It did not have to be a question of whether we used them or not
Did we have to choose targets where 150,000 civilians were killed?
Could a non lethal “demonstration” have yielded the same results?
A non-lethal demonstration would have indicated weakness. "See, the Americans are reluctant to shed blood, we can hold out for better terms."
I don't think there was really as much hand-wringing going on at the time. Americans hated Japan with a passion after Pearl Harbor, Bataan, and a litany of horrors.
AFTER the war. After we were facing down the threat of nuclear annihilation, we did a lot of reflection.
But consider another thing. What if both sides had developed these weapons without them ever having been used on people? Imagine trying to resolve Korea or Vietnam or the Suez Crisis because you had no idea what these things actually did.
WWII ended on July 16, 1945
That was the day we knew we had a working bomb. Japan didn’t know it, but we had a working bomb. At that point, an invasion of Japan was off the table.
The trade off has never been.....
Drop the bomb or lose a million people to an invasion
The real trade off was......How should we use our bomb?
Was killing 100,000 civilians in Hiroshima and 70,000 in Nagasaki our only option? No, it wasn’t.
We could have chosen a lightly populated island that had military value. We could have filmed the island before the bomb, filmed the bomb and then filmed the island after the bomb. We then show the film to the world. Say...We are a badass...we have a freaking bomb
Give Japan one month to assess their situation, not two days
If they do not capitulate, then Hiroshima is the next target
Where is the real rightwinger? What have you done with him? He would never be agreeing with me on something like this. The gig is up. Who are you, really?
To follow up on your valid points, Truman knew weeks before Hiroshima that if he would just assure the Japanese that the emperor would not be deposed, the Japanese would surrender on terms that were acceptable to us. He knew this because we were reading the Japanese diplomatic cables--all of them. He knew that the emperor himself wanted to end the war and that the only snag was the demand for "unconditional surrender." Many Japan experts, including former Ambassador Grew, told Truman that guaranteeing the emperor's status would lead to an acceptable Japanese surrender.
Truman and his inner circle, along with most of the War Department, also knew that Japan was prostrate and beaten, that Japan was virtually defenseless again our air raids, that our naval blockade had cut off most shipping, that Japan's merchant fleet was almost non-existent, that its Navy had been reduced by about 90%, and that for months the Japanese people had been surviving on greatly reduced food rations.
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) spent months studying the effects of our conventional and atomic bombing of Japan and concluded that Japan would have surrendered by no later than December 1945, and probably before November, even if we had not used the atomic bomb and even if the Soviet Union had not entered the war against Japan:
Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated. (USSBS 26)