On 14 August 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) revealed the existence of undeclared nuclear facilities in Iran, including Natanz Enrichment Complex, the address of the Kalaye Electric Company, a heavy water production plant under construction at Arak, and the names of various individuals and front companies involved with the nuclear program. [14] Between September and October 2003, the IAEA carried out a number of facilities inspections and met with Iranian officials to determine the history of Iran's nuclear program. In November, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution welcoming Iran's decision to sign the Additional Protocol and suspend enrichment. However, the Board noted with concern Iran's previous concealment efforts and pointed out that Iran's new declarations contradicted the Agency's previous information about its nuclear program. The Board requested that the Director General take all of the necessary steps to confirm Iran's past and present nuclear activities. [15]
At a Diplomatic Impasse with the International Community: 2003 to 2009
To avoid referral to the UN Security Council, Iran entered into negotiations with the EU-3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom), and agreed in October 2003 to cooperate with the IAEA, sign the Additional Protocol, and temporarily suspend conversion and enrichment activities. [16] However, Iran exploited ambiguities in the definition of "suspension" to continue to produce centrifuge components and carry out small-scale conversion experiments. [17] Faced with renewed sanctions threats, Iran concluded the Paris Agreement with the EU-3 on 15 November 2004. [18] Tehran agreed to continue the temporary suspension of enrichment and conversion activities, including the manufacture, installation, testing, and operation of centrifuges, and committed to working with the EU-3 to find a mutually beneficial long-term diplomatic solution. [19]
In early November 2004, the CIA received thousands of pages of information from a "walk-in" source indicating that Iran was modifying the nose cone of its Shahab-3 missile to carry a nuclear warhead. Furthermore, in early 2004, the IAEA discovered that Iran had hidden blueprints for a more advanced P-2 centrifuge and a document detailing uranium hemisphere casting from its inspectors. [20] Iranian officials dismissed these documents as forgeries. [21] The IAEA called on Iran to be more cooperative and to answer all of the Agency's questions about the origins of its centrifuge technology. [22] Iran amended its previous declaration and admitted that it had clandestinely imported P-1 centrifuges through a foreign intermediary in 1987. Iran also acknowledged for the first time that it had imported P-2 centrifuge drawings in 1994. [23] The Agency determined that the traces of highly enriched uranium (HEU) on Iranian centrifuge equipment most likely originated from the foreign intermediary, as they did not match any samples from Iran's declared inventory. [24]
Iran's Nuclear Program Timeline and History | NTI
