Right, when the Clinton administration threatened banks to lower their lending standards and the Fed flooded them with virtually zero interest loans, and W continued that policy it was the bank's fault, not the politicians who used government force and confiscated assets to make them do it.
You're a sheep. Or in your native language, baaaaaa...
Propaganda alert! Pure BULLSHIT.
History is propaganda? Interesting. So when liberal politicians tell you things that didn't happen, you really believe that it did, even when you remember that it didn't. Amazing. The brainwashing is strong in this one...
History? From you?...You are spewing RIGHT WING propaganda. As USUAL. You are right wing, not libertarian.
WTF don't you actually educate yourself instead of parroting faux news propaganda.
Here are the FACTS we DO know:
1) The financial crisis was not caused by low and middle income families buying a home.
2) It was not caused by dead beat poor people.
3) Fannie and Freddie were not to cause.
4) The Community Investment Act was not the culprit either.
The crisis was caused by private lending, to mostly upper middle class and the wealthy. ONLY 6% of of all the higher-priced loans were extended by CRA-covered lenders to lower-income borrowers or neighborhoods in their CRA assessment areas. The majority of those foreclosed on were wealthy and upper middle class, plus a large segment of buyers who were wealthy home flippers looking for a fast buck. They strategically walked away from their mortgages, leaving people who bought homes to live in with lower values on their house and neighborhood.
AND, what really sucks for the right wing propaganda of lies, all the way back to the late '90's there was one very outspoken and vocal critic of predatory lending practices, they even held protests at companies like Wells Fargo and Lehman Brothers...ACORN
FACT- the Community Reinvestment Act was
NOT to blame for the financial meltdown.
CRA was enacted in 1977 in response to concerns that banks were unwilling to lend in minority communities and in those in danger of "tipping." Note that we're talking about 1977. While one can argue about the precise timing of the start of what ultimately became the sub-prime bubble, as late as 2001, 24 years after CRA was enacted, only about 9.7 percent of mortgage originations (about $200 billion) were sub-prime or Alt-A loans (Alt-A loans have weak or no documentation of income or credit records); by 2006, sub-prime and Alt-A loans were 33.5 percent of loans made and had quintupled to $1 trillion.
CRA states, rather simply, that "regulated financial institutions have [a] continuing and affirmative obligation to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered." It requires the federal bank regulators to "assess the institution's record of meeting the credit needs of its entire community, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with safe and sound operation of such institution," (emphasis added) and to "take such record into account in its evaluation of an application for a deposit facility [including a merger or acquisition] by such institution."
Although CRA and its close cousin, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (passed in 1975 to gather data on bank lending patterns), had some effect during the 1980s, the statutes came into their own during the 1990s. In 1989, the Federal Reserve denied a proposed merger by the Continental Illinois Corporation because of poor CRA performance, the first time any agency had used this enforcement action. Amendments to CRA in 1989 and 1994 made data more public and more useable. With its reduction in direct federal support for housing, the Reagan Revolution of the 1980s rather ironically led to the growth of the community-development movement, which included both organizations that partnered with banks subject to CRA to meet community credit needs and entities that functioned as advocates to ensure that the statute was enforced (sometimes the same community groups played both roles).
The Clinton administration made enforcement of CRA a priority. A major stimulus to this effort was the 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Act, which permitted, through merger and acquisition, the nationwide banks we have today. That brought the CRA's primary enforcement mechanism, consideration of a bank's record of serving its community in evaluating the merger application, into play.
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What happened during the 1990s? The homeownership rate, which had been stagnant since the 1960s, climbed from 64 percent in 1994 to 67.8 percent in 2001, with larger increases for minorities, women, and lower-income families. Between 1993 and 1998, CRA-covered lenders increased their home-mortgage lending in low- and moderate-income areas by 39 percent, compared to a 17 percent increase in other areas. In 2002, the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard found that "CRA has expanded access to mortgage credit; CRA-regulated lenders originate more home purchase loans to lower-income people and communities than they would if CRA did not exist." And CRA did not just expand home-mortgage lending. Testifying in 1999, Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan reported that in 1997 alone, CRA loans included "525,000 small business loans worth $34 billion; 213,000 small farm loans worth $11 billion; and 25,000 community-development loans totaling $19 billion."
What didn't happen? An explosion of sub-prime lending. That came later. So for starters, the timing is entirely wrong for the contention that CRA caused the crisis. Nevertheless, by the end of the 1990s, bank regulators became concerned that poor lending practices were beginning to develop in the home-lending market and that some might ignore CRA's admonition that CRA lending needed to be done "consistent with safe and sound operation." In 1999, banking regulators issued guidance concerning sub-prime lending and made the point that CRA lending needed to be responsible -- well underwritten, well priced, and understandable by the borrower.
Even efforts after 2001 to press Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to buy sub-prime loans, as part of the Bush administration's "Ownership Society," do not implicate CRA. Those who scapegoat CRA often contend that it was a reckless push for homeownership -- by both the Clinton and Bush administrations -- that led to the sub-prime crisis. But while homeownership increased significantly during the Clinton years, sub-prime (and also Alt-A) lending was still under 10 percent of mortgage originations when President Bill Clinton left office. President George W. Bush's further pressure for homeownership, which included substantial pressure on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase loans, in particular low-documentation loans, was dubious policy, but cannot be blamed on CRA. In 2006, the height of the sub-prime boom, almost two-thirds of the high-cost loans made were for purposes other than the purchase of a home by an owner-occupant -- they were mostly refinancings to extract equity. But even this overstates the case against homeownership. As the Center for Responsible Lending has demonstrated, between 1998 and 2006, only about 9 percent of sub-prime loans went to first-time homebuyers.
Note also that CRA applies only to banks and savings institutions ("thrifts"). It does not apply to credit unions, independent mortgage companies, or investment banks. And banks and thrifts get credit under CRA only for lending to low- and moderate-income borrowers or in low- and moderate-income census tracts in their assessment areas, broadly the area near their branches which, for large institutions, generally includes entire metropolitan areas. This is critically important to understanding the role of CRA in the current debacle. When CRA was enacted, there were approximately 18,000 banks and thrifts, which made about 70 percent of all home-mortgage loans, and almost all loans were originated by branches and thus were covered by CRA. By 2006, there were 8,700 banks and thrifts, with a market share of about 43 percent. Even adding the share of their CRA-covered subsidiaries (15 percent), this was a marked decline.