Eloy, et al,
This is simply NOT true. This was an interpretation made by unskilled and uneducated
(in the ways of politics and diplomacy) laymen.
You have been taken-in by Zionist propaganda so that you do not even believe what your own eyes tell you. The Israelis were told to withdraw from "territories occupied in the recent conflict". This, of course, includes the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and Gaza.
(COMMENT)
If you want to know and understand what the Resolutions actually says, GO TO THE SOURCE:
But while many sources correctly describe the wording and intent of Resolution 242, others have misrepresented it as requiring Israel to return to the pre-1967 lines – the armistice lines established after Israel’s War of Independence.
Such an interpretation was explicitly not the intention of the framers of 242, nor does the
language of the resolution include any such requirement.
Lord Caradon (Hugh M. Foot) was the permanent representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, 1964-1970, and chief drafter of Resolution 242.
• Institute for the Study of Diplomacy,
U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, pg. 13, qtd. in
Egypt’s Struggle for Peace: Continuity and Change, 1967-1977, Yoram Meital, pg. 49:
Much play has been made of the fact that we didn’t say “the” territories or “all the” territories. But that was deliberate. I myself knew very well the 1967 boundaries and if
we had put in the “the” or “all the” that could only have meant that we wished to see the 1967 boundaries perpetuated in the form of a permanent frontier. This I was certainly not prepared to recommend.
•
Journal of Palestine Studies, “An Interview with Lord Caradon,” Spring - Summer 1976, pgs 144-45:
Q. The basis for any settlement will be United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, of which you were the architect. Would you say there is a contradiction between the part of the resolution that stresses the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and that which calls for Israeli withdrawal from “occupied territories,” but not from “the occupied territories”?
A. I defend the resolution as it stands. What it states, as you know, is first the general principle of inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. That means that you can’t justify holding onto territory merely because you conquered it.
We could have said: well, you go back to the 1967 line. But I know the 1967 line, and it’s a rotten line. You couldn’t have a worse line for a permanent international boundary. It’s where the troops happened to be on a certain night in 1948. It’s got no relation to the needs of the situation.
Had we said that you must go back to the 1967 line, which would have resulted if we had specified a retreat from all the occupied territories, we would have been wrong. In New York, what did we know about Tayyibe and Qalqilya? If we had attempted in New York to draw a new line, we would have been rather vague. So what we stated was the principle that you couldn’t hold territory because you conquered it, therefore there must be a withdrawal to – let’s read the words carefully – “secure and recognized boundaries.” They can only be secure if they are recognized. The boundaries have to be agreed; it’s only when you get agreement that you get security. I think that now people begin to realize what we had in mind – that security doesn’t come from arms, it doesn’t come from territory, it doesn’t come from geography, it doesn’t come from one side domination the other, it can only come from agreement and mutual respect and understanding.
Therefore, what we did, I think, was right; what the resolution said was right and I would stand by it. It needs to be added to now, of course. ... We didn’t attempt to deal with [the questions of the Palestinians and of Jerusalem] then, but merely to state the general principles of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. We meant that the occupied territories could not be held merely because they were occupied, but we deliberately did not say that the old line, where the troops happened to be on that particular night many years ago, was an ideal demarcation line.
• MacNeil/Lehrer Report, March 30, 1978:
We didn't say there should be a withdrawal to the '67 line; we did not put the “the” in, we did not say “all the territories” deliberately. We all knew that the boundaries of '67 were not drawn as permanent frontiers, they were a cease-fire line of a couple of decades earlier... . We did not say that the '67 boundaries must be forever.
•
Daily Star (Beirut), June 12, 1974. Qtd. in
Myths and Facts, Leonard J. Davis, pg. 48:
It would have been wrong to demand that Israel return to its positions of 4 June 1967 because those positions were undesirable and artificial. After all, they were just the places the soldiers of each side happened to be the day the fighting stopped in 1948. They were just armistice lines. That's
why we didn't demand that the Israelis return to them and I think we were right not to ...
• Interview on Kol Israel radio, February 1973,
qtd. on Web site of Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
Q. This matter of the (definite) article which is there in French and is missing in English, is that really significant?
A. The purposes are perfectly clear, the principle is stated in the preamble, the necessity for withdrawal is stated in the operative section. And then the essential phrase which is not sufficiently recognized is that withdrawal should take place to secure and recognized boundaries, and these words were very carefully chosen: they have to be secure and they have to be recognized. They will not be secure unless they are recognized. And that is why one has to work for agreement. This is essential. I would defend absolutely what we did.
It was not for us to lay down exactly where the border should be. I know the 1967 border very well. It is not a satisfactory border, it is where troops had to stop in 1947, just where they happened to be that night, that is not a permanent boundary...
While there were more that 2 dozen Palestinian Terrorist Attacks by Jihadist and Fedayeen, in the year previous to the Arab incited 1967 Six Day War, there were the embryonic development of some serious incidents:
- Apr 25, 1966 - Explosions placed by Militants wounded two civilians and damaged three houses in moshav Beit Yosef, in the Beit She'an Valley.
- May 16, 1966 - Two Israelis were killed when their jeep hit a terrorist landmine, north of the Sea of Galilee and south of Almagor. Tracks led into Syria.
- July 14, 1966 - Militants attacked a house in Kfar Yuval, in the North.
- July 19, 1966 - Militants infiltrated into Moshav Margaliot on the northern border and planted nine explosive charges.
- Oct 27, 1966 - A civilian was wounded by an explosive charge on the railroad tracks to Jerusalem.
Back in the day, even then, no one wanted another failed Arab State in the Region; politically, economically, or commercially interactive. And it is still that way today. And in part, while the main reason to support the Jewish National Home/State of Israel, was the preservation and protection of a complete culture, there was --- lurking in the background --- that even then, Jihadist, Deadly Fedayeen, Hostile Insurgent, Radicalized Islamist, and Asymmetric Fighters were going to become a big problem (with or without Israel). Better to preserve Israel then to let the Radical Islamist have they way and eventually destroy it.
Most Respectfully,
R