I do not like Trump, but banning him was totally illegal.
It does not matter if he lied or told the truth, that is not the business of the service provider.
The service provider can not use their own discretion in any way.
The only time the service provider can and should act, is when it is without doubt harmful, such as revenge porn or the illegal dissemination of private contract information.
The service provider can put what ever they want in a service agreement, and it does not matter.
The only thing that matters is what the FCC requires service providers to adhere to for them to be allowed on the Internet.
You really are wrong. But let's let the court tell your that.
Wrong. I am an expert on FCC internet regulations, so I know that it is illegal for social media sites to discriminate based on political beliefs. About the only thing they can legally censor are criminal acts.
Not to doubt your "expertise", but do you have a link to an actual law that is being violated?
Again, laws establish jurisdiction, but actually rules are set by arbitrary FCC regulations.
And they are currently under examination as to possible reinterpretation.
So I am generalizing the original principles.
But if you want to read more as to how the FCC is proceeding, here is some interesting reading:
{...
Last week, FCC Chairman Ajit Pai announced his intent to move forward with a rulemaking to interpret Section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934. Under certain circumstances, Section 230 provides websites, including social media companies, that host or moderate content generated by others with immunity from liability. In announcing his decision, Chairman Pai noted that “[m]embers of all three branches of government have expressed serious concern about the prevailing interpretation” of Section 230, and observed that an overly broad interpretation could “shield[] social media companies from consumer protection laws in a way that has no basis in the text” of the statute.
The Chairman’s decision was consistent with my advice that the FCC has the legal authority to interpret Section 230. Due to the unique interest generated by this proceeding, Chairman Pai has now asked me to make my analysis public, in furtherance of his longstanding commitment to transparency in the rulemaking process.
The policy issues raised by the debate over Section 230 may be complex, but the FCC’s legal authority is straightforward. Simply put, the FCC has the authority to interpret all provisions of the Communications Act, including amendments such as Section 230. As I explain below, this authority flows from the plain meaning of Section 201(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, which confers on the FCC the power to issue rules necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act. By expressly directing that Section 230 be placed into the Communications Act, Congress made clear that the FCC’s rulemaking authority extended to the provisions of that section. Two seminal U.S. Supreme Court cases authored by the late Justice Antonin Scalia—
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) and
City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013)—confirm this conclusion. Based on this authority, the Commission can feel confident proceeding with a rulemaking to clarify the scope of the Section 230 immunity shield.
Statutory Background
To understand why the Commission has authority to interpret Section 230, it helps to understand how that section became part of the Communications Act. In 1934, Congress adopted the Communications Act in its original form, establishing the FCC as an independent federal agency charged with regulating interstate and international communications. Four years later, Congress added Section 201(b), which delegated to the Commission the power to “prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions of this Act.”
Since then, the most consequential set of amendments to the Communications Act arrived in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which updated the Act for the then-nascent Internet age. Section 1(b) of that Act made clear that, except where otherwise expressly provided, each of the 1996 Act’s provisions were to be inserted into the Communications Act of 1934.
Title V of the 1996 Act was named the “Communications Decency Act of 1996.” Among other provisions, this Title included Section 509, named “Online family empowerment.” Consistent with Section 1(b), Congress instructed in Section 509 that “Title II of the Communications Act of 1934 . . . is amended by adding at the end the following new section: Section 230.” Thus, Section 230 was born and became part of the Communications Act of 1934.
Section 230 provides, among other things, that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” It further provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of . . . any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.” The term “interactive computer service” is defined “as any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.” That broad definition is commonly understood to include websites that host or moderate content generated by others, such as social media companies.
...}
Last week, FCC Chairman Ajit Pai announced his intent to move forward with a rulemaking to interpret Section 230 of the C
www.fcc.gov