toobfreak
Tungsten/Glass Member
I laugh often here shaking my head reading how many nitwits on this board often tout that the USA can support many more (especially speaking in defense of illegal immigrants) by stating blankly that if all the US population were moved together, how it would only fill a small state, as if that suggests the USA can withstand many times more people (just keep BRINGING THEM IN!), apparently totally unaware of the many other factors involved in rising population and the burgeoning needs this imposes on economic, societal, and environmental factors. The same holds true when applied on a global scale that either the world (or the USA) has room to support far more people. The main point is usually to claim all arguments against illegal immigration are based solely in xenophobia, prejudice and hysteria, if not outright stupidity (as we know is always the case with all conservatives and Trump-supporters).
The truth is that we already have FAR TOO MANY PEOPLE on the planet and in the country, we may already be at an unsustainable level in the long run and I've long thought that we need to cut back population (nationally if not globally) by A THIRD. And not doing so could ultimately lead us to a collapse of (at least western) civilization. Which brings me to the observations and thoughts on the longevity and cycles history tells us about civilizations we would be wise to remember.
Some observations about civilizations throughout history:
1). Great civilizations are not murdered. Instead, they usually take their own lives.
2). Collapse is often quick and greatness provides no immunity. The Roman Empire covered 1.9 million sq miles in 390AD. Five years later, it had plummeted to 770,000 sq miles. By 476, the empire’s reach was zero.
In the chart below, the lifespan of various civilizations can be compared, which is defined as a society with agriculture, multiple cities, military dominance in its geographical region and a continuous political structure. Given this definition, all empires are civilizations, but not all civilizations are empires. The data is drawn from the growth and decline of empires ranging from the period 3000BC to 600AD.
Collapse can be defined as a rapid and enduring loss of population, identity and socio-economic complexity.
Public services crumble and disorder ensues as government loses control of its monopoly on violence. Virtually all past civilizations have faced this fate. Some recovered or transformed, such as the Chinese and Egyptian. Other collapses were permanent, as was the case of Easter Island. Sometimes the cities at the epicenter of collapse are revived, as was the case with Rome. In other cases, such as the Mayan ruins, they are left abandoned as a mausoleum for future tourists.
What can this tell us about the future of global modern civilization? Are the lessons of agrarian empires applicable to our post-18th Century period of industrial capitalism?
While there is no single accepted universal theory for why collapses happen, various explanations and contributing factors have been proposed, including:
CLIMATE CHANGE: crop failure, starvation and desertification. The collapse of the Anasazi, the Tiwanaku civilization, the Akkadians, the Mayan, the Roman Empire, and many others have all coincided with abrupt climatic changes, usually droughts.
ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION: Collapse can occur when societies overshoot the carrying capacity of their environment. This ecological collapse theory points to excessive deforestation, water pollution, soil degradation and the loss of biodiversity as precipitating causes.
INEQUALITY AND OLIGARCHY: Wealth and political inequality can be central drivers of social disintegration, as can oligarchy and centralization of power among leaders. This not only causes social distress, but handicaps a society’s ability to respond to ecological, social and economic problems. As population increases, the supply of labor outstrips demand, workers become cheap and society becomes top-heavy. This inequality undermines collective solidarity and political turbulence follows.
COMPLEXITY: Societies eventually collapse under the weight of their own accumulated complexity and bureaucracy. Societies are problem-solving collectives that grow in complexity in order to overcome new issues. However, the returns from complexity eventually reach a point of diminishing returns to where eventually, the costs of said complexity outweigh what it gives us back. After this point, collapse will eventually ensue.
Another measure of increasing complexity is called Energy Return on Investment (EROI). This refers to the ratio between the amount of energy produced by a resource relative to the energy needed to obtain it. Like complexity, EROI appears to have a point of diminishing returns.
EXTERNAL SHOCKS: In other words, the “four horsemen”: war, natural disasters, famine and plagues. The Aztec Empire, for example, was brought to an end by Spanish invaders. Most early agrarian states were fleeting due to deadly epidemics. The concentration of humans and cattle in walled settlements with poor hygiene made disease outbreaks unavoidable and catastrophic.
RANDOMNESS/BAD LUCK: Collapse can be random and independent of age much as a similar pattern has been seen in the evolutionary record of species.
Collapse is a tipping point phenomena, when compounding stressors overrun societal coping capacity. Inequality is more difficult to calculate. The typical measurement of the Gini Index suggests that inequality has decreased slightly globally (although it is increasing within countries). However, the Gini Index can be misleading as it only measures relative changes in income. In other words, if two individuals earning $1 and $100,000 both doubled their income, the Gini would show no change. But the gap between the two would have jumped from $99,999 to $198,000. The 1% have increased in their share of global income from approximately 16% in 1980 to over 20% today. Importantly, wealth inequality is even worse. The share of global wealth from the 1% has swelled from 25-30% in the 1980s to approximately 40% in 2016. The reality is likely to be starker as these numbers do not capture wealth and income siphoned into overseas tax havens.
The EROI for fossil fuels seems to be steadily decreasing over time as the easiest to reach and richest reserves are depleted. Unfortunately, most renewable replacements, such as solar, have a markedly lower EROI, largely due to their energy density and the rare earth metals and manufacturing required to produce them. This has led to the possibility of an “energy cliff” as EROI declines to a point where current societal levels of affluence may soon no longer be able to be maintained.
When we look at all these collapse and resilience indicators as a whole, the message is clear that we should not be complacent. There are some reasons to be optimistic, thanks to our ability to innovate and diversify away from disaster. Yet the world is worsening in areas that have contributed to the collapse of previous societies. The climate is changing, the gap between the rich and poor is widening, the world is becoming increasingly complex, and our demands on the environment are outstripping planetary carrying capacity.
Worryingly, the world is now deeply interconnected and interdependent. In the past, collapse was confined to regions – it was a temporary setback, and people often could easily return to agrarian or hunter-gatherer lifestyles. For many, it was even a welcome reprieve from the oppression of early states. Moreover, the weapons available during social disorder were rudimentary: swords, arrows and occasionally guns.
Today, societal collapse is a more treacherous prospect. The weapons available to a state, and sometimes even groups, during a breakdown now range from biological agents to nuclear weapons. New instruments of violence, such as lethal autonomous weapons, may be available in the near future. People are increasingly specialized and disconnected from the production of food and basic goods. And a changing climate may irreparably damage our ability to return to simple farming practices.
Think of civilization as a poorly-built ladder. As you climb, each step that you used falls away. A fall from a height of just a few rungs is fine. Yet the higher you climb, the larger the fall. Eventually, once you reach a sufficient height, any drop from the ladder is fatal.
With the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we may have already reached this point of civilizational “terminal velocity”. Any collapse – any fall from the ladder – risks being permanent. Nuclear war in itself could result in an existential risk: either the extinction of our species, or a permanent catapult back to the Stone Age. While we are becoming more economically powerful and resilient, our technological capabilities also present unprecedented threats that no civilization has had to contend with before. Assistance in our self-imposed ruin will not come from hostile neighbors, but from our own technological powers. Collapse, in our case, would be a progress trap.
The collapse of our civilization is not inevitable. History suggests it is likely, but we have the unique advantage of being able to learn from the wreckages of societies past. We know what needs to be done. The policy proposals are there. Only the political will is lacking. We will only march into collapse if we continue to advance blindly. We are only doomed if we are unwilling to listen to the past.
Civilization [Duration in years]:
Ancient Egypt, Old Kingdom [505]
Ancient Egypt, Middle Kingdom [405]
Ancient Egypt, New Kingdom [501]
Norte Chico Civilisation [827]
Harappan Civilisation (Indus Valley Civilisation) [800]
Kerma [400]
Akkadian Empire [187]
Elam Civilisation (Awan Dynasty) [157]
Minoan Civilisation (Protopalatial) [500]
Xia Dynasty [500]
Third Dynasty of Ur [46]
Old Assyrian Empire [241]
Middle Assyrian Empire [313]
Neo Assyrian Empire [322]
Elam Civilisation (Eparti Dynasty) [210]
First Babylonian Dynasty [299]
Old Hittie Empire [250]
Minoan Civilisation (Neopalatial) [250]
Shang Dynasty [478]
Mycenae [400]
Vedic Civilisation [1000]
Middle Hittite Kingdom [70]
Elam Civilisation (Middle Elamite Period) [342]
New Hittite Kingdom [220]
Olmecs [1000]
Phoenicia [661]
Zhou Dynasty (Western Period) [351]
Kingdom of Israel and Judah [298]
Chavin Culture [700]
Urartu [225]
Kushite Kingdom [1150]
Etruscans [404]
Zhou Dynasty (Eastern Zhou Spring Period) [330]
Zhou Dynasty (Eastern Zhou Warring States Period) [411]
Ancient Rome [244]
Elam Civilisation (Neo-Elamite Period) [203]
Phrygia [43]
Lydia [144]
Magadha Empire [364]
Chaldean Dynasty (Babylon) [87]
Medean Empire [66]
Orontid Dynasty [540]
Scythians [800]
Mahanjanapadas [200]
Carthage [667]
Achaemenid Empire [220]
Roman Republic [461]
Nanda Empire [24]
Ptolemaic Egypt [302]
Classical Greek [265]
Hellenistic [177]
Maurya Empire [137]
Seleucid Empire [249]
First Chera Empire [500]
Early Chola Empire [500]
Maghada-Maurya [90]
Parthian Empire [469]
Satavahana Dynasty [450]
Qin Dynasty [14]
Xiongnu Empire [184]
Han Dynasty (Western Period) [197]
Numidia [156]
Teotihuacans [735]
Kingdom of Armenia [442]
Hsiung Nu Han [120]
Sunga Empire [112]
Andhra [370]
Aksumite Empire [1100]
Kanva Dynasty [45]
Three Kingdoms of Korea [725]
Saka [140]
Roman Empire [525]
Han Dynasty (Eastern Period) [195]
Kushan [200]
Bactria [70]
Ptolemaic [290]
Liu-Sung [250]
Gupta [90]
Hun [100]
Byzantine [350]
Yuen-Yuen [30]
Toba [130]
White Hun [100]
Visigoth [240]
T'u Chueh Turk [90]
Avar [220]
Western Turk [70]
The lifespans of ancient civilisations
Further reading on the effects man had in one small microcosm as an example of what he is really doing everywhere on a global scale:
The beach nobody can touch - BBC News
The truth is that we already have FAR TOO MANY PEOPLE on the planet and in the country, we may already be at an unsustainable level in the long run and I've long thought that we need to cut back population (nationally if not globally) by A THIRD. And not doing so could ultimately lead us to a collapse of (at least western) civilization. Which brings me to the observations and thoughts on the longevity and cycles history tells us about civilizations we would be wise to remember.
Some observations about civilizations throughout history:
1). Great civilizations are not murdered. Instead, they usually take their own lives.
2). Collapse is often quick and greatness provides no immunity. The Roman Empire covered 1.9 million sq miles in 390AD. Five years later, it had plummeted to 770,000 sq miles. By 476, the empire’s reach was zero.
In the chart below, the lifespan of various civilizations can be compared, which is defined as a society with agriculture, multiple cities, military dominance in its geographical region and a continuous political structure. Given this definition, all empires are civilizations, but not all civilizations are empires. The data is drawn from the growth and decline of empires ranging from the period 3000BC to 600AD.
Collapse can be defined as a rapid and enduring loss of population, identity and socio-economic complexity.
Public services crumble and disorder ensues as government loses control of its monopoly on violence. Virtually all past civilizations have faced this fate. Some recovered or transformed, such as the Chinese and Egyptian. Other collapses were permanent, as was the case of Easter Island. Sometimes the cities at the epicenter of collapse are revived, as was the case with Rome. In other cases, such as the Mayan ruins, they are left abandoned as a mausoleum for future tourists.
What can this tell us about the future of global modern civilization? Are the lessons of agrarian empires applicable to our post-18th Century period of industrial capitalism?
While there is no single accepted universal theory for why collapses happen, various explanations and contributing factors have been proposed, including:
CLIMATE CHANGE: crop failure, starvation and desertification. The collapse of the Anasazi, the Tiwanaku civilization, the Akkadians, the Mayan, the Roman Empire, and many others have all coincided with abrupt climatic changes, usually droughts.
ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION: Collapse can occur when societies overshoot the carrying capacity of their environment. This ecological collapse theory points to excessive deforestation, water pollution, soil degradation and the loss of biodiversity as precipitating causes.
INEQUALITY AND OLIGARCHY: Wealth and political inequality can be central drivers of social disintegration, as can oligarchy and centralization of power among leaders. This not only causes social distress, but handicaps a society’s ability to respond to ecological, social and economic problems. As population increases, the supply of labor outstrips demand, workers become cheap and society becomes top-heavy. This inequality undermines collective solidarity and political turbulence follows.
COMPLEXITY: Societies eventually collapse under the weight of their own accumulated complexity and bureaucracy. Societies are problem-solving collectives that grow in complexity in order to overcome new issues. However, the returns from complexity eventually reach a point of diminishing returns to where eventually, the costs of said complexity outweigh what it gives us back. After this point, collapse will eventually ensue.
Another measure of increasing complexity is called Energy Return on Investment (EROI). This refers to the ratio between the amount of energy produced by a resource relative to the energy needed to obtain it. Like complexity, EROI appears to have a point of diminishing returns.
EXTERNAL SHOCKS: In other words, the “four horsemen”: war, natural disasters, famine and plagues. The Aztec Empire, for example, was brought to an end by Spanish invaders. Most early agrarian states were fleeting due to deadly epidemics. The concentration of humans and cattle in walled settlements with poor hygiene made disease outbreaks unavoidable and catastrophic.
RANDOMNESS/BAD LUCK: Collapse can be random and independent of age much as a similar pattern has been seen in the evolutionary record of species.
Collapse is a tipping point phenomena, when compounding stressors overrun societal coping capacity. Inequality is more difficult to calculate. The typical measurement of the Gini Index suggests that inequality has decreased slightly globally (although it is increasing within countries). However, the Gini Index can be misleading as it only measures relative changes in income. In other words, if two individuals earning $1 and $100,000 both doubled their income, the Gini would show no change. But the gap between the two would have jumped from $99,999 to $198,000. The 1% have increased in their share of global income from approximately 16% in 1980 to over 20% today. Importantly, wealth inequality is even worse. The share of global wealth from the 1% has swelled from 25-30% in the 1980s to approximately 40% in 2016. The reality is likely to be starker as these numbers do not capture wealth and income siphoned into overseas tax havens.
The EROI for fossil fuels seems to be steadily decreasing over time as the easiest to reach and richest reserves are depleted. Unfortunately, most renewable replacements, such as solar, have a markedly lower EROI, largely due to their energy density and the rare earth metals and manufacturing required to produce them. This has led to the possibility of an “energy cliff” as EROI declines to a point where current societal levels of affluence may soon no longer be able to be maintained.
When we look at all these collapse and resilience indicators as a whole, the message is clear that we should not be complacent. There are some reasons to be optimistic, thanks to our ability to innovate and diversify away from disaster. Yet the world is worsening in areas that have contributed to the collapse of previous societies. The climate is changing, the gap between the rich and poor is widening, the world is becoming increasingly complex, and our demands on the environment are outstripping planetary carrying capacity.
Worryingly, the world is now deeply interconnected and interdependent. In the past, collapse was confined to regions – it was a temporary setback, and people often could easily return to agrarian or hunter-gatherer lifestyles. For many, it was even a welcome reprieve from the oppression of early states. Moreover, the weapons available during social disorder were rudimentary: swords, arrows and occasionally guns.
Today, societal collapse is a more treacherous prospect. The weapons available to a state, and sometimes even groups, during a breakdown now range from biological agents to nuclear weapons. New instruments of violence, such as lethal autonomous weapons, may be available in the near future. People are increasingly specialized and disconnected from the production of food and basic goods. And a changing climate may irreparably damage our ability to return to simple farming practices.
Think of civilization as a poorly-built ladder. As you climb, each step that you used falls away. A fall from a height of just a few rungs is fine. Yet the higher you climb, the larger the fall. Eventually, once you reach a sufficient height, any drop from the ladder is fatal.
With the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we may have already reached this point of civilizational “terminal velocity”. Any collapse – any fall from the ladder – risks being permanent. Nuclear war in itself could result in an existential risk: either the extinction of our species, or a permanent catapult back to the Stone Age. While we are becoming more economically powerful and resilient, our technological capabilities also present unprecedented threats that no civilization has had to contend with before. Assistance in our self-imposed ruin will not come from hostile neighbors, but from our own technological powers. Collapse, in our case, would be a progress trap.
The collapse of our civilization is not inevitable. History suggests it is likely, but we have the unique advantage of being able to learn from the wreckages of societies past. We know what needs to be done. The policy proposals are there. Only the political will is lacking. We will only march into collapse if we continue to advance blindly. We are only doomed if we are unwilling to listen to the past.
Civilization [Duration in years]:
Ancient Egypt, Old Kingdom [505]
Ancient Egypt, Middle Kingdom [405]
Ancient Egypt, New Kingdom [501]
Norte Chico Civilisation [827]
Harappan Civilisation (Indus Valley Civilisation) [800]
Kerma [400]
Akkadian Empire [187]
Elam Civilisation (Awan Dynasty) [157]
Minoan Civilisation (Protopalatial) [500]
Xia Dynasty [500]
Third Dynasty of Ur [46]
Old Assyrian Empire [241]
Middle Assyrian Empire [313]
Neo Assyrian Empire [322]
Elam Civilisation (Eparti Dynasty) [210]
First Babylonian Dynasty [299]
Old Hittie Empire [250]
Minoan Civilisation (Neopalatial) [250]
Shang Dynasty [478]
Mycenae [400]
Vedic Civilisation [1000]
Middle Hittite Kingdom [70]
Elam Civilisation (Middle Elamite Period) [342]
New Hittite Kingdom [220]
Olmecs [1000]
Phoenicia [661]
Zhou Dynasty (Western Period) [351]
Kingdom of Israel and Judah [298]
Chavin Culture [700]
Urartu [225]
Kushite Kingdom [1150]
Etruscans [404]
Zhou Dynasty (Eastern Zhou Spring Period) [330]
Zhou Dynasty (Eastern Zhou Warring States Period) [411]
Ancient Rome [244]
Elam Civilisation (Neo-Elamite Period) [203]
Phrygia [43]
Lydia [144]
Magadha Empire [364]
Chaldean Dynasty (Babylon) [87]
Medean Empire [66]
Orontid Dynasty [540]
Scythians [800]
Mahanjanapadas [200]
Carthage [667]
Achaemenid Empire [220]
Roman Republic [461]
Nanda Empire [24]
Ptolemaic Egypt [302]
Classical Greek [265]
Hellenistic [177]
Maurya Empire [137]
Seleucid Empire [249]
First Chera Empire [500]
Early Chola Empire [500]
Maghada-Maurya [90]
Parthian Empire [469]
Satavahana Dynasty [450]
Qin Dynasty [14]
Xiongnu Empire [184]
Han Dynasty (Western Period) [197]
Numidia [156]
Teotihuacans [735]
Kingdom of Armenia [442]
Hsiung Nu Han [120]
Sunga Empire [112]
Andhra [370]
Aksumite Empire [1100]
Kanva Dynasty [45]
Three Kingdoms of Korea [725]
Saka [140]
Roman Empire [525]
Han Dynasty (Eastern Period) [195]
Kushan [200]
Bactria [70]
Ptolemaic [290]
Liu-Sung [250]
Gupta [90]
Hun [100]
Byzantine [350]
Yuen-Yuen [30]
Toba [130]
White Hun [100]
Visigoth [240]
T'u Chueh Turk [90]
Avar [220]
Western Turk [70]
The lifespans of ancient civilisations
Further reading on the effects man had in one small microcosm as an example of what he is really doing everywhere on a global scale:
The beach nobody can touch - BBC News
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