mikegriffith1
Mike Griffith
- Thread starter
- #141
The FDR-Truman apologists here seem to forget, or choose to ignore, that the Chinese Nationalists were getting massive aid from the Soviet Union. They also keep acting like Japan started the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, but this is simply false--even most historians now admit that the Chinese, not the Japanese, started the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Furthermore, as numerous scholars have documented, it was the Chinese, not the Japanese, who broke the truce (1) by moving four divisions into the area near Shanghai and (2) by attacking the Japanese quarter of Shanghai with two divisions. The record is clear that before the Nationalists attacked, the Japanese were urgently trying to reach a peace deal with the Nationalists because even the Army's general staff did not want to prolong the war in China any further.
Clarification: I should have said the Japanese army's general staff did not want to expand Japan's involvement in China any further. There was no "war" yet. There had been a few skirmishes in the preceding four years, but no war, and there was a long-standing truce in effect in 1937. The war began when the Chinese Nationalists, in response to Japan's peace offer, moved four divisions into the Shanghai region and then attacked the Japanese quarter of Shanghai with two full divisions in 1937.
The Japanese had been trying to defuse the tense situation in Shanghai when the Nationalists attacked a small Japanese garrison because they thought they could easily overrun the garrison before the Japanese could get reinforcements to the area. But, the 2,000-man garrison fought with unbelievable courage and held off the 30,000-man Chinese army that attacked it just long enough for reinforcements to arrive. However, this incident did not lead to an all-out battle for Shanghai. A compromise was reached, and Shanghai returned to some sense of normalcy (Peter Harmsen, Storm Clouds Over the Pacific, 1931-1941, locs. 732-762).
But, this situation changed when Chiang Kaishek, the Nationalist leader, decided to attack the Japanese section of Shanghai with two elite divisions. The Japanese brought in more reinforcements and an enormous battle ensued, ending with the Nationalist forces being expelled from Shanghai and the Japanese taking control of the city (Storms Clouds Over the Pacific, locs. 1413-1453).
Chiang Kaishek’s reasons for picking a fight with the Japanese at Shanghai remain a subject of debate. Harmsen:
Chiang may have genuinely thought that by concentrating his best troops in a shock attack on the meager Japanese garrison in Shanghai, he would be able to score a quick, dramatic victory that could rally the nation.
Japan, on the other hand, only entered the battle reluctantly. The army already felt overstretched in the north of China, and for the wrong reasons. Many Japanese generals considered the Soviet Union to be the main threat and the one that most resources had to be directed towards. The Chinese themselves understood this was the case, and on occasion admitted so in public. “Japan had no wish to fight at Shanghai,” Chinese General Zhang Fakui, one of the top field commanders during the struggle for the city, said in a post-war interview. “It should be simple to see that we took the initiative.” (Storm Clouds Over the Pacific, loc. 1453)
Yet, FDR and his allies in the press, along with the Soviets, blamed the Japanese and cited their capture of Shanghai as another alleged example of Japanese aggression.