excalibur
Diamond Member
- Mar 19, 2015
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The insanity here is, as Bastiat explained long ago. There is nothing, but hey ave turned the law on its head to go after an individual.
Bragg is bad enough, this 'judge' is worse. What the hell does he think a candidate does but try and influence an election?
www.nationalreview.com
Bragg is bad enough, this 'judge' is worse. What the hell does he think a candidate does but try and influence an election?
...
So, here is how Merchan defines Trump’s “intent to defraud”:
- The People submit that Defendant’s “intent to defraud” was established in the Grand Jury by evidence that Defendant sought to suppress disclosure of information that could have negatively impacted his campaign for President of the United States and that he made “false entries in the relevant business records in order to prevent public disclosure of both the scheme and the underlying information. In substance, the People argue the Defendant’s intent to influence the 2016 presidential election by violating [federal and state election laws and state tax laws] satisfies the “intent to defraud” prong. . . .
- Evidence presented to the Grant Jury demonstrated that Defendant, starting in 2015, intended to pay Daniel and MacDougal a sum of money to prevent the publication of information that could have adversely affected his presidential aspirations. [Emphasis added]
This is remarkable. According to Merchan, the intended defrauded party here is the national electorate. In other words, this is — in the view of the trial judge! — fundamentally a prosecution for political-campaign speech by a candidate for office. Need I remind the reader that it’s not illegal for a political candidate to try to influence the election in which he’s running for office. Nor, under our First Amendment, is it illegal for candidates to conceal things from the voters or even lie to the voters.
This is America. We’re not supposed to use the criminal law to prosecute political candidates for what they say or don’t say during elections. But the judge just said out loud that this is what Alvin Bragg is doing, and he’ll let it happen.
Yet, the only fraud alleged here is concealing an affair from the voters. And the judge still has no theory for how exactly these particular private records — all of them created after the election — were supposed to deceive the American public.
A major part of the confusion here is that the false-records statute is a misdemeanor that can be elevated to a felony if the prosecution proves that the defendant’s “intent to defraud includes an intent to commit another crime or to aid or conceal the commission thereof.” Note the word “includes.” As my prior series noted:
McKinney’s Practice Commentary, the standard treatise on New York laws, notes that “for the first-degree crime there must be two separate intents in that the ‘intent to defraud’ must include ‘an intent to commit another crime or to aid or conceal the commission thereof.’ The first degree, for example, is not committed when there is an ‘intent to . . . conceal the commission’ of a crime but no ‘intend to defraud.’”
The prosecution’s theory that Trump intended to violate the federal and state campaign-finance laws and the state’s tax laws are flimsy for their own reasons, but that’s another day’s discussion. The important point here is that even having an intent to conceal regulatory violations is not a substitute for an intent to defraud — not without some theory of who was entitled or expected to review these records in order to detect those violations.
The most essential element of the crime hasn’t been alleged here, and there’s nothing in the public record to suggest that evidence of that element was presented to the grand jury. Yet, the judge will let the case go to trial without even a legal theory of how that element can be satisfied. That’s a mockery of the rule of law.
So, here is how Merchan defines Trump’s “intent to defraud”:
- The People submit that Defendant’s “intent to defraud” was established in the Grand Jury by evidence that Defendant sought to suppress disclosure of information that could have negatively impacted his campaign for President of the United States and that he made “false entries in the relevant business records in order to prevent public disclosure of both the scheme and the underlying information. In substance, the People argue the Defendant’s intent to influence the 2016 presidential election by violating [federal and state election laws and state tax laws] satisfies the “intent to defraud” prong. . . .
- Evidence presented to the Grant Jury demonstrated that Defendant, starting in 2015, intended to pay Daniel and MacDougal a sum of money to prevent the publication of information that could have adversely affected his presidential aspirations. [Emphasis added]
This is remarkable. According to Merchan, the intended defrauded party here is the national electorate. In other words, this is — in the view of the trial judge! — fundamentally a prosecution for political-campaign speech by a candidate for office. Need I remind the reader that it’s not illegal for a political candidate to try to influence the election in which he’s running for office. Nor, under our First Amendment, is it illegal for candidates to conceal things from the voters or even lie to the voters.
This is America. We’re not supposed to use the criminal law to prosecute political candidates for what they say or don’t say during elections. But the judge just said out loud that this is what Alvin Bragg is doing, and he’ll let it happen.
Yet, the only fraud alleged here is concealing an affair from the voters. And the judge still has no theory for how exactly these particular private records — all of them created after the election — were supposed to deceive the American public.
A major part of the confusion here is that the false-records statute is a misdemeanor that can be elevated to a felony if the prosecution proves that the defendant’s “intent to defraud includes an intent to commit another crime or to aid or conceal the commission thereof.” Note the word “includes.” As my prior series noted:
McKinney’s Practice Commentary, the standard treatise on New York laws, notes that “for the first-degree crime there must be two separate intents in that the ‘intent to defraud’ must include ‘an intent to commit another crime or to aid or conceal the commission thereof.’ The first degree, for example, is not committed when there is an ‘intent to . . . conceal the commission’ of a crime but no ‘intend to defraud.’”
The prosecution’s theory that Trump intended to violate the federal and state campaign-finance laws and the state’s tax laws are flimsy for their own reasons, but that’s another day’s discussion. The important point here is that even having an intent to conceal regulatory violations is not a substitute for an intent to defraud — not without some theory of who was entitled or expected to review these records in order to detect those violations.
The most essential element of the crime hasn’t been alleged here, and there’s nothing in the public record to suggest that evidence of that element was presented to the grand jury. Yet, the judge will let the case go to trial without even a legal theory of how that element can be satisfied. That’s a mockery of the rule of law.
It’s Not Fraud on the Voters to Lie to Your Own Checkbook | National Review
The New York State trial judge who upheld the charges against Donald Trump ignored the total absence of the most essential element of the crime.
www.nationalreview.com
Has he considered pinky promising the court that he's innocent?
