I’m guessing that those who are defending the government’s version of Japan’s surrender have never read any of the mountain of scholarly research that has debunked that version. One such research piece is Professor Ward Wilson’s famous article “The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in Light of Hiroshima,” published in the prestigious journal
International Security in 2007
.
Wilson documents what numerous other scholars have documented, namely, that Soviet entry into the war, not the atomic bombs, caused the moderates to push harder than ever for surrender and caused some key hardliners to soften their opposition to surrender. Wilson notes, for example, that after the nuking of Hiroshima was confirmed, this was
not enough to cause the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War to meet (this council is commonly referred to as the Supreme Council or the Supreme War Council). However, when news of the Soviet invasion reached Tokyo, the Supreme War Council met almost immediately. Here is an excerpt from Wilson’s article:
When Japanese responses to the Hiroshima bombing are placed side by side with responses to the Soviet intervention, it is clear that the Soviet intervention touched off a crisis, while the Hiroshima bombing did not.
Japanese governing bodies did not display a sense of crisis after Hiroshima. First reports of an attack on that city reached Tokyo on August 6 and were confirmed the next day by fuller reports and an announcement by President Truman that a nuclear weapon had been used in the attack. Even after the attack was confirmed, however, the Supreme Council did not meet for two days. If the bombing of Hiroshima touched off a crisis, this delay is inexplicable. . . .
In all, three full days elapsed after the bombing of Hiroshima in which the Supreme Council did not meet to discuss the bombing. When the Soviets intervened on August 9 and word of the invasion reached Tokyo at around 4:30 a.m., on the other hand, the Supreme Council met by 10:30 that same morning. . . .
Following the bombing of Hiroshima, Emperor Hirohito took no action except to repeatedly request “more details.” When word of the Soviet invasion reached him, however, the emperor immediately summoned Lord Privy Seal Kido and told him, “In light of the Soviet entry . . . it was all the more urgent to “find a means to end the war.” He commanded Kido to “have a heart-to-heart talk” with Prime Minister Suzuki without delay. (
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/is3104_pp162-179_wilson.pdf)
Literally hundreds of other scholars have documented these same facts. For example, Dr. Noriko Kawamura, a professor of history at the University of Washington, in her recent book
Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War, using previously unexploited Japanese sources, presents additional evidence that it was the Soviet invasion, not the nukes, that caused the moderates to push harder for surrender than they had ever done before and that created the circumstances that enabled the emperor to order the military to surrender.
Incidentally, Dr. Kawamura also debunks the slanted portrayals of Hirohito and the Japanese government painted by scholars like Herbert Bix and Robert Maddox. She points out that Bix mistranslated several of the Japanese sources that he used.