The Supreme Court stated:
This case raises a different issue than
Bowers: whether, under the Equal Protection Clause, moral disapproval is a legitimate state interest to justify by itself a statute that bans homosexual sodomy, but not heterosexual sodomy. It is not. Moral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause. See,
e.g.,
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, supra, at 534;
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S., at 634-635. Indeed, we have never held that moral disapproval, without any other asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection Clause to justify a law that discriminates among groups of persons.
Source:
Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
Similarly, the Supreme Court stated hostility to racial desegregation is not a rational basis to discriminate on the basis of race and to delay enforcement of the Court's ruling in Brown v. Board of Education.
Source:
Cooper v. Aaron 358 U.S. 1 (1958)
To satisfy constitutional scrutiny, Keyes and Silhouette, you must set forth a sufficient basis to justify state-sponsored discrimination other than your personal hostility or disapproval.