployments of USS
Liberty, the ship aroused unusual curiosity only during the
first and second deployments. The configuration of the ship
with unusual mast antennae arrangements and deckhouse
structures caused, so I understand stand inasmuch as I was
not on board as Commanding Officer at the time, some
surveillance, primarily surface, from the Southwest African
countries during its first two deployments. Lieutenant
GOLDEN, who was aboard at the time, my be
[48]
able to provide the Board with additional details in this
area.
...Lieutenant Junior Grade Lloyd C. PAINTER, United States
Naval Reserve, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn,
advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of
Military Justice and examined as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
Questions by Counsel for the Court:
Q. State your name, rank and organization?
A. Lloyd C. PAINTER, Lieutenant (jg), USNR.
Q. On 8 June 1967, at about 1400 hours, an incident
occurred aboard USS LIBERTY in which the vessel was
attacked. Would you please relate to this Court of Inquiry
what you recall concerning that incident?
A. Yes sir. I was at this time, the officer of the deck. I
had the 12 to 1600 watch that afternoon, and we had had a
practice general quarters drill at 1300 and secured from
that at approximately 1345, 1350. And during general
quarters I left the bridge and went to my general quarters
station, which is repair three, located on the mess docks.
After this drill was over, I went back up to the bridge to
relieve the watch, and when I came up to the bridge, I was
Q. What time was that?
A. Sir, I think It was 1350, thereabouts. I came back up
to the bridge and relieved Mr. O'CONNOR who was the general
quarters OOD, and assumed the watch. The first thing I was
concerned with was getting a fix, and I remember distinctly
checking the radar, and the nearest point of land on the
radar at approximately 1355 was 17.5 miles. And I remember
distinctly asking the Captain if I could come back to our
base course, which I believe was set at about 14 and a half
miles. We were about three miles outside of base course.
About this time, it was around 1400, the Captain was on the
starboard wing. He was watching some jet aircraft. The
Captain was on the starboard wing, and he was looking up in
the air at a couple of jet aircraft. He called me out there
and said, "you'd better call the forward gun mounts." He
said "I think they're going to attack," or words to that
effect. So, I ran into the bridge area and tried to call
the port and starboard gun mounts forward. I couldn't get
them; I called them about three times, and about the third
[55]
time I said, "bridge, gun mounts 51 and 52." They were hit.
I can't testify exactly which one was hit first, port or
starboard; they were both hit so fast. I believe the
starboard one was hit first. At this time, I still had the
phone in my hand, I was looking through the porthole at the
gun mounts. I was looking through the porthole when I was
trying to contact these two kids, and I saw them both; well,
I didn't exactly see them as such. They were blown apart,
but I saw the whole area go up in smoke and scattered metal.
And, at about the same time the aircraft strafed the bridge
area itself. The quartermaster, quartermaster third class
POLLARD was standing right next to me, and he was hit,
evidently with flying glass from the porthole. I don't know
why I came out without a scratch. I was standing, as I
said, right next to him. Finally, about this time they
started strafing and we both hit the deck, as well as Mr.
O'MALLEY, who was my JOOD at the time. As soon as the first
strafing raid had been made, we sounded general quarters
alarm. The Captain was on the bridge, He was in the pilot
house at this time. I don't know whether he was hit then or
not, I can't remember. It was so smokey. I took off for my
general quarters station, which, as I said before, was
repair three on the mess decks. On the way down I was
running as fast as I could. By the time I got to the
Chief's Lounge, the entrance through the lounge to the mess
docks, I saw SPICER, our postal clerk, lying there cut in
half with strafing and the hospital corpsman was applying
mouth to mouth resuscitation. This I later found out
failed. He died right there. Well, anyway, I got down to the
mess decks and all my men were assembling there as fast as
possible. They went to full battle dress, and so did I. I
can't recall exactly how long we were waiting for the
strafing raids to be over, but I believe it was
approximately 20 minutes. At this time someone, I believe
it was one of the quartermasters, came down and called me to
the bridge. He said, "the Captain's hurt and the operations
officer was dead, and the executive officer was mortally
wounded." I ran up to the bridge. And when I got up there,
the Captain was laying on the stretcher up there while
trying to get underway. He thought for a while I think, I'm
not sure, that he would pass out, and he wanted somebody up
there to take over. He wanted somebody up there in case
[56]
he did. I'm not sure, but I think that is why he had called
me up there. I don't know whether he called me up there, or
the quartermaster just took it on his own to get me up
there. I never found out. So, I was up there for a few
minutes and it looked like the strafing raids were over, and
some of the people were coming out and looking around and my
repair chief had come out to assess some of the damage.
When I saw him an the 01 level aft, I told him to take over
Repair Three as I would be on the bridge. Well, by this
times, the Captain had regained consciousness and told me
that I would best be needed in Repair Three.
Q. Was that the Captain?
A. Yes sir. So I left and went back to Repair Three, and, I
don't know how long, time was slipping by so fast at this
time, after that we had our first torpedo attack. It came
over, well the 1MC was out, it came over the sound powered
phones, "prepare for torpedo attack starboard side." So, we
prepared for a torpedo attack starboard side, which we
received in midships. I can't say exactly what time it was,
maybe 1435. Well, the ship at this time as soon as the
torpedo hit midships, we began to develop a starboard list
very quickly. So quickly that I felt as though we were
probably going to lose it. At this time, the DC central
passed the word to prepare to abandon ship. We then filed
out to our life rafts which were no longer with us because
they had been strafed and most of them were burned, so we
knocked most of them over the side. At this time the
torpedo boats, three of them, that had torpedoed us, were
laying off, waiting for us to sink, I believe. Anyway, they
didn't come near us at this time. However, we were able to
maintain the ship and stabilize it. It didn't sink. So the
Captain said that everyone could go back to general quarters
stations. At this time I went back to Repair Three on the
mess decks along with the rest of my repair party. All
during this time in Repair Three, my men were fighting fires
and knocking burning liferafts, etc. So we were kept fairly
busy down in Repair Three the whole time. Also they were
checking bulkheads and shoring where needed. After I went
back there, after the torpedo attack, we waited for what
seemed like many, many hours but I
[57]
imagine it was only 20 or 30 minutes; and in that time we
were checking out the torpedo hit midships and doing what
was necessary to prevent further flooding. About 30 minutes
later we had word from the Captain that torpedo boats were
approaching us again and to prepare for another torpedo
attack starboard side. And I know that if another torpedo
had hit us, it would have sunk us, so I told the men to
standby to abandon ship. We prepared to abandon ship in
case we were hit the second time. At this time we were dead
in the water with no steerage. However, we were able to
regain our steerage by manual means and able to make
approximately five to six knots. The pit log was out, we
were just guessing by the number of turns that were being
made. We tried to maintain a course, this time, I'm not
really sure, it was either 300 or 320 to take us out of
there. After we had gotten underway, an Israeli helicopter
came out and asked us if we wanted aid; well, they didn't
ask us, they just came along side and acted like they wanted
to help, but we waved them off. We maintained this course
as best we could throughout the night. I was up on the
bridge most of the night with the Captain, up until the
destroyer, DAVIS, I believe it was, came alongside the next
morning. Repair Three on the mess decks was designated a
casualty station because the wardroom, which was the normal
casualty station, was so badly strafed that we couldn't keep
them up there. The mess deck was a bloody mess that night.
People were dying. It was a ghastly sight. That's about all
I have to say.
Counsel for the Court: Did you have occasion to see the
national ensign flying?
A. Yes sir, I did. I saw the national ensign flying after
the, it was at the time I believe when we were going to
abandon ship. I ran out on the main deck to get the life
rafts ready. I remember distinctly looking back up and
seeing the Ensign flying. This was, I think, after the air
raid, after the torpedo attack.
Q. Had you seen it earlier that morning?
A. I saw it earlier that morning when I came up, I don't
know when it was.
[58]
I came up on and of off that morning checking a patrol plane
that had been flying over us. The quartermaster, DAVID QM2,
had told me that the night that he was wounded that he had
put the flag up at 0730 that morning.
Q. So you, in recollection, recall seeing the flag flying
in the morning and after the torpedo attack?
A. Yes, before and after the torpedo attack.
Q. Do you know whether or not it was the same flag?
A. I couldn't tell you sir. The way I thought at one time,
what the heck was it, I noticed there was something funny
about it. I might have seen the flag twice, because once I
saw one that had been shot up and it was ragged, and the
next time I looked at it I didn't notice whether it was
ragged or not. I couldn't say either way whether it was the
same flag.
A. Earlier in your testimony you mentioned that the LIBERTY
was 17.5 miles from nearest point of land. How did you
arrive at this?
A. By radar navigation.
Q. Did you take a fathometer check?
A. Fathometer checked, yes sir. Either 33 or 31 fathoms
under the keel at this time.
Counsel for the Court: Does any other member of this Court
have questions of this witness?
President: No further questions.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
Ensign John D. SCOTT, U. S. Naval Reserve, took the stand as
a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under
Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and examined as
follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
Questions by Counsel for the Court:
Q. State your full name, rank, and organization.
A. John D. SCOTT, Ensign, USNR.
Q. Mr. SCOTT, you know that this Court of Inquiry is
interested in the incident involving USS LIBERTY on 8 June
1967. Would you please tell the Court what you recall of
that incident?
[59]
A. Yes sir. On the morning of the 8th, I had the 4 to 8
Officer of the Deck watch on the bridge. It was a routine
watch. The only thing out of the ordinary was we had one
reconnaissance plane that flew by us and made a few circles
off our port beam. He circled around about three or four
times, then took off.
Q. About what time?
A. About 0515, 1 was not able to identify the aircraft. We
looked at it with the binoculars. Due to the distance we
could not see any markings or insignia of any sort on it.
President: That was local time, Mr. SCOTT?
A. Yes sir. The plane circled around several times then
took off in a true direction towards Tel Aviv. About 30
minutes later I got a call from coordination, sir, and Chief
CT SMITH was on the phone; wanted to know if I had an air
contact that was fairly close in the last half hour. I told
him I did and he wanted to know which direction it went
after it left the vicinity of the ship. I told him, "Tel
Aviv." He said, "Fine, that's all I want to know." I did
manage to take four pictures of the aircraft with the camera
on the bridge. I didn't know what type it was. It was a
double fuselage, twin-engine type. It looked somewhat like
an old P-38 or a small flying boxcar. That's about the only
significant thing that happened on the 4 to 8.
Q. Do you recall the flag or the national ensign flying?
A. Yes sir, it was flying. I noticed at first light that
the ensign was flying. I looked up to it to check the wind
direction just in the event I had to blow tubes and I wanted
to have a favorable wind direction. That's about all I
recall about the flag being up on the day and night while we
were over here. I don't recall seeing it down at all.
That's about all I have to say about the 4 to 8.
Q. Continue on during the day?
A. I wasn't aware of any aircraft overhead. I did notice
that at about the noon hour there was smoke on the horizon.
Could see results of bombing on the horizon. I had gone out
and taken a picture. I wasn't aware of aircraft. After we
secured from general quarters, I came in to
[60]
the wardroom and I just left when I heard the first hit.
With that, I took off running to DC central. I did not come
topside again until about 0500 the following day.
Counsel for the Court: I have no further questions of this
witness. Does any member of the Court?
Presidents: Tell us a little bit about your damage control
measures when the ship was hit from starboard.
A. Yes sir. When we were first hit, the first orders we got
were, "two fires, one port side in the vicinity of the gas
drums, one starboard side vicinity of the motor whaleboat."
I ordered fire fighting parties out. Next we were ordered to
pick up the wounded. We had a number of calls, repeated
calls to pick up the wounded. I called back and said that
every available stretcher was in use. They were using
blankets and mattresses to haul the people back. After the
fires were out, they burned for quite awhile before we got
them under control. The next thing, we were told by the
bridge to stand by for torpedo attack starboard side. The
torpedo hit at approximately, somewhere between 1425 and
1445. As soon as the torpedo hit, I called main control. I
don't keep a damage control log as such, my repair parties
do. They log messages they receive in a book. Neither one
of them, as soon as the attack started, kept a log. I kept
message blanks coming into repair parties, but they were not
timed. I had about ten or twelve message blanks prior to
the torpedo hitting. I had the main damage, I had the large
hole in the back berthing compartment, I had the hold in the
diagnostic room, I had the two fires, the fires under
control and one of them logged as out. But when the torpedo
hit, the logroom in damage control central was in a
shambles, the safe door blew open, logs went flying off the
shelves, we were knocked on the deck, and shortly thereafter
the order was passed down to set the destruction bill. And
with that, we didn't bother to write down our messages
anymore. Myself, my 1JV talker, and my 2JV talker commenced
burning all confidential messages and pubs in DC central.
Q. That's fine. Tell me a little about your shoring.
[61]
A. It was necessary, after we investigated the diagnostic
room, which is directly above the vicinity which the torpedo
hit, I went in, it was next to DC central, I went in with
the DC investigator from repair two. We saw the level of
the water rising. I stuck my hand in the hole. It came out
with black, black oil. With that I said, "It's still
rising, we're going to have to shore-it." We brought
shoring in and mattresses from the engineering berthing
compartment and commenced shoring. We found another rupture
out in the passageway and it was bulged out, but we had that
area pretty well under control.
Q. To establish the watertight boundary after the torpedo
attack, was there any question about anyone being left alive
in the spaces below?
A. No sir. When I saw the black oil coming up, I knew it
had ruptured the fuel tanks. I went down to main control.
I called them first and told them I had ruptured tanks up
here, and told them not to take inspections from these
tanks. Later on in the morning, I went down to main control
and told them to take inspections from starboard tanks but
not those two to correct the list. We went over to twelve
degrees, and came back to ten. About 0500 in the morning we
were down to about a 6 degrees list.
Q. Who was in charge of the forward repair parties at that
time?
A. Ensign TAYLOR. He was the Repair Officer. He was hit
before he ever got to the repair locker. He wandered off on
his own. He came down the passageway, stuck his head in DC
central. I could see he was hit very bad. He said,
"Scottie, I've been hit." I said, "I can't help you, go to
the mess decks. I'll call them and tell them you're coming."
I don't have a plotter or messenger, and there were just
three people in DC central, so none of us could leave.
Next, there was Chief THOMPSON, and I got the word that he
was hit, but not bad. A little later the bridge called
wanting a signalman. Both my signalmen had been hit, and I
called repair and asked them if they had any signalmen,
anybody, even enlisted men. Chief THOMPSON volunteered and
went to the bridge. Then DEMORI, shipfitter third, took
over.
President: This was Chief THOMPSON who volunteered, who was
already wounded?
